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During the nineteen-tens and -twenties the British Empire was transformed into the 
British Commonwealth of Nations and the League of Nations was created and began 
its work. 
This thesis argues that from the perspective of a loosely defined group of public 
academics and politicians from the British Empire, here identified as imperialist-
internationalists, these two events were dual processes, as they considered both the 
Commonwealth and the League natural steps of progression from the British Empire 
of the early twentieth century. By analysing selected perspectives on empires as 
peacemakers from antiquity to the late nineteenth century and the education of the 
imperialist-internationalists it is argued that they belonged to an established Western 
tradition of seeing empires as a positive form of peaceful international organisation. 
However, like many contemporaries, they were critical of the traditional model of 
empire where all power was centred in the imperial metropolis as a valid form of 
international governance. 
With a focus on their published contributions to the public debate, supported by 
selected archival material, it is demonstrated how the imperialist-internationalists 
promoted the existence of what they named the British Commonwealth of Nations 
before it was given any kind of legal recognition, attributing specific values of 
democracy and equality to its constituent parts. Likewise, it is demonstrated how they 
identified the outbreak of World War One as an opportunity to reorganise the world to 
promote international cooperation, and how they worked to use British imperial 
experience in the formation of the League and formulation of the Covenant. 
Finally, it is argued that E.H. Carr’s rejection of the interwar thinkers as utopians was 
unjust as they tried to use what they thought was an established model. As a 
consequence, applying Carr’s lens has limited the existing scholarship of several 
members of the imperialist-internationalists.   
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1: Introduction 
The slaughter that took place during World War I prompted an intense interest in the 
years between 1915 and 1919 about how best to prevent major new wars from 
happening again. The focus of this interest became the creation of the League of 
Nations which, it was hoped, would provide a permanent forum for international 
debate and dispute settlement rather than taking the form of just another anti-war pact. 
Although the people involved with creating the British proposal for the League laid 
down the initial groundwork before the end of the War, their ideas subsequently 
became the focus of criticism. E.H. Carr concluded in his famous 1939 book The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis that the League’s failure to prevent conflict demonstrated the 
ineffectiveness of the ideas put forward by those who helped to influence its creation. 
Yet today, a hundred years after World War I, there is still nearly universal 
membership of the League’s successor, the United Nations, and despite all the 
challenges and charges of irrelevance laid against it, very few people can imagine 
abolishing it without setting up a new international organisation in its place. The 
discussions that takes place today seldom focus on abolishing the United Nations 
outright, but rather consider how best to reform it, something that might be seen as 
evidence of the clear success of the ideas that helped to shape the formation and 
development of the League given that it had no obvious predecessor. 
And yet, as this thesis will argue, there was one group of thinkers from the British 
Empire who thought about these issues in a rather different way (the group referred to 
later on as the ‘imperialist-internationalists’). Rather than seeing the League of 
Nations as an entirely new creation, founded on grand ideas of development and 
democracy, they saw it as modelled on something that already existed, a model that 
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they believed fostered international cooperation between countries at various stages of 
development spread out across the world: the British Empire. Taking the view that the 
Empire had developed organically from empire into a new kind of international 
organisation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this group of 
thinkers saw the British Empire as both a model for the League, and as a separate 
international organisation that needed to continue its own organisational development 
side by side with the League. 
This thesis investigates the ideas developed by these thinkers about the Empire’s role 
as an international organisation and possible model for the League of Nations, along 
with their ideas about how the Empire could and should itself develop into a 
Commonwealth, seeking to show how both represented a kind of Hegelian endpoint 
for the organic development of the British Empire. It covers the period from 1915, 
when both the League idea and ideas of Commonwealth first started to be widely 
discussed, through to the aftermath of the Imperial Conference of 1926, when 
Dominion status was formulated and the League had become well-established.  
1.1 British concepts of ‘empire’ in the early 20th century: 
The concept of ‘empire’ has had a variety of connotations in the Western world since 
Antiquity, undergoing a particular revolution during the 20th century.  At the start of 
the century, empires were the main international actors, but their subsequent decline, 
combined with the growth of a critical idiom condemning the way in which empires 
had fostered brutal exploitation of the marginalised, meant that within a few decades 
‘imperialism’ had become a kind of shorthand to describe what was worst in the near 
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past.  The term ‘Empire’ became a term of abuse, as in US President Ronald Reagan’s 
denunciation of the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’.1 
The early twentieth century, however, was still the heyday of modern imperialism. 
Lionel Curtis, in his 1916 The Problem of the Commonwealth, could list all the forty 
three independent states of the world, of which more than ten were clearly defined as 
empires, and the main European empires alone ruled between them more than half the 
population of the world.2 With empires an entirely ubiquitous fact of life, they were 
for many people simply something that existed rather than a focus for reflection 
(although in reality much metropolitan culture was profoundly shaped by ideas of 
empire). Among the politicians and academics who did think about empires, some on 
the left believed them to be immoral or inefficient, while many others considered 
them beneficial, but expressed different ideas about what the British Empire was and 
should be. A brief discussion of these attitudes in terms of such ideal types can 
perhaps be helpful. 
--Hardliners-- 
Conservative hardliners, of whom Winston Churchill may be considered the best-
known example, maintained that the British Empire was built on a relationship 
between a colonial centre and colonies whose main purpose was to provide the centre 
with resources, whether raw materials from Africa or soldiers from the Dominions. 
Wm. Roger Louis, in his excellent book on Leo Amery and Winston Churchill, In the 
                                                             
1 R. Reagan, ‘Address to the National Association of Evangelicals (“Evil Empire Speech”)’ (8 March 
1983), at http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/ (29 November 2013). The 
term ‘evil empire’ had at the time been popularised by the original Star Wars trilogy, the second of 
which was called The Empire Strikes Back.  
2 L. Curtis, The Problem of the Commonwealth (Macmillan, 1916), plate inserted at p. 69. With a world 
population listed as 1.721.386.045, the larger European empires (Russian Empire included) ruled about 
nine hundred thousand all together. The British and the Chinese Empires each ruled about 25% of the 
world’s population, with the British Empire slightly ahead of the Chinese according to Curtis’ figures.  
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Name of God, Go!3,gives a powerful sense of the sheer futility of Amery’s attempts to 
make Churchill understand how it could be argued that Britain owed India money 
after the World War 2 for the services rendered.4  Churchill for his part consistently 
argued during World War 1 that Australian soldiers should be used in European 
theatres of war on the grounds that if Australia was lost it could be won back later, but 
if Britain was lost then the war was lost. In short, for Churchill and those who thought 
like him, Great Britain was the Empire, while the colonies and dominions were supply 
grounds that could be used in the manner most useful to the core. Although that logic 
may have helped win the War in 1914-18, it was not particularly popular in the 
periphery, and represented a centralised view of empire that was in reality already 
outmoded.5 And, clearly, such an approach had little to offer in terms of theory or 
ideology for developing a new concept of empire, as it was essentially trying to freeze 
intra-imperial relations in place.  
--Anti-imperialists-- 
At the opposite end of the spectrum were those who saw the very concept of ‘empire’ 
as essentially corrupt, offering no opportunity for redemptive change and 
development. This view held empires to be utterly without any moral or even 
financial justification in the modern world. The subjection of foreign peoples based 
on a presumed superiority was deemed morally unacceptable, as one colony after 
another demonstrated the capacity of its elite to go to western universities and return 
home to lead calls for self-determination, independence, and even equality with the 
                                                             
3 W.R. Louis, In the Name of God, Go! : Leo Amery and the British Empire in the age of Churchill 
(Norton, 1992). 
4 W.R. Louis, In the Name of God, Go! (1992), pp. 164-166. 
5 Discussions of Churchill’s fraught relations with Australia can be found in many places, including 
recently G. Freudenberg, Churchill and Australia (Macmillan 2008). 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         5 
 
‘white races’.  Such critical views of empire were in the nineteenth century mainly 
found among laissez-faire liberals, who combined a commitment to free trade with 
radical politics, but was by the early twentieth century most associated with those who 
identified themselves as socialist. As Japan had shown its ability to modernise, 
becoming sufficiently strong to win the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, it was simply 
untenable to claim that only white people were capable of developing an industrial 
society. When coupled with a radical critique of capitalism and imperialism, it 
became a popular socialist view to reject imperialism in any form and under any 
justification. This rejection of imperialism was echoed by the traditional American 
rejection of empires (although the foundation of this rejection was very different).  
Woodrow Wilson might reject socialism and coloured equality in his own country, 
but he still considered it a natural American perspective to reject imperialism, and 
defend the right to national self-determination (as set down in his famous Fourteen 
Points of January 1918). 
The rejection of the very idea of ‘empire’ was in part enhanced by the end of World 
War I, as the breakup of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires released a 
swathe of new countries, leading the British politician Leo Amery to use a phrase that 
has since become commonplace: Balkanisation.6 The British and French saw the 
outcome of World War I as a chance to develop their own imperial interests, given the 
collapse of their rivals, but in retrospect it is clear that once the de-legitimisation of 
the empires had first begun there was no way back. The gradual disintegration of the 
French and British Empires in the middle decades of the twentieth century stands 
testament to that interpretation. 
                                                             
6 L. Amery, ‘The British Empire and the Pan-European Idea’, Journal of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan, 1930). 
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--Normalisation, Imperial Federation, and International Organisations-- 
In the middle ground between the extremes of the hardliners and the anti-imperialists, 
there was fertile ground for ideas to develop about how empires might evolve into 
some new form or organisation suitable for the 20th century. A common feature in 
many of these ideas was recognition that the factors shaping the development of 
British Empire had been gradually changing since the American Revolution, and that 
ignoring those changes—as did hardliners like Churchill—would achieve nothing but 
a series of revolutions that would tear the Empire apart. Acknowledging this 
development was generally understood to imply accepting that relations between 
Britain and the Dominions had changed and had to be reformulated to take into 
account the fact that the Dominions were now fully self-governing states. There was 
also a growing (though by no means universal) acceptance of the principle that the 
colonies and coloured peoples of the Empire should be considered on the path to 
political maturity and self-government.   
Three main lines of thought in this area can be distinguished within this broad area: 
federalism, internationalism, and a third strain that is hard to name but might simply 
be called the modern imperialism.  The modern imperialists included people like Leo 
Amery, Conservative Secretary of the Colonial and Dominions Offices from 1924-29. 
They acknowledged that the dynamics of empire had changed, and that it was 
necessary to acknowledge such change, but although they welcomed (at least in 
theory) the Dominions as new partners in the Empire, rather than colonies, the new 
imperialists saw no reason to change their fundamental understanding of the Empire. 
They instead believed that adjusting bureaucracy and law to match the present 
incarnation of the Empire, while encouraging close ties and trade between the 
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constituent parts, would be sufficient to maintain the coherence and strength of the 
British Empire.  
Many of these ‘modernists’ preferred as few formal changes as possible, as they 
considered the fluidity of the “unwritten British Constitution” its greatest asset and a 
main reason why the Empire had survived so long, in spite of having so many 
different and almost incompatible parts.7 According to this line of thought, the main 
practical innovations should be to strengthen the lines of communications through 
Imperial Conferences and other forms of personal contacts in order to strengthen 
intra-imperial bonds. An indication of the conservatism inherent in this line of thought 
is, perhaps, that Amery, who oversaw the Imperial Conference of 1926 and its 
definition of Dominion status, continued to favour the use of the term ‘Empire’ over 
‘Commonwealth’ well into the 1930s.8 
One challenge to this approach to the developing empire was the call for Imperial 
Federation that started in the late nineteenth century. Duncan Bell’s The Idea of 
Greater Britain (2007) explores the development of the federation movement and the 
ways the concept of a “greater Britain” was used by federalists and others.  Bell’s 
work is helpful in putting the developments of the early twentieth century in 
perspective.9  Imperial federation found its last strong proponents in the Round Table 
movement, founded by Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr and the rest of the so-called 
‘Milner’s Kindergarten’. Several good examinations of the Round Table movement 
                                                             
7 M.A. Ebbesen, ‘United Empire: Intellectual Reflections on the Commonwealth Idea in the 20th 
Century’ (unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Lancaster University, 2001).  
8 See for example Amery, ’The British Empire and the Pan-European Idea’, pp. 1-22, or his memoirs, 
L. Amery, My Political Life (London, 1953).  
9  D. Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain. Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
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already exist,10 but in brief it was founded by a group of friends from Oxford, who 
served together in Milner’s administration in South Africa as it prepared for setting up 
the Union of South Africa. Spurred by their experience, they decided to create a study 
group to encourage the broader study of ’the problem of the Commonwealth’, which 
culminated in Curtis’s 1916 book of the same name. The book was originally to be 
published on behalf of the entire Round Table group, but as full agreement on its 
conclusions could not be reached, it was agreed to let Curtis publish his ideas in his 
own name. 
While the Round Table movement stated its focus as ‘the problem of the 
Commonwealth’ in a broad sense, the founders started from the assumption that 
federation was the answer. The ‘problem’ posed by the Empire, as far as the Round 
Table group was concerned, was that the Dominions had become nations in their own 
right, with interests of their own, and to a certain degree individual cultural traits and 
concerns: South Africa had to consider the Afrikaners just as Canada had the 
Francophonie. As a result, a simple imperial model could no longer be considered 
sufficient and a new model was needed. Looking to the lost colony of the United 
States of America, the obvious solution appeared to be some form of Imperial 
Federation, which would allow Britain and the Dominions to be independent and yet 
united at the same time. However, as the group delved into the details of federation, it 
quickly became clear they could not agree on how to settle the practical details, such 
as electing an imperial parliament or dealing with the coloured vote when colonies 
reached Dominion status. Given these issues, the idea of imperial federation was 
dropped by many of its original proponents before the outbreak of World War 1, 
                                                             
10 J. Kendle, The Round Table Movement (University of Toronto Press, 1975), L. Foster, High Hopes. 
The Men and Members of the Australian Round Table (University of Melbourne Press, 1986). 
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although the idea of federation nevertheless survived to be discussed fitfully.  During 
the Interwar Period, Philip Kerr raised the issue of federation again, suggesting the 
federation of all countries into a world state rather than simply imperial federation.11  
The third line of thought among the ‘middle ground’ thinkers—and the one that is 
central to this thesis—is that of imperialist-internationalism.12 This line developed 
partly alongside the idea of imperial federation, partly as its successor, as its 
proponents took a different approach to reconciling the emerging independence of the 
Dominions with the collaboration of the whole Empire. Rather than call for a federal 
structure, the imperialist-internationalists proposed a completely new ‘take’ on the 
Empire, by suggesting that it was no longer an Empire at all, but rather an 
international organisation that had arisen out of the Empire of the nineteenth century.  
In this perspective, the change from Empire to international organisation was, at least 
as regards Britain and the Dominions, a fait accompli rather than a goal. According to 
the perspective of the imperialist-internationalists, any external analysis of the intra-
imperial relations at Dominion-Britain level would find that they resembled the 
relations between cooperating independent countries, rather than those between 
mother country and colonies. It was in other words the kind of relationship that 
pertained to an international organisation rather than an empire (whatever the actual 
name). On those grounds, they concluded that the very name ‘Empire’ was misleading 
and needed to change leading, among other suggestions, to a call for the Empire being 
to be renamed the British Commonwealth of Nations. By declaring that the British 
                                                             
11 A. Bosco, ‘Lord Lothian and the Federalist Critique of National Sovereignty’ in P. Wilson, Thinkers 
of the Twenty Years’ Crisis (Clarendon, 1995), pp. 247-276. 
12 The formulation imperialist-internationalism is the authors own term. However, the connection 
between imperialism and internationalism in early IR theory is discussed in D. Long and B.C. Schmidt 
(ed.s), Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (State University 
of New York Press, 2005).   
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Empire was already a new kind of international organisation, the imperialist-
internationalists were able to focus on how to make the Commonwealth more 
successful, rather than on spending time trying to convince people to create it. It also 
allowed them to think creatively about what the Commonwealth could be a model for 
rather than focus on what it was modelled on. 
It is as noted above this group of imperialist-internationalists who are the focal centre 
of this thesis. Their existence as a group and the group’s principal members are 
described in the following section. It is worth noting that in spite of the originally 
close connections between the idea of imperial federation and world federation on the 
one hand, and the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations on the other, 
they nevertheless represent significantly different approaches to the challenge of 
peaceful cooperation. Ultimately, the federal idea is based on the constituent parts not 
being fully independent, but rather all committed to one Imperial or Universal 
Government, while the idea of international organisations is based on fully 
independent states cooperating under an aegis of an institution that can only in an 
attenuated sense be said to wield Imperial or Universal governance.  
1.2 Framing the group ‘the imperialist-internationalists’: 
The original interest in this research was shaped by Duncan Hall’s 1920 book The 
British Commonwealth of Nations,13 with its idealistic, though by no means utopian, 
ideas for the development of the Empire into Commonwealth. Its approach prompted 
the author to look for other thinkers who shared his modern liberal attitude towards 
the peoples of the various constituent parts of the Empire and similarly believed that 
the best future for them lay inside a reformed Empire. It was clear in Hall’s British 
                                                             
13 D. Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations (Methuen, 1920). 
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Commonwealth that he thought that the contemporary development of the new 
League of Nations was closely connected to the Empire and the Commonwealth 
movement. Its final chapter was indeed on ‘The British Group and the League of 
Nations’ with one section entitled “The British Commonwealth as the Model of the 
League”.14 Hall himself went on to work for the League of Nations during the 1920s. 
Clearly, in the mind of this young Australian-born academic, the 
Empire/Commonwealth and the League of Nations were intrinsically connected. 
Duncan Hall’s principal source for his 1920 volume was Jan Smuts, and close 
investigation shows that Hall gave a fair account of his views.15 Smuts, as will be 
discussed in detail later, was a main proponent of the League and the Commonwealth, 
and his ideas are so articulate and clearly formulated that it leaves some doubt as to 
whether Hall’s own 1920 book can be considered truly independent. In order to 
identify other like-minded individuals, as part of this research an effort was made to 
identify the names of delegates from the various Empire or Dominion delegations 
who worked for one of the various secretariats in the League of Nations. Having 
established the identity of a group of people who were sufficiently interested in the 
League to work for it, it was then necessary to establish whether they were equally 
interested in the development of the Empire/Commonwealth, as shown by 
membership in the Round Table group or some similar group. It became clear that a 
number of them were. 
Alfred Zimmern, a classicist turned early international relations theorist, worked for 
the Foreign Office and helped prepare the British proposal for the League of Nations. 
                                                             
14 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp. 329-371. 
15 M.A. Ebbesen, ‘Rule Australia: Australian Imperialists on the Development of Dominion Autonomy 
1910-1927’ (Cand.Mag. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 2002), p. 73.  
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Gilbert Murray, a fellow classicist, did work for the League of Nations Union and had 
stints as a delegate for South Africa in the League of Nations in the mid-1920s. Both 
men approached the study of international relations influenced by their understanding 
of the classical past. Thus, a core of a vaguely defined group was established: Smuts, 
the South African general and statesman, who had a wide audience both popularly and 
politically, making his ideas for the development of Commonwealth and League of 
Nations a leading influence in the official formulation of both. Zimmern, the classicist 
turned internationalist, whose work academically and politically focussed both on the 
Empire/Commonwealth and on the League. Murray, Australian born, but for most 
practical purposes English, was the dominant classicist Oxford don of his time, friend 
and correspondent of Smuts, colleague of Zimmern, and a leading public academic 
voicing his general opinions and support for the League in all types of political and 
popular media available. Hall, meanwhile, represented an example of how these ideas 
were synthesised by a young man and published in a very readable format that Smuts 
himself would come to refer to. 
Beyond this core group more people of interest can be identified.  Robert Cecil was in 
charge of the British Empire Delegation for negotiating the League of Nations and 
was responsible for bringing Zimmern’s work (the so-called Cecil Draft) to Paris. 
With the exception of his lack of any notable classics education, Cecil fitted 
seamlessly into the general if vaguely-defined group of imperialist-internationalists. 
So too did some other figures including Edward Grey, Murray’s co-founder of the 
League of Nations Union, as well as H.A.L. Fisher, Murray’s fellow student from 
Oxford and collaborator at the Board of Education.  Conversely, while Leo Amery 
appeared to share many, if not all the traits of the core group of imperial-
internationalists, including a detached relationship with the Round Table movement, 
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his correspondence with Smuts makes it clear that he did not believe in the League of 
Nations. Nevertheless, given his strong interest and involvement in the debates about 
the development of the Empire into Commonwealth during in the 1920s, he remains 
an interesting counterpoint, helping to define the character of the group. 
What is clear, then, is that the internationalist-imperialists did not represent a 
completely homogenous group with a definite set of shared traits. Rather, it was a 
group that can be framed, so to speak, through a cluster of traits—of which some 
members had all, while others only displayed some, though sufficient to ‘fit in’. 
Without exception, all members of the group personally knew at least some of the 
other members, and in most cases they were directly or indirectly linked through 
education, personal relations or political, academic, or voluntary work to a majority of 
the rest of the group. A common tendency to relate both the British Empire and the 
idea of the League of Nations to a long European tradition of both historical events 
and political philosophy, makes an investigation into their education background 
particularly relevant to understanding their approach to international and intra-
imperial relations.  
Collectively then, the following cluster of traits dominates: 
 Most of the imperialist-internationalists considered here were born in the 
1860s-1870s, a scope that can even be narrowed further down to a 
concentration from 1865-75 for a very significant part of the group. A few 
were a whole generation younger than the majority, but none were born later 
than the early 1890s. 
 Most members of the group had at least part of their education at Oxford, 
where the Hegelian philosophy of T.H. Green dominated, challenging young 
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men to take up public service to better society.  Many spent part of their 
working life connected to Oxford as well. A majority studied classics, but law 
was also common, and those who studied in the Dominions tended to favour 
law and modern history. The choice of classics is in itself not very significant, 
as classics was a core part of common curriculum, but the way they interpreted 
the classical history and philosophy in their own work is significant, so their 
educational landscape is analysed in chapter three. 
 Most of the group of imperialist-internationalists had an active involvement in 
the League of Nations, either shaping the British policies for the Peace 
conference, representing the Empire or Dominions as delegates, or working in 
the League of Nations secretariats during the 1920s. In addition to this, most 
also wrote pamphlets, articles and newspaper contributions supporting the 
League. 
 Most of the group were politically liberal, though some of the outliers were 
conservative or socialist. 
 Most of the imperialist-internationalists considered here were politically active 
beyond their League of Nations engagement at both national and imperial 
level, but only Smuts reached the top ranks in politics. 
 Many of the members of the group had shown interest in the Round Table 
Movement (which was itself inspired by Green) and its investigations into 
imperial federation and other ways forward for the Empire. 
 Many had a career that spanned over at least two parts of the Empire, or one 
part of the Empire and the USA, ‘the lost colony’. 
This group of individuals would not have self-identified as a coherent group, but 
through their collaboration and correspondence they undoubtedly influenced one 
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another, sharing certain ideas about how the British Empire could serve as a model for 
the League of Nations. And, given that members of the group all occupied positions 
of influence, their importance was significantly greater than their numbers might 
suggest in helping to shape British policy towards the League of Nations. 
1.3 Main members 
With a ‘group’ identified by a cluster of traits rather than clearly defined borders of 
membership, there must inevitably be some argument about whether particular 
individuals were members or not. Equally, although all were active in the public 
sphere, not all were equally influential, with the result that a few central members 
dominated the conversation at the time (and indeed form the focus of this work).  This 
section of the chapter develops somewhat fuller biographies of the key figures 
introduced above.  The leading triumvirate of members was without doubt composed 
of Smuts, Murray and Zimmern, who each played a central role in defining and 
influencing the conversation about the developments of the Empire into the 
Commonwealth and its potential significance for the creation of the League of 
Nations.   
Jan Christiaan Smuts appears a very complex figure when viewed from a modern 
perspective: an Afrikaner general turned British war hero and leading proponent of 
the Empire/Commonwealth; a visionary who shaped both the League of Nations and 
the United Nations but also helped to create the South African Apartheid system; and 
a man who was dedicated both to science and to holistic religion. Yet despite Smuts’ 
importance, a review of the scholarly research of the past 20 years—that is since the 
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end of the Apartheid era—reveals surprisingly little new material.16 Smuts has been, if 
not forgotten, then pushed aside in what may reflect both scholarly unease at focusing 
on such a complex and controversial figure as well as the more mundane fact that his 
archives are not easy to access.  
Born in 1870, Smuts studied Literature and Science in the Cape Colony followed by 
Law at Cambridge, passing examinations with honours in 1895. He went on to a 
career in law and politics, getting his first significant position in the South African 
Republic in 1898 as State Secretary of Law and Order. From that point onwards, 
Smuts was a key figure in South African politics until 1949, holding positions of 
progressing importance, until he became Prime Minister on his return to South Africa 
after the Paris Peace conference (his political career was only broken by his exclusion 
from government from 1924-1933). In three major wars—the second South African 
War, World War I, and World War II—he combined his political roles with active 
military service, first as an Afrikaner general, and ultimately as a British Field 
Marshall.  He was a leading figure in the peace negotiations as an Afrikaner after the 
second South African War, and later as a member of the British Empire delegation 
and representative of South Africa at the Paris Peace Conference. During World War 
I, he also served as a member of the British War Cabinet. While in London in 1917 he 
began promoting the Commonwealth as the future of the British Empire, and—in the 
same speeches—laid the ground for his later proposals for the League of Nations. 
By the end of the War, Smuts was increasingly clear about his ideas for the future of 
both the League of Nations and the Empire (and was hugely influential on British 
debates about the League). As Prime Minister of South Africa, Smuts continued 
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actively shaping both the League, as well as the future form of the Commonwealth, 
through his participation in the Imperial Conferences. His ouster from government in 
1924 was regretted in London precisely because of his dedication to the 
Commonwealth idea, and his consequent absence was considered a loss at the 
Imperial Conference of 1926, where Dominion Status was finally determined. Smuts 
career revived after 1933, when for six years he served as deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Justice, before finally resuming the position of Prime Minister from 1939-
48. He lived only two more years after leaving office, honoured as Chancellor of 
Cambridge University.17 
Access to the Smuts Papers is difficult for the simple reason that they are located in 
Pretoria and to date have not been digitised. A common approach among scholars is 
to use the great compilation Selections from the Smuts Papers by Keith Hancock18, 
which along with his two-volume Smuts biography19 remain the authoritative sources 
for any scholar working on Smuts. However, while access to Smuts’ own papers is 
complicated geographically, much of his correspondence can be found in the archives 
of his correspondents, many of whom have their papers in Great Britain. Among 
others, lengthy correspondence can be found in the Gilbert Murray and Leo Amery 
papers. Also, of course, many of Smut’s speeches were printed in newspapers such as 
The Times and can be accessed in their published version.  
Gilbert Murray was a complex man of a completely different type than Smuts, with 
whom he established a close friendship and frequent correspondence.  Born in 
Sydney, in 1866, Murray moved to England with his mother while still a child and 
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18 W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (ed.s), Selections from the Smuts papers, 7 vols. (1966-73). 
19 W. K. Hancock, Smuts, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1962-8). 
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stayed in Britain to the end of his days, so in a practical sense was very much an 
Englishman, albeit one with connections to Australia. He studied classics at St. John’s 
College Oxford, finishing his degrees in 1887, and went on to spend ten years as 
Professor of Greek at Glasgow University. After a nine-year hiatus he became 
Professor of Greek at Oxford University in 1908, ensuring his reputation as the 
greatest classicist of his day. His social position had been secured when he married 
Lady Mary Howard and became associated with the English aristocracy, which 
connected him to much of the English establishment, including Bertrand Russell, a 
cousin of his wife, who became a regular correspondent of Murray.  George Bernard 
Shaw used Murray as the inspiration for one of the main characters in his play Major 
Barbara. In spite of his connections, Murray was unsuccessful when he stood for 
parliament at various times in the 1920s as a Liberal, but he remained a persistent 
political activist, who wrote regularly to any ministry that he thought might benefit 
from his comments.  
Murray was also an active public commentator, engaging in the debate about World 
War I and its justification right from its outbreak, surprising many of his pacifist 
friends by being a staunch supporter of the British war effort. In 1917 he joined 
H.A.L. Fisher at the Board of Education, and after the war became co-founder and 
vice-president of the League of Nations Union, where he collaborated for years with 
Robert Cecil. In January and early February 1919, Murray was part of Lord Cecil’s 
Advisory Committee, which was intended to support Cecil’s work negotiating the 
League of Nations Covenant in Paris.20 In spite of not having had much chance to 
affect the proceedings, Murray’s part in the Committee shows Cecil’s trust in his 
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opinions. Smuts became acquainted with the Murrays during his stay in England, and 
their correspondence shows strong evidence of mutual respect. At the request of 
Smuts, Murray represented South Africa as its delegate at the League of Nations from 
1922-23 when Robert Cecil was no longer able to so, and he also served on the 
League of Nations Committee of Intellectual Co-operation from 1922 (and as 
chairman from 1928-1939). Like Smuts, Murray kept his faith in the international 
project after the fall of the League of Nations and played an important role in the 
United Nations Association after World War II. In spite of a clear latent racism, he 
rejected the mistreatment of the coloured people in the colonies and, unlike Smuts, 
recognised and supported the opinions of Ghandi. Because of his increasing public 
and political engagement, Murray resigned his professorship in 1936, dedicating his 
time to the internationalist project until his death in 1957.21  
Murray’s Papers are kept at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, and his published 
opinions can be traced through numerous articles, pamphlets and opinion pieces in 
papers such as The Times. In recent years, as discussed in the literature review, 
scholars like Peter Wilson have begun to reassess Murray’s ideas, as part of a broader 
challenge to E.H. Carr’s dismissive treatment of the internationalist idealists of the 
Interwar Period22 (a group of which Murray has typically been considered part and is 
still treated as such in books like Jeanne Morefield’s Swords without Covenants).23  
                                                             
21 ’Gilbert Murray’, DNB. 
22 C. Stray (ed), Gilbert Murray Reassessed (OUP, 2007), P. Wilson, 'Gilbert Murray and International 
Relations: Hellenism, liberalism, and international intellectual cooperation as a path to peace', Review 
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Murray’s fellow classicist, Alfred Zimmern, was the younger man of the two, born in 
1879 in Surrey. He studied classics and letters at New College Oxford, finishing his 
degree in 1901. From 1902-09 he was a lecturer in ancient history at New College, 
after which he took two years off for independent travel in Greece and for writing up 
his main classical work, The Greek Commonwealth. It was during his years as lecturer 
that his interest in international affairs first began, prompted by the Japanese victory 
in the Russo-Japanese War, and after the publication of the Greek Commonwealth, 
Zimmern went into the Board of Education (1912-15), rather than return to teaching 
classics. In the latter part of World War I, Zimmern joined the Civil Service (1917-
19), first in the Ministry of Reconstruction and political intelligence, then in the 
Foreign Office, where he wrote the first version of the Cecil Draft, the British 
proposal at the Peace Conference for the creation of the League of Nations,24 and as 
previously mentioned, he joined Murray on Cecil’s Advisory Committee in London in 
January 1919. By that stage it was quite clear that he had left his classics career 
behind him—though he continued to publish revised editions of The Greek 
Commonwealth—and he accepted the position as the world’s first professor of 
international relation at the University of Aberystwyth where he stayed for two years. 
During the 1920s, he tried to advance international cooperation through lecturing at 
Cornell University (1922-23), running a summer school of international relations in 
Geneva from 1924, and participating in the League of Nations' Institute of Intellectual 
Co-operation (1926-30). From 1930-44, Zimmern became professor of international 
relations at Oxford, and after World War II he continued his internationalist work as 
director and advisor to the UNESCO from its founding in 1945 until his death in 
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1957. From 1947 he was also academically affiliated to the University of Connecticut, 
and he lived his last years in the United States.  
Throughout his career as an internationalist, Zimmern published prolifically including 
titles such as The Third British Empire (1926)25 and The League of Nations and the 
Rule of Law (1936),26 both of particular interest here since they tie together his 
interest in the Empire and the League of Nations while drawing occasional parallels to 
the ancient world. He was among the co-founders of Chatham House (Royal Institute 
of International Affairs) which published a significant number of his articles. At 
Chatham House, he cooperated with Arnold Toynbee, Gilbert Murray’s son-in-law, 
and another classicist turned internationalist.27 Like Murray, Zimmern was among the 
internationalists whom E.H. Carr charged with utopianism in The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis.  Little recent research can be found on him, except in Morefield’s Covenants 
without Swords and Mazower’s No Enchanted Palace along with a few other articles 
(these works, none of which take a very fresh approach to Zimmern, are discussed 
below).28 Zimmern’s papers are held at the Bodleian. 
Outside of this core triumvirate, there existed a host of other associates, each of whom 
have something to add to the group and the research. The most significant of these 
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was Lord Robert Cecil who represented the most political wing of the group. Born in 
1864, Cecil was the younger cousin of Arthur Balfour (born 1848), and a close 
contemporary of Viscount Grey (born 1862), whom he met at Oxford where they both 
studied law and finished with modest degrees in the early 1880s.  After university, 
Cecil spent most of his early years developing his career as a lawyer before being 
elected MP for the Conservative Party in 1906. In 1915 Cecil entered the government 
as Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, serving first under Grey for a year, then 
under Balfour after Grey’s resignation. Cecil dedicated himself to the establishment of 
the League of Nations from 1916 onwards and in 1919 Cecil led the British 
Delegation at the Peace Conference on League related issues, bringing with him the 
Cecil Draft that Zimmern had helped to prepare.  
From the 1920s onwards, Cecil showed increasingly Liberal sympathies though he 
remained a Conservative. Against the UK Government wishes, but on the invitation of 
Smuts, Cecil represented South Africa at the League of Nations Assembly from 1920-
22,29 and through the twenties cooperated closely with Gilbert Murray in the League 
of Nations Union, as well as with Grey and Balfour in more honorary positions as 
Presidents.30 Grey focussed on promoting international cooperation down until his 
death in 1933, while Balfour became the leading statesmen of intra-imperial 
cooperation at the Imperial Conferences of the 1920s until his death in 1930. Cecil 
continued to work for the League of Nations Union and the International Peace 
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Campaign until World War II, in spite of the League’s failing popularity, and was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in 1936. In 1946 he participated in the 
final session of the League, ending his speech with “the League is dead; long live the 
United Nations”. He became honorary president of the United Nations Association 
and continued working for international peace until his death in 1958.31 Cecil’s papers 
are held in the Western Manuscripts Collection at the British Library. 
Another politician on the fringes of the group that forms the focus of this research was 
Leo Amery. Born in India in 1873, Amery studied classics and letters at Balliol 
College Oxford, finishing his degree in 1896, after which he specialised in the study 
of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. He also worked for a time in South 
Africa (1899-1902) for The Times, later writing a history of the South African Wars, 
before becoming a Conservative MP in 1911. He remained in parliament until 1945. 
During his years in South Africa he was introduced to Lord Milner and his famous 
“Kindergarten”, thereby associating himself with the Round Table Movement, 
although he found many of its ideas on imperial federation unrealistic and never 
formally joined. During World War I, Amery’s expertise in the Balkans was used by 
the embryonic intelligence services, and he became assistant secretary from 1916-
1918 to Maurice Hankey (Secretary to the War Cabinet). In 1919 Amery was 
appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary to Milner in the Colonial Office, then in 
1921 appointed Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, before 
serving as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1922-23. He then served as Colonial 
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Secretary 1924-29, and Dominions Secretary 1925-29. He returned to government in 
1940 as Secretary of the India Office until 1945.32  
Throughout his career Amery was dedicated to the development of the British 
Empire, and was deeply engaged in developing intra-imperial relations, and therefore 
has some of the traits that align him with the group that forms the base of the present 
research. However, Amery did not believe in the idea of the League of Nations and, in 
that essential respect his ideas clearly differed from those of men like Smuts and 
Zimmern. He is nevertheless discussed in this work, specifically in chapter 5, as his 
ideas show how even such a sceptic as Amery believed that the British Empire could 
help to provide a model for the League. Amery’s papers are located in the Churchill 
Archives Centre, Cambridge, and among his more important publications are his 
memoirs, published as My Political Life, as well as his many articles for The Times.    
The final figure to be introduced here is Duncan Hall, whose British Commonwealth 
of Nations, as mentioned earlier, prompted the author’s original interest in this whole 
topic. Born in 1891 in New South Wales, he represents the youngest generation in the 
group.  He completed his degree in modern history at the University of Sydney in 
1915, after which he enrolled at Oxford University. He apparently never joined the 
war effort either in Australia or in England, possibly because he was exempt from 
conscription as an Australian or as an enrolled student. He was an active socialist 
during the War with connections to the Fabian Society, which he combined with his 
studies at Oxford. On the suggestion of the Fabian Society, Hall in May 1917 
undertook a research project about the history, present, and future of the British 
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Empire,33 which he presented for his B.Litt. and which was later to be published as 
The British Commonwealth of Nations, in which he argued that the Empire had 
reached a new stage of development as a Commonwealth, and could itself be used as 
a model for the League of Nations. It is worth noting that the structure of Hall’s final 
work, strongly resembles the structure of investigation first suggested by the Fabian 
Society, and several of his reflections are similar to those presented to the Society on 
the topic.34 In the course of his research, Hall became connected to the Round Table 
movement, but found the ideas being developed there unconvincing if a helpful 
stimulus to his own thinking.  Nevertheless, he acknowledged their help in the preface 
and the Round Table journal in its turn gave a positive review of his work.35 
Although The British Commonwealth of Nations gained some political recognition 
after its publication, particularly with Smuts and Amery, Hall did not realise the 
influence of his book.  Since he could not find work in Britain, he returned to 
Australia, working as a tutor at the University of Sydney. In 1926-27 he became 
professor of international relations at Syracuse University, New York, after which he 
spent the next 12 years working in the League of Nations Secretariat, first for the 
Control of Opium trade, then for the Information section (specialising in the British 
Dominions). From the beginning of World War he worked in the United States in 
various academic positions, continuing as an independent scholar after his retirement 
in 1955 until his death in 1976.  Hall kept returning to the topic of the British 
Commonwealth throughout his life, reusing his 1920 title for two articles written in 
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1927 and 1953 respectively, while his final opus magnum was simply called 
Commonwealth when published in 1971. Ironically, it was only while preparing his 
final work that he learnt of the impact of his original 1920 publication.36 Hall’s papers 
can be found in the National Library of Australia, and his rather modest production of 
relevant books and articles is easily available.  
1.4 The many origins of the League of Nations and the rise of New Diplomacy 
Just as there were many concepts of ‘empire’ in the early twentieth century, there 
were also many ideas for a League of Nations circulating when World War I finally 
ended with Armistice in November 1918. Not only did various politicians and 
academics discuss ideas for a future league, but across the United States, Great 
Britain, France, and other countries, societies and associations calling for a league 
arose encouraging a public debate and interest in the idea of a league of nations to 
protect the world from war in the future. 
Nevertheless, it is hardly too much to say, that in popular knowledge, it is Woodrow 
Wilson and his Fourteen Points that loom large as the basis for creating the League. 
The standard story of the origins of the League, at least in popular parlance, is 
probably that Wilson formulated the Fourteen Points, came to Europe and created the 
League of Nations, and went back to the United States, only to find that he couldn’t 
get the necessary support for the States to join his own invention. This narrative 
makes the League essentially Wilson’s baby, that he was forced to abandon and leave 
to be reared by whoever cared, predominantly the main European powers and Japan. 
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That Wilson’s importance on the foundation of the League was immense is 
indisputable, and it is by no means the purpose of this thesis to really challenge this 
assumption. Wilson’s popularity in Europe at the end of the War as well as America’s 
economic and military power meant that the European leaders could not ignore him at 
the Peace Conference, irrespective of what opinions they might have of Wilson or his 
ideas.37 As leader of the British delegation negotiating the League of Nations, Robert 
Cecil came to conclude quite decidedly that “now that I have sat for two or three days 
with the President […] I do not personally like him”38, and in his estimate the French 
considered the whole League of Nations idea “a queer Anglo-Saxon fancy not likely 
to be of the slightest importance in practice”39. Nevertheless, both Cecil and the 
French had to pay their respects to Wilson and negotiate their way to a League 
Covenant that Wilson would accept, not least because of the economic power the 
U.S.A. held over Europe after years of taking out loans to continue the war effort. 
Additionally, the fact that men such as Smuts and Cecil were far more dedicated to 
the League idea than Lloyd George, who as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
ultimately had the dominant voice of the entire British Empire, meant that they were 
deeply dependent on the sheer tenacity of Wilson to secure that a League of Nations 
was actually created as a matter of priority at the Peace Conference. In short, Wilson’s 
role in the foundation of the League is well established,40 and his papers are now 
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openly available online making them very accessible,41 although as noted his role is 
not the focus of this thesis.  
In the context of this thesis, it is worth addressing that Wilson’s liberal credentials 
have been challenged based on his blatantly racist opinions. Aligning the Fourteen 
Points with the American history of segregation, which had Wilson’s full support, is 
obviously challenging for a modern reader. However, a quite recent work by Leonard 
Smith, Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, argues that Wilson was—
and certainly would consider himself—a true liberal in spite of his racism, on the 
premise that liberalism has always been based on equal rights for a select group, 
making Wilson’s idea of national self-determination for white’s only logically 
consistent with the framework of his time.42 A similar kind liberalism for white’s only 
occurred in the writings of John Stuart Mill, as shown in chapter two. Smith’s 
interpretation of liberalism in the interwar period, appears to be as relevant to 
understanding Smuts, as it is to Wilson.   
On the other hand, the British role in the creation of the League, while the lesser 
known story than the American, has not been ignored either. There was in Britain 
particularly strong support for the league idea, with several competing societies 
promoting the League, which were merged into the League of Nations Union, at its 
time the largest popular political society in Britain and a significant lobbying group.43 
Seeing the league idea as an essentially liberal-democratic way to secure peace in the 
future, it appealed to a large segment of the British population as a concept that was 
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fundamentally compatible with the British political tradition. Unsurprisingly, the 
league idea found significant supporters among politicians, who either deeply 
believed in the idea, or at least considered it a strategic way to engage with public 
opinion. George Egerton’s Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations 
and Peter Yearwood’s Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Foreign 
Policy 1914-1925,44 both provide valuable insights into the British contribution to the 
creation of the League of Nations, not least in regards to the motivations of the British 
Government, and the dynamics between Robert Cecil, Philip Kerr, and Lloyd George. 
Yearwood’s Guarantee of Peace, goes beyond the creation of the League, including 
the early years of the League, when the Peace Treaties were being adjusted and the 
League tried to find its legs in an early post-war Europe in particular, at a time when 
the British Empire was trying to find its own new internal balance in the relationship 
between Britain and the Dominions. It is in this respect hardly coincidence that The 
Guarantee of Peace covers almost the exact same set of years as this thesis does, in 
spite of the different foci of the two works; it is simply a very intense period in the 
history of both League and Empire. Yearwood’s focus on British foreign policy, is 
well complemented by the introduction and first chapter of Patricia Clavin’s Securing 
the World Economy (2013), which analyses the role of world economics in the League 
and the involvement of the League in managing economic crisis from the creation of 
the Covenant to 1925,45 and by Ruth Henig’s The League of Nations, which gives a 
comprehensive history of the League from idea to abolishment.  
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While none of these works analyse the angle of imperialist-internationalism, they 
provide a good framework for understanding both the complexity of the origins of the 
League, the sheer breadth of issues it was challenged to engage with, and struggles of 
the early development of the League, after it had officially commenced. That the core 
history of the League is less debated in the chapters ahead, should not be understood 
to reflect any dismissal of its importance, nor does it suggest that the subject has been 
exhausted as an area for research. It simply reflects the wish of this thesis to keep a 
tight focus on the specific line of thought that imperialist-internationalism represented 
at a time where a whole range of internationalisms were trying to become a part of 
common parlance. Where Arno Mayer argued that Wilson and Lloyd George 
promoted New Diplomacy through the League as a way to prevent Socialist 
Internationalism from gaining ground popularly,46 this thesis contends that the 
imperialist-internationalists who formed the British proposal for the League of 
Nations were not simply proponents of liberal internationalism indistinguishable from 
Wilsonianism, but that they rather supported the notion of a liberal internationalism 
that had organically grown out of British imperialism –an argument that Wilson 
would appear much less likely to support. 
--New and Old Diplomacy— 
Key to Wilson’s ideas for the League of Nations was the idea of substituting the so-
called ‘Old Diplomacy’ for ‘New Diplomacy’. In this conception, Old Diplomacy was 
dependent of the notion of the Balance of Power between the great powers, and based 
on the apparatus of each country using its diplomatic corps of Ambassadors and their 
juniors to negotiate bilateral, often secret, treaties, without much in the way of 
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democratic influence or oversight. New Diplomacy, however, was to be characterised 
by negotiations between elected officials, accountable to their legislative assemblies 
and public opinion, and based in international conferences or, even better, in the 
League of Nations itself, in agreement with the first of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. The 
fact that Wilson himself deviated from the idea of keeping all proceedings open to 
public scrutiny already during the creation of the League Covenant at the Paris Peace 
Conference, where most decisions were made by the great powers anyway, is well 
known, but his promotion of the principles should be acknowledged all the same. The 
League did create a new forum of international communication, which changed the 
possibilities for international cooperation, even if it did not abolish secret diplomacy. 
The British approach to New Diplomacy was mixed. Harold Nicolson, a career 
diplomat from a family of aristocratic career diplomats, who was part of the British 
delegation, was, perhaps unsurprisingly, sceptical about the value of rejecting the 
system he was brought up in. In his Chichele Lectures, delivered in November 1953, 
he argued that the Old Diplomacy, which he called the ‘French method’, was “best 
adapted to the conduct of relations between civilized States. It was courteous and 
dignified; it was continuous and gradual; it attached importance to knowledge and 
experience; it took account of the realities of existing power; and it defined good 
faith, lucidity and precision as the qualities essential to any sound negotiation.”47 
While he acknowledged that it was no longer possible to bring back the Old 
Diplomacy, he made it quite clear that he felt that the principles of Wilson’s New 
Diplomacy were unworkable and that Wilson’s acts at the Peace Conference had 
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proved as much, and that New Diplomacy rather exaggerated than solved any of the 
issues inherent in the Old Diplomacy.48 
Nicholson’s rejection of Wilson’s New Diplomacy was shared by many in the Foreign 
Office and by some British Politicians, not least among the Conservatives, who 
tended to think of Wilson as dangerously naïve, and his ideas a utopian rejection of 
the realist basis of the balance of power. Later chapters contrast Amery’s disdain for 
Wilson with the attempts of the imperialist-internationalists to create what they 
considered was a realist basis for the League. 
Because the imperialist-internationalists did not consider New Diplomacy utopian. 
Arthur Balfour, the former Prime Minister and future grand old man of the settlement 
of Dominion Status, gave a speech to the Imperial Conference in November 1921, 
where he defended the works of the League and the value of the New Diplomacy, 
while accepting the past value of the Old Diplomacy:   
I am the last person to deride what is commonly called "The Old Diplomacy." The Old 
Diplomacy has for many generations done much in the cause of peace, and those who 
see in it merely a costly method of embittering international relations and snatching 
national advantages, completely misread the lessons of history. But there are assuredly 
many things which the League of Nations has even now shown that it can do, which 
Diplomacy could scarcely attempt, and which it certainly could not attempt with 
success.49 
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From this point, Balfour moved on to discuss a set of cases in which the League had 
been involved, generally successfully, and in which Old Diplomacy would have had 
no way of intervening, such as the illegal trafficking of women, children and arms, the 
establishment of an International Court of Justice, the involvement in solving the 
economic problems of the successor states of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, a 
settlement of the Aaland Islands dispute, and other issues.50 
This embrace of the League and New Diplomacy as another tool in the box of the 
internationalist is a fairer reflection of its acceptance among the imperialist-
internationalists than imagining them as setting it up as a complete counterpoint to the 
Old Diplomacy. 
1.5 Literature review 
Given the nature of the area of research, there is inevitably a fluid line between 
primary and secondary sources, particularly since so many of the main primary 
sources are the printed publications by the various members of the group. As David 
McIntyre’s The Britannic Vision51 demonstrates, many historians were indeed 
important actors in shaping the development of the Commonwealth rather than simply 
neutral observers post factum.  To give one example of this process, Keith Hancock, 
the writer of the authoritative biography of Smuts, found out during his research that 
Smuts had considered Duncan Hall’s 1920 British Commonwealth of Nations very 
inspiring.  He passed this on to Hall, who related the fact repeatedly as he wrote to 
friends about the finishing of his 1971 Commonwealth, clearly re-evaluating his own 
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understanding of what had happened back in 1920-1921.52 So, should Hall’s 
Commonwealth of 1971 count as a purely secondary source, since it was written as a 
history fifty years after the facts, or should we grant it some primary source value as a 
window into Hall’s thoughts about the process?  And, if so, how relevant should we 
consider his much later knowledge of Smuts’ interest in his 1920 work? Clearly, such 
publications fall into a grey zone between primary and secondary. 
The situation becomes clearer with publications appearing since the 1970s, because 
all the original active participants had died, breaking the most tangible link to the 
thoughts of those who had during the interwar period focused on the creation of the 
League of Nations and the formation of the Commonwealth. It is therefore reasonable 
to use 1980 as a watershed that clearly separates the strictly secondary literature from 
the more uncertain earlier publications. Although much work of value has appeared, 
none of this new secondary literature really focuses its core attention on the 
interaction between the parallel processes of the formation of the League of Nations 
and the development of the Empire into Commonwealth. The present research does 
not, then, so much seek to challenge any account as propose to fill a gap in the 
existing research. 
-Books- 
Three books perhaps come closest to dealing with the parallel development of League 
and Commonwealth which forms the focus of this thesis: J. Morefield, Covenants 
without Swords (2005), M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace (2008), and W.D. 
McIntyre, The Britannic Vision (2009).53 Morefield and Mazower examine the 
                                                             
52 Ebbesen, ‘Rule Australia’, p. 74. 
53 Morefield, Covenants without Swords, Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, McIntyre, The Britannic 
Vision.  
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         35 
 
ideology of some of the individuals who form the focus of this thesis primarily in 
terms of their involvement with the formation of the League of Nations. McIntyre, as 
mentioned previously, takes a broad overview of the historians who helped form the 
idea of the development of Empire into Commonwealth. And yet it is precisely the 
relationship between these two processes which was the focus of the group of 
imperial-internationalists discussed in this thesis. These three books are discussed 
further below. 
From a different perspective, Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of 
International Relations, edited by David Long and Brian Schmidt,54 analyses the 
relationship between imperialism and internationalism in the early twentieth century 
among the founders of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline. The 
book argues “that the dual themes of imperialism and internationalism were 
paramount when the field began to take a recognizable form at the beginning of the 
twentieth century” and that the relationship between the two was the driving factor for 
early IR theory rather than “the much discussed realist-idealist debate”.55 The most 
relevant chapter is by Jeanne Morefield, ‘A Liberal in a Muddle’56 on Alfred 
Zimmern, which mainly supports the interpretation of Zimmern offered here. When 
Morefield argues that “from early on in his career Zimmern argued that his idealized 
understanding of the British Commonwealth—as a kind of quasi-international 
government based on a loose, organic confederation of semi-sovereign nations—
provided the world with a clear model of what such a community might look like”57 
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she fully supports the premise of this thesis. However, both her chapter and the book 
as a whole do not have the breadth of this thesis.  
Meanwhile, Ali Parchami’s Hegemonic Peace and Empire (2009)58 focuses on the 
concept of Pax and how it was interpreted and applied by the Roman and British 
Empires as well as by the United States. Making a convincing case for the Pax having 
to be understood as an armed peace that can only be created by a power holding 
Imperium, Parchami touches on issues deeply relevant to chapter two and three of this 
thesis, which deal with the concept of Empires as peace creators and the educational 
background of the imperialist-internationalists. However, as his focus is on the 
Roman tradition of Pax, he only passingly evaluates the Greek impact, while 
Hegemonic Peace and Empire does not in any detail examine the transformation from 
Empire to Commonwealth or the Empire as a model for the League of Nations. 
It is now time to return in more detail to the three books mentioned at the start of this 
section. McIntyre’s The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Marking of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-1948 has been a very useful work in writing this 
thesis. The book is split in to three main parts—‘Historiography’, ‘Terminology’, and 
‘Chronology’—and provides an abundance of well researched and clearly formulated 
entries that allow for a quick overview of 17 historians (or writers of historical 
literature – some, like Amery, would not normally be considered historians). It also 
considers a range of questions and terminologies that may be considered relevant to 
the subject matter here (such as imperial federation or common allegiance to the 
crown). The topics are well chosen and concisely written, providing a valuable insight 
into discussion of the ideas about Commonwealth—the Britannic Vision of the title. 
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The arguments given in the two first parts strongly support the notion that historians 
were not only chroniclers but also sometimes makers of the development of Empire 
into Commonwealth (it is noticeably one of the few books around that takes Duncan 
Hall into consideration). The Chronology, however, refers more to Smuts, Borden and 
the other ‘usual suspects’ than to the historians discussed in part one and two. Several 
reviews of The Britannic Vision did indeed point this out as a weakness that 
undermines the premise of the book.59. 
What the Britannic Vision covers, it covers well, but although it does briefly mention 
how Zimmern, Hall and Smuts mention League and Empire/Commonwealth in the 
same breath,60 it does not develop the idea of a connection between the two sets of 
ideas. It instead focuses on how independent Dominion membership of the League 
was a manifestation of their increasing autonomy within the Empire/Commonwealth 
(something rather different). The Britannic Vision is particularly interesting for this 
research because its selection of historians has a significant overlap with the people 
identified as relevant to this research: Zimmern, Hall and Amery have each their 
section, one after the other, in the ‘Historiography’ section.61 Likewise, the book’s 
frequent references to Smuts matches the connections presented here.  And, finally 
and very significantly, McIntyre does not endorse Carr’s critical evaluation of 
Zimmern in the entry on him, which is a fresh perspective compared to most others as 
will be shown in the following section. 
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Mark Mazower’s No Enchanted Palace62 focuses on the links between liberal 
imperialism and the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations. 
However, since his main focus is on the United Nations, his treatment of the League 
of Nations is rather brief, in spite of the fact that the liberal imperialists were arguably 
at their most influential over the creation of the League.  It is worth noting that, both 
in language and assumptions, Mazower seems to be taking a realist approach to the 
actions and intentions of the early internationalists that Carr had previously identified 
as idealists and utopians in The Twenty Years’ Crisis.  
The chapters devoted to the League of Nations reviews the ideology of imperial 
internationalism through an analysis of the ideas of Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern. 
Mazower argues that the support of imperialists in Britain for the creation of the 
League of Nations and its successor was to create a framework within which the 
Empire and colonialism could survive and secure the dominance of Anglophone ideas 
over the world at large. The latter point is not really controversial.  It was certainly a 
dominant theme in the writings of the imperialist-internationalists that the 
Anglophone peoples of the world possessed a special genius that made their two 
bastions, the British Empire and the United States, particularly apt models for the 
future development of human civilization across the world.  
Mazower’s first point, however, i.e. that the men like Zimmern believed that the 
League should secure the future of the Empire and colonialism, is not nearly as 
strong. While it is true that there was a broad consensus among the imperialist-
internationalists that the League would help to secure the future of the Empire-
Commonwealth, it is not nearly as clear, with the exception of Jan Smuts, that they 
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believed it would secure the continuation of colonialism (at least not for more than a 
limited time). Though Smuts, as Mazower argues, probably was aiming for permanent 
white leadership in Africa, other leading imperialist-internationalists did not. 
Mazower admits that Zimmern did not entirely follow Smuts’ ideas for racial 
segregation, and that segregationist ideas were widely considered abhorrent in Britain, 
but he nevertheless holds firm to his general proposition. Zimmern, however, in Third 
British Empire specifically argues against dividing humans along colour lines. Indeed 
he states in the first part of the book that the official pronouncement of the aim of 
responsible government in India “marks the definite repudiation of the idea that there 
can be, under the British flag, one form of constitutional evolution for the West and 
another for the East, or one for the white races and another for the non-white”.63 Later 
on, he approaches the issue from a more emotional angle, criticizing the ‘brother-in-
law argument’, ie that anytime one argues for racial equality one is likely to meet 
resistance by the way of the question “how would you like your sister to marry such 
[a] one?”  Zimmern’s answer is that while he probably wouldn’t like it very much, the 
question is totally irrelevant:  
The coloured peoples under the British flag are not asking to be loved by their white 
fellow citizens. [...] They are only asking for certain ordinary commonplace political 
and social rights –for justice, for civil equality, for tolerance, and for courtesy.64   
 
Other members of the imperialist-internationalist circle shared this view. Duncan Hall 
made it clear in The British Commonwealth of Nations that all colonies and 
protectorates should be considered to be on the road towards self-government, and 
with it their own independent place within the British Commonwealth, and thus also 
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in the League of Nations. Like virtually all British academics of his time, he conceded 
that the different colonies were at very different stages of their political development, 
and would mature only gradually and over a long period, but his desired endpoint was 
clear: the point when all the colonial populations had matured politically to the point 
of being capable of independence. This view, arguably more dominant than Smuts’ 
among the imperialist-internationalists outside Africa, implied that the League of 
Nations was not intended to uphold colonialism indefinitely, but rather to provide a 
framework where the development from Empire to Commonwealth could continue 
untroubled, until it reached the point where ‘imperialism’ was superseded by 
internationalism.  
One point that might admittedly be held in favour of Mazower’s theory of permanent 
colonialism is that even the most idealist-minded of the imperialist-internationalists 
had their doubts about the ability of some peoples ever to reach the maturity needed 
for self-government. But most believed that while such a ‘lack of maturity’ might lead 
to permanent colonialism, this represented a regrettable failure rather than a desirable 
aim, and does not support the idea that the aim of the League of Nations was 
considered by the majority of the imperialist-internationalists to be the establishment 
of permanent colonialism. All in all, Mazower does argue that Smuts and others used 
the Empire as a model for the League of Nations, and in that respect several of his 
points can be used to support the arguments of this work, but because of his focus on 
the League as a way to preserve white rule and colonialism, No Enchanted Palace 
does not really engage with the perspective developed in this thesis of the Empire 
being a proto-type international organisation. Simply put, Mazower’s work suggests 
that the League was created in the image of the Empire to save imperialism, while the 
present work argues that the ‘Empire’ was seen by some as an international 
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organisation that could be used as a model to develop the League and further promote 
internationalism. 
While Zimmern and Smuts loom large both in The Britannic Vision and No 
Enchanted Palace, one of the first striking things to notice about Morefield’s 
Covenants without Sword is that it focuses on the liberal imperialism of Gilbert 
Murray and Alfred Zimmern while Smuts is nowhere to be found (his name does not 
even appear in the index).  According to Morefield:  
The main goal of this book [Swords without Covenants], then, is to investigate the 
dense ideological matrix that made Murray’s and Zimmern’s simultaneous 
commitment to an international politics based on the “Fraternity of Mankind” and the 
conservative attachment to a language of social stasis, nationhood, and empire appear 
coherent. It seeks to illuminate the internal logic that made it possible for these men to 
fancy themselves apostles of a radically transformative approach to world politics that 
required little to no change of the status quo.65 
 
With that in mind, the complete absence of any mention of the influence of Jan Smuts 
becomes puzzling, to say the least. As a frequent correspondent of Murray and a main 
influence on the Foreign Office policy that Zimmern helped draft, it is hard to see 
how the goal of understanding the ideology of Murray and Zimmern can be achieved, 
while leaving out such an important influence. It is not that Morefield is unwilling to 
discuss other influences or correspondents.  The importance of Curtis and Kerr of the 
Round Table movement, with its strong connections to South Africa, are both 
considered66 It is an omission that cannot easily be explained, unless Morefield really 
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considered Smuts’ influence on Murray and Zimmern so irrelevant that it is not worth 
mentioning.  Needless to say such an evaluation of Smuts is not shared by this work.  
What Covenants without Swords does do, though, is analyse the ideological 
influences on Murray and Zimmern, with particular attention given to the importance 
of T.H. Green’s Hegelian idealism in shaping the Oxford Liberalism of the late 
nineteenth century.67 Covenants also looks at the classicist influence on the political 
ideas of Murray and Zimmern—just as No Enchanted Palace tries to incorporate 
Zimmern’s classicist background as an explanation for his ideas—though it misjudges 
the degree to which they differed from some of their 19th century predecessors such as 
George Grote.68  
In theory, Morefield’s book ought to be of great relevance to this thesis, not least to 
chapter 3 on the education of the group, but it is rather tendentious in its attempt to 
squeeze Murray and Zimmern into a predetermined mould. There is an assumption 
that Murray and Zimmern presented themselves as egalitarian, and anti-imperialist 
utopians, concealing an elitist, conservative imperialism underneath the public façade. 
That position, however, is a straw man. Murray and Zimmern certainly were elitist,69 
though with a strong sense of social responsibility, and they were to varying degrees 
imperialist. They also openly admitted that their education had been touched by 
Hegelian influences. They did not believe, though, that such attributes were in conflict 
with a commitment to a (fairly) liberal internationalist perspective.  
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As Morefield makes clear throughout her book, Covenants is written in many respects 
as a clarification of Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, agreeing with many of Carr’s points 
but disagreeing with ‘his simplification of the liberal paradigm’.70 This starting point 
means that the entire book is angled to agree or disagree with Carr, and her ‘straw 
man’ assumptions about Murray and Zimmern probably arose from that particular 
starting point. While Covenants certainly has its value as a history book, it is also 
firmly situated within the framework of the ‘International Relations’ debate about the 
inter-war period started by Carr which continues to this day.  The book does indeed 
seek to bring the debate up to the present, with a final section on the relevance to 
several modern internationalists and the debate after September 11th.71  
While there are many interesting perspectives in Covenants, it does not really tie 
together the complex and related development of the League and the Commonwealth 
in the minds of men like Murray and Zimmern (which of course it never set out to 
do). Nor does it fully credit the liberal approach on questions of race expressed by 
Murray and Zimmern, given its premise that both men ultimately favoured a system 
that would not much challenge the status quo. In this respect, Covenants shares a 
basic outlook with No Enchanted Palace and it is indeed striking that Covenants was 
used by Mazower as one of the sources for his chapter on Zimmern. The idea that the 
League was a tool designed to maintain the international status quo appears to the 
author of this thesis to stem in part from applying a realist interpretation to liberal 
thoughts and actions (in a sense not taking the associated values seriously). This does 
not mean that the thesis will support Carr’s notion that the imperialist-internationalists 
were utopians, but it does mean that it considers the whole status quo argument as 
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based on a misunderstanding of the ideas behind the League articulated by men like 
Zimmern and Murray.  
1.6 Carr and the Interwar thinkers 
“Englishmen do not regard politics as an end in themselves. They are not Utopians. 
They do not dream of the British Empire as an instalment of the perfect state.”72 Thus 
wrote Zimmern in an article on Britain and the League of Nations, published in 
France in 1928, apparently rejecting the ideas of political Utopianism. 
As the discussion of Covenants without Swords has already shown, E.H. Carr’s The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-193973 is still considered relevant to the discussion of 
Gilbert Murray, who is not specifically attacked by the book, and Alfred Zimmern, 
who was one of Carr’s main targets. A quick perusal of recent scholarship on 
Zimmern and Murray shows that Morefield is not alone in broadly sharing Carr’s 
perspective.  It instead appears a main theme in much scholarship on these interwar 
thinkers.74 This section therefore examines in more detail Carr’s attack on the inter-
war thinkers he condemned as ‘utopian’, an attack that included but was not limited to 
the circle of imperial-internationalists that are the focus of this research. 
Carr himself was, like Hall, a generation younger than Murray, Zimmern and Smuts.  
And, as was the case with a number of the imperialist-internationalists, he had a very 
multifaceted career, starting out as a clerk in the Foreign Office in 1914, eventually 
                                                             
72 A. Zimmern, ‘Great Britain, the Dominions, and the League of Nations’ in A. Zimmern, The 
Prospects of Democracy (Chatto & Windus, 1929), p. 280. Article first published in L’Année Politique 
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73 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (2nd ed. 1946) 
74 Markwell, 'Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited', pp. 279-292; P. Wilson, et al., Thinkers of the Twenty 
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taking up in 1936 the Chair of International Relations at Aberystwyth previously held 
by Zimmern.75 (It is perhaps not without significance that Murray argued against 
Carr’s appointment in favour of another candidate).76 It was during his tenure at 
Aberystwyth, which lasted till 1947, that The Twenty Years’ Crisis was written and 
published. From his early years in the Foreign Office, Carr had learned Russian and 
become interested in the USSR. From 1946 onwards most of his academic work was 
on Soviet history, including his fourteen volume History of Soviet Russia,77 as well as 
the short essay What is History?,78 both still recognised as classics by modern 
historians.79 
That a book published in 1939 remains a centrepiece of Zimmern/Murray scholarship 
is probably best explained by two facts.  The first is that Carr’s condemnation of the 
interwar thinkers associated with the League of Nations as utopians rang true, given 
that the League had failed to prevent a new world war by the time it was published.  
The second and perhaps more significant fact is that The Twenty Years’ Crisis became 
a—perhaps even the—foundational textbook of International Relations,80 with the 
result that most scholars of the subject will have encountered Carr’s critique long 
before they ever had the chance to read anything by the people he criticised.81 Of 
course, the status of ‘main textbook’ may also have been helped by the fact that Carr 
lived to the healthy age of 90, dying in 1982, thus having the chance of being the 
grand old man of International Relations throughout much of the Cold War.      
                                                             
75 ‘Carr, Edward Hallett (1892–1982)’, DNB. 
76 B. Porter, ‘David Davies and the Enforcement of Peace’ in Wilson , Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, p. 68. 
77 E.H. Carr, History of Soviet Russia (Macmillan, 1950-1978). 
78 E.H. Carr, What is History? (Penguin, 1961). 
79 ‘Carr, Edward Hallett (1892–1982)’ DNB. 
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literature on the Interwar thinkers. 
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In this respect, I consider it strongly to my advantage that I originally approached the 
period and its actors as a historian more familiar with Carr as a specialist in Russian 
history and historical method than as a founder of International Relations theory, and 
consequently was extensively acquainted with the texts of Zimmern and Murray in 
their own right before reading The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Approaching their texts 
without the lenses of Carr allowed for a fresh look at the material. This thesis does not 
intend to engage deeply in the ongoing dialogue with Carr that so many IR scholars 
still have, but because so much of the scholarship on Zimmern and Murray is 
coloured by Carr, it is pertinent to consider whether he presented them fairly. 
The basic premise of The Twenty Years’ Crisis’ is a distinction between utopians and 
realists, where utopians are described as thinkers basing their worldview on theory 
and expecting facts to follow: “The utopian makes political theory a norm to which 
political practice ought to conform”.82 The morality of the utopian thus becomes 
defined by what people ought to do, on the expectation that once the “ought” has been 
clearly explained, actual behaviour will follow.83 Carr states that the League of 
Nations was based on such an intellectual utopia, where 19th century theories of 
utilitarianism of Bentham and Stuart Mill as applied to the national democratic idea 
were transposed onto the international scene without regard to the differences 
between the domestic and the international realities.84 Curiously, while Carr referred 
briefly to the peace projects of Rousseau, Kant and Abbe de Saint-Pierre, he only 
discussed Bentham’s utilitarianism, and not his plan for perpetual peace as an origin 
for the ideas of his utopians.85 It is interesting to notice that Zimmern himself, in a 
                                                             
82 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 12. 
83 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 5-9 and 31-36. 
84 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 26-28. 
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1921 evaluation of George Louis Beer, the American historian and member of the US 
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, makes a similar distinction between Realist 
and Utopian, writing that “the scholar in public affairs is a Realist, he has his feet on 
the rock of fact, of world facts. […] And thus unlike the philosopher, who sets up his 
utopia in an unchartered wilderness that will never be marked of the plain man’s map, 
he can carry men with him in his thinking.”86 So while Carr firmly placed Zimmern in 
the group of utopians, there is no question that Zimmern saw not only George Beer, 
but also himself, as one of the scholar-realists working in the tradition of Thucydides 
(to whom he frequently refers in the same article).  
While much of Carr’s book is a polemic against British internationalists of the inter-
war years, most of the quotes that he uses to argue that the League of Nations was 
rooted in a utopian conception of international politics in fact come from Americans, 
in particular Woodrow Wilson, but also President Taft and others.87 In fact, Carr made 
more references to Wilson than to Cecil and Zimmern added together, so while Cecil 
in particular is mentioned frequently in connection with the creation of the League of 
Nations,88 Carr often uses the words of Americans expressed prior to the creation of 
the League as a basis for criticising the interwar ideas of his own British compatriots. 
Carr argued that it was the influence of America, “still in the heyday of Victorian 
Prosperity and of Victorian belief in the comfortable Benthamite creed” that had 
brought utilitarianism back to Europe after the War, and that “nearly all popular 
theories between the two world wars were reflections, seen in an American mirror, of 
nineteenth-century liberal thought”. His argument would in fact have been more 
                                                             
86 A. Zimmern, ‘The Scholar in Public Affairs’, in Zimmern, The Prospects of Democracy, pp. 8-9. The 
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87 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 8, 14, 18, 27, 32-34, 37-39 among  many others. 
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powerful if he had quoted his so-called utopians more frequently to compare them 
with the ideas expressed by American internationalists.89 
Since Zimmern and Cecil are among the utopians specifically named by Carr, this is a 
point where it can be argued that he was simply wrong. As this work will repeatedly 
show, Zimmern, Cecil and the other members of the group of thinkers who form the 
focus of this research considered the British Empire to be a kind of international 
organisation and a direct model for the League of Nations. This implies that while 
they might reasonably be accused of trying to use 19th (and early 20th) century 
experiences as a model for the League of Nations, they cannot simply be dismissed as 
using national experience as a model for international experience since none of them 
would have accepted that the Empire consisted of one nation only. In this context it is 
interesting to note that while Carr refers to plenty of Zimmern’s published works, he 
at no point in The Twenty Years’ Crisis refers to Zimmern’s 1926 Third British 
Empire, which is the work where Zimmern most clearly makes the case for the 
Empire having practical experience that makes it a relevant model for the League.90 
Whether this omission is conscious or the result of Carr overlooking relevant material 
is not clear. It is however interesting in the context to see that Carr in 1939 himself 
used the Empire, now renamed Commonwealth, as a relevant comparison for 
international cooperation, though in his case he used it as an example of the problems 
of cooperation: 
The fact that the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have hitherto 
steadfastly refused to set up any kind of permanent and obligatory procedure for the 
judicial settlement of disputes between  one another should serve as a warning to those 
                                                             
89 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 25-26. Both quotes from p. 26. 
90 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, pp. 77-79. 
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who are disposed to attach undue importance to the perfection of judicial machinery in 
international relations. It is a curious paradox that, by signing the optional Clause of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court and by excluding from its operation 
inter-Commonwealth disputes, Great Britain and the Dominions are bound in this 
respect towards many foreign countries by an obligation more far-reaching than they 
have assumed among themselves.91  
 
Thus Carr himself in effect legitimises the use of the Empire/Commonwealth as a 
model—even if a negative one—for international relations, and as such justifies it as a 
relevant model for his “utopians” to use (even if they drew, in his opinion, the wrong 
lessons from it). In using the Empire as a model for the League of Nations, they may 
have been naive and mistaken about the lessons it taught, but they were not, even by 
Carr’s own definition, utopian. Carr’s (mis)representation of Zimmern and his fellow 
idealist internationalist thinkers is therefore not simply a question of a now irrelevant 
historical argument precisely because it continues to shape the way in which many 
contemporary scholars approach the vaguely defined groups of utopians.  
Why Carr’s work misrepresented these thinkers, is not the subject of this thesis and 
has not been investigated. However, given that his work was published in 1939, just 
as World War II war breaking out, it was very much part of an ongoing discussion in 
Britain about British politics and the influence of public academics. Many of the men 
targeted by Carr were direct academic competitors who certainly supported a different 
view on international relations than his own, and constraints of time—assuming that 
Carr wanted to get the book out as soon as possible—might have encouraged him to 
use easily availably quotes from American politicians, rather than mining the 
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academic output of his colleagues for the sake of supporting his arguments. But this is 
speculation. The fact is that The Twenty Years’ Crisis was an early work by Carr, and 
he could scarcely have imagined how influential it would become for future 
scholarship.  
Who were these utopians condemned by Carr? His strictures were not limited to the 
individuals who formed part of the group of imperial-internationalists.  Indeed, apart 
from Zimmern, Cecil, Arnold Toynbee, and Norman Angell, it is not particularly clear 
who Carr was discussing since he gave few names.  More recent writers have 
therefore typically composed a group according to some vaguely defined borders and 
own interests. Morefield clearly included Murray in her book, as does Peter Wilson in 
his articles challenging some of Carr’s interpretations,92 but the 1995 collected work 
Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis, though edited by Wilson, does not (Murray’s 
name does recur in various chapters so he is in a sense both present and absent).  
Instead, the list of ‘Thinkers’ comprises a list including Philip Noel-Baker, David 
Davies, Zimmern, Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, J.A. Hobson, J.M. Keynes, David 
Mitrany, Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), and Toynbee.93 Smuts, though given brief 
mention by Carr,94 hardly ever appears in the pages of Thinkers; in fact he is only 
mentioned once, in passing, in the chapter on Zimmern.95 One might wonder if the 
absence of Smuts in Morefield’s Covenants reflects Carr’s limited interest in him in 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis.  
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The consequence of all this is that any number of political thinkers from the interwar 
period can be categorised at will as relevant to Carr’s analysis, leaving the ‘targets’ a 
poorly-defined group to be condemned, unless salvaged by a more sympathetic ’re-
evaluation’. Most of the interwar internationalists have in a sense been written out of 
the history of International Relations theory. A popular IR theory textbook for 
postgraduates, Theories of International Relations,96 in its fifth edition in 2013, 
mentions Carr and The Twenty Years’ Crisis six lines into the introduction and 
repeatedly afterwards throughout the book.97 Zimmern is first introduced on page 7, 
as a target of Carr’s criticism, and only in passing on page 11 after that. Murray and 
Smuts are not mentioned at all, while the chapter on Liberalism as an IR theory is 
only concerned with its re-emergence after the Cold War.98 
This trend in the literature means that people like Zimmern have been left out in the 
cold, defined in Carr’s terms as an interwar internationalist and utopian, and therefore 
largely dismissed without any real evaluation of his writings. The result is shown in 
the limited amount of modern scholarship about Zimmern, and indeed other 
imperialist-internationalists, and consequently this thesis will focus closely on their 
writings.  It is also worth pointing out that there is a particular opportunity for a 
scholar to write a monograph on Zimmern’s work and impact in a way that does not 
take as its starting point Carr’s assessment of him.  Such a work would increase our 
knowledge of one of the key founders of the field of International Relations. Although 
the interwar idealists (broadly interpreted) did not consider themselves mortally 
wounded by The Twenty Years’ Crisis when it was published back  in 1939, as Peter 
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Wilson shows in his 1998 article 'The Myth of the First Great Debate'99, Carr has, for 
the time being at least, been successful in defining as utopian a whole group of 
thinkers. This thesis aims to show that some of them, at least, were far more 
sophisticated and indeed ‘realistic’ in their attempt to understand how international 
organisations could be developed that were both grounded in history yet capable of 
creating a foundation for a new pattern of international relations.  
1.7 Theoretical framework 
It has been seen, then, that this thesis provides a study of a loosely defined group of 
individuals, referred to here as the imperialist-internationalists, focusing in particular 
on their public debates about the Empire as an international organisation and thus as a 
relevant model for the League of Nations. It is essentially a piece of intellectual 
history, though it also uses prosopographic methods when analysing the group 
identity of the imperialist-internationalists (to the extent it existed), in order to foster a 
fuller understanding of the ideas they held in common.  From a prosopographic 
perspective, it is clearly the study of narrow elite, a “small[s] group of well 
documented individuals”,100 although the thesis also focuses on the important 
differences between individual perspectives. The thesis also uses methods derived 
from philology, with its intense focus on the meaning of the finer details in writing, 
along with insights derived from various historians of philosophy. The contribution of 
each member of the group is primarily analysed though their published works, as 
these represented their voice in the public debate, although careful attention is also 
                                                             
99 Wilson, 'The Myth of the First Great Debate', pp. 1-16. 
100 K. Verboven, M. Carlier, j. Dumolyn, ‘A short manual to the Art of Prosopography’ at 
http://prosopography.modhist.ox.ac.uk/images/01%20Verboven%20pdf.pdf (17. December 2013), p. 
42. 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         53 
 
given to selected archival material (particularly the correspondence between key 
individuals and the various drafts of the Covenant of the League of Nations). 
A significant aspect of the thesis is an analysis of the philosophical roots of their 
ideas. Chapter 2 explores the long Western tradition of viewing empires as a source of 
international peace, while chapter 3 focuses on the content and impact of Classical 
education in the late nineteenth century. Chapter 2 analyses a selection of political and 
historical works from antiquity to the nineteenth century, outlining the development 
over time of ideas on peace and its connection to empires or world states.  It shows 
how both the imperial federalists and the imperialist-internationalists were, perhaps 
both consciously and instinctively, following in a long established Western tradition. 
Chapter 3 then moves beyond this focus on the grand tradition of Western thinking 
about questions of empire and international order and focuses on the specific set of 
ideas that most of the imperialist-internationalists were exposed to during their 
education. Particular attention is given to classical studies at Oxford, where many of 
them studied, exploring in particular the influence of the liberal values embedded in 
the historical writing of George Grote.  This chapter also examines the influence 
exercised by the Hegelian philosopher T.H. Green, whose ideas on the ethics of state 
and community helped to shape the outlook of several generations of Oxford 
undergraduates.  
Chapters 4 to 6 then analyse in depth how the imperialist-internationalists 
conceptualised the British Empire as an International Organisation, its role as a 
potential model for the League, and the relationship between the League and the re-
formed British Commonwealth. All three chapters rest primarily on a close reading of 
the sources, exploring the ongoing debate on how to formulate the new reality of the 
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Empire and what its impact would and should be.  Chapter 4 focuses in particular on 
how the Empire was reformulated as an international organisation, examining how 
World War 1 changed its internal structure as regards relations between Britain and 
the Dominions, as well as the debate about whether cultural Englishness was a 
precondition for efficient internationalism. Particular attention is also given to the 
string of alternative names offered for the new version of the Empire, as they reveal 
the underlying thoughts about what kind of unit or organisation it was. 
Chapter 5 then focuses on how the imperialist-internationalists considered that the 
Empire could serve as a model for the League, both ideologically and practically, 
examining the ways in which it could foster new forms of internationalism.  The 
ideological aspects are examined primarily through the published writings of men like 
Zimmern and Murray, while the practical aspects are analysed through a combination 
of published papers and archival records of the various drafts of the Covenant. The 
chapter also shows through published and archival sources that even politicians who 
were against the League could agree that it had been based on the model of the British 
Empire.  Chapter 6, the last of the main chapters, analyses the ways in which the 
imperialist-internationalists expected the League and Commonwealth to continue to 
influence each other in an ongoing symbiosis. Since the actual development of intra-
imperial relations and the Commonwealth itself are well-covered in the existing 
scholarly literature, the chapter focuses focus primarily on the inter-relationship 
between the two processes.  
The conclusion sums up the ideas of imperialist-internationalism, challenging Carr’s 
dismissal of their ideas for being utopian, and argues that figures like Zimmern, 
Smuts, and Murray can be of value in the ongoing debate about how to combine 
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internationalist cooperation with the existence of fully independent states.  It also 
highlights their challenge to Marxism by placing imperialism as a natural predecessor 
to internationalism. 
2: Ideas on empires as peace-creators from antiquity to the late 19th 
Century  
 “An empire” and “an international organisation” are typically seen as two different 
things. Though both involve the organisation of more than one nation, often with a 
strong element of preserving peace and order between the constituent parts, a 
qualitative difference is commonly understood between the two terms. An empire is 
understood to spread its authority through forcing other nations under its control. 
International organisations are supposed to be created and expanded through the 
voluntary collaboration of their constituent parts. 
This difference between coercion and free collaboration is treated as essentially a 
moral issue, and it strips the term “empire” of any legitimacy, as the liberal-
democratic paradigm does not accept coercion as a legitimate political means. The 
term “an international organisation”, however, was not used before the twentieth 
century. Political models for co-operation or international organisation were 
suggestions for how to organise internationally, but not—in name—for how to create 
“an international organisation”.  Proposals for international co-operation to secure 
international peace and order might call for “a Diet”, “a Congress”, “a Concert”, or, in 
time, “a League”, but they did not call for “an International Organisation”. They did, 
however, on some occasions call for “an Empire”.101 
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The word “empire” is derived from the Latin “imperium” having command, or rule, of 
something, just like the Greek “arché”. When proposing an international arrangement 
to secure peace, most proposals included some sort of organisational body that was to 
have binding authority over the members. In other words, the organisational body was 
to have rule, or command, over certain aspects of the member-states affairs. That is a 
kind of imperium, and “empire” was therefore a natural choice of name for such an 
organisation. However, as argued by Parchami in Hegemonic Peace, it is implied by 
“imperium” that it has been imposed by military order following a victory, or string of 
victories, so it is implicitly militaristic.102 Yet up until World War I, in spite of its 
militaristic origins, there existed a fluidity around the term “empire” where it could be 
understood either in the coercive meaning that we use today, or in a more 
collaborative manner, where the militaristic aspect was seen more as a kind of 
policing effort, to some degree resembling the common understanding of “an 
international organisation”.103 George Grote’s History of Greece from the mid-
nineteenth century, analysed in chapter three, is a good example of the ambivalence of 
the term. On one hand it detailed the perceived ills of the Empire of Alexander the 
Great, presented as coercive, militaristic and anti-democratic, while on the other hand 
it discussed the Athenian Empire as an internally democratic and often positive force 
for the member cities, whether they originally were voluntarily part of that empire or 
not.104 This fluidity allowed the term “empire” to be used from antiquity onwards in 
political suggestions for how to arrange international collaboration and order in a 
manner conducive to peace. 
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century the separation between the two types of 
empire became confused, to say the least, as the British Empire contained elements of 
both. The vast majority of colonies were clearly the subjects of a coercive empire, but 
the burgeoning Dominions, at least in regards to their white, politically dominant 
populations, fell into the category of voluntary collaboration. In that context, the 
imperialist-internationalists started to see an essential separation between the coercive 
empire and the empire of voluntary collaboration, and they came to promote a change 
in name of the voluntary empire, exactly to stress its distinctness from the coercive 
part of the empire. That, however, was a development of the twentieth century, and 
mainly from World War I onwards. The topics of the concept of “empire” in the late 
nineteenth century and the need for the change of name away from Empire are further 
developed in chapter three and four. 
This chapter focuses on the western European tradition of seeing empire as a 
constructive form of international organisation, conducive to peace and the 
preservation of the liberty of the citizens within its confines. The thesis is that by the 
early twentieth century, this specifically positive imperial tradition was still alive 
among political thinkers and it was a relevant part of the intellectual background of 
the imperialist-internationalists. That many other views on ‘empire’ either 
commensurable of incommensurable have also existed, is in no manner rejected by 
their absence here, nor is it argued that the positive tradition was dominant by World 
War I. However, as the imperialist-internationalists were leading influences on the 
British approach to creating the League of Nations, it is the tradition of empires as a 
form of international organisation that is the scope of investigation in this chapter and 
not the alternatives views. 
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Though the development of political ideas is closely connected to the contemporary 
political and social conditions, only sparse historical context is provided here where 
essential, as a full explanation of the historical context, would dominate the chapter 
and lead it to expand uncontrollably. The scope of this chapter is very broad as it 
covers nearly two and a half millennia, from Greek antiquity to the mid-nineteenth 
century. The period has been divided into three sections, Antiquity, The Middle Ages, 
and Modernity. For practical purposes, the analysis in the first two sections was based 
on a few selected texts, while the third section is based on a rather broader selection. 
All texts help demonstrate the existence of a Western European tradition of thought 
considering empires a constructive element in international relations. Emphasis has 
been placed on both consistency, not least in the form of an adherence to the idea of 
the Roman Empire, and on innovation, when genuinely new and challenging ideas 
came out. 
It will also be seen that the early twentieth century is in part represented by a couple 
of texts engaging directly with the earlier writings, showing how the tradition was 
kept alive. One particular publication will be highlighted, as its topic and purpose 
makes it uniquely suitable for this work. The publication in question is Leagues of 
Nations: Ancient, Medieval and Modern published in London in 1919 under the pen 
name Elizabeth York.105 In it, York supported the League idea with her own 
interpretation of historical sources. Interestingly, many of the sources she used, Dante, 
Abbé Saint Pierre, Penn, Rousseau, and Kant remain dominant in present work on the 
concepts of world states and perpetual peace,106 and largely reflect the selection in 
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Early Notions of Global Governance. Selected Eighteenth-Century Proposals for 
‘Perpetual Peace’, printed in 2008.107   
2.1 Antiquity 
Antiquity is a wonderfully wide term that covers at least some six centuries and two 
major European civilisations, so no brief analysis can possibly pretend to be 
representative of the entire period, though this analysis will cover both Ancient 
Greece and the Roman Empire. However, traditionally, when we speak of Ancient 
Greece, it is in fact the fifth and fourth centuries BC we are referring to, and it is the 
period analysed here, as it was also the period of interest to the classicists of the early 
twentieth century. From a historical perspective, these two centuries have offered a 
clear set of events and issues that have tended to dominate the interest in it: the 
Persian War, the Delian League also known as the Athenian Empire, The 
Peloponnesian War, Athenian democracy, the “golden age of philosophy”—especially 
Plato and Aristotle—and  Alexander the Great and the spread of Hellenism.  
Reflection on this set of events and issues goes back, indeed, to antiquity itself and 
has continued ever since. The collected writings of Plato and Aristotle have been 
fundamental to the development of Western philosophy, though they have not been 
equally in vogue in Western Europe in all periods. The Persian and Peloponnesian 
Wars fast got their keynote historians in Herodotus and Thucydides respectively, who 
have since been considered among the founders of western historical writing and, in 
the case of Thucydides, have remained relevant as a central historian for International 
Relations theorists as well. The importance of Athens permeates through works on 
                                                             
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/world-government/>. Main writings on ‘perpetual 
peace’ are gathered in Aksu, Early Notions of Global Governance.  
107 Aksu, Early Notions of Global Governance. Interestingly, the introduction contains the only 
reference to York, Leagues of Nations that I have found in any scholarly publication. 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         60 
 
ancient Greece, and as to Alexander, his conquests have consistently been 
acknowledged to be a turning point in history, and his personal exploits have been 
popularised in many periods since. 
 
2.1.1 ‘Empire’ in 5th and 4th centuries BC Greece 
In terms of political ideas, we do not have many ancient Greek texts on empires, as 
their natural focus was the city state. Thus, both Plato’s Republic and Laws and 
Aristotle’s Politics are primarily concerned with how to rule a good city, rather than 
giving much thought to what it takes for something to be a good empire. Indeed, their 
focus on defining the right size of the population of a good city and the measures that 
should be taken to keep it within its limits would seem to suggest a distinctly anti-
imperial approach. Thus, in spite of their importance to later philosophers, and in spite 
of their lives being linked to the early 20th century ideas and ideals of Hellenism, it 
was not the great philosophers who started the concept of empires as a positive form 
of international organisation. 
A better place to look is in the histories by Herodotus and Thucydides, both of whom 
lived in the fifth century BC. Though their dates of birth and death are not exactly 
known, Herodotus is generally considered to have been about twenty years older than 
Thucydides, having been born sometime around 480 BC, and Thucydides is assumed 
to have died about 400 BC.108 Herodotus is from his own work known as Herodotus 
of Halicarnassus (on the West coast of modern Turkey, then a Greek city under 
Persian control with strong connections to the non-Greek neighbouring peoples), but 
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was in antiquity also known as Herodotus of Thurii, an Athenian colony in Southern 
Italy that Herodotus according to some traditions took part in founding.109 It is thus 
worth noting that he was not an Athenian, and while his historical veracity has been 
challenged all the way back to Thucydides, his personal views on Athens and his 
presentation of how it was perceived are valuable as reflections of what he expected 
his audience to accept about Athens. 
Thucydides, on the other hand, was an Athenian citizen, so his writings on Athens 
should be viewed in light of his own loyalties. The main section from his History of 
the Peloponnesian Wars to be used is ‘Pericles’ Funeral Oration’, where 
Thucydides/Pericles presents an idealised version of Athens. For the purpose of this 
analysis, it is irrelevant whether the words and intentions are those of Pericles or 
Thucydides, as their value is what they tell about the Athenian ideal of Athens. 
However, it is noticeable that Thucydides later, in the Melian Dialogue, presents a 
much harder and more cynical approach of Athens as a great/imperial power.110 
--What did the Greeks use for ‘Empire’?-- 
Given that the Greeks did not work with the concept of ‘empire’ as such, it is not in a 
direct reference to empire, that their relevance is to be found, but rather in issues that 
relate indirectly to empires. 
---Colonies--- 
First of all, though the Greek city states did not see themselves as empires, they did 
form colonies. This issue, though not directly related to the theories of empires as a 
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form of international organisation through the middle ages, became deeply relevant to 
the imperialist-internationalists in the early twentieth century, who, in line with Adam 
Smith and various nineteenth century liberals, thought they could see an analogy to 
the British Empire itself in the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. This 
assumed similarity is dealt with later in this chapter and in chapter three.  
The Greek model, at least in theory, was intimately based on the perception of the city 
state as the basic model of organisation, since a city state—as discussed by Plato and 
Aristotle—could become too big. The response to an overflowing population was to 
send out settlers to start a colony, theoretically in vacant land, in reality often by 
subduing a pre-existing population. The colony would grow under the auspices of its 
mother-city until it had reached a level of self-sufficiency. Its constitution would often 
be based on the constitution of the mother-city, but it was understood that a former 
colony would have its own political development depending on its circumstances. As 
the Melian Dialogue highlights, a familial relationship between mother- and daughter-
cities was expected to continue.111 All things equal, it was a bond that the cities did 
use as a base for alliances, and there was an expectation on family loyalty in times of 
need, whether from mother- to daughter-city or vice versa. Of course, as the Melian 
Dialogue also shows,112 all things were often not equal, and in many cases help would 
not be offered, and ancient Greek history is full of examples of mother-, daughter- and 
granddaughter- cities fighting each other. 
However, for the imperialist-internationalists, the development of Greek colonies 
from dependents to independent city states with a cultural, familial bond of loyalty to 
the mother- and sister-states appeared the perfect example of how Dominion 
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In regards to empires as a form or international organisation, the Greeks also 
contributed ideas that were later influential. Broadly speaking they can be categorised 
as ideas of universalism, democracy, and of the greater state benefitting the smaller 
states.  
Greek universalism was, of course, a limited matter. Inside the city state there was a 
clear division between men and women, and citizens, slaves, and metics, while 
between the city states there was an equally clear division between Athenians, 
Spartans, Thebans, etc. However, there was also the greater division, that between 
Greeks and others, the barbarians, whether weak barbarians like those up north, or 
strong contesting civilisations such as the Persians. In spite of all the wars between 
the Greeks city states they upheld a clear belief in the rather abstract higher identity, 
that of Greeks. At the end of the eighth book of his Histories, Herodotus has an 
Athenian delegation state to the Spartans that Athens will not betray the common 
Greek cause against the Persians, because: “the Greek race being of the same blood 
and same language, and the temples of the gods and sacrifices in common; and our 
similar customs; for the Athenians to become betrayers of these would not be well.”113 
In this way, Herodotus defines the Greeks based on their sense of familial, cultural, 
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religious, and linguistic bonds—a basis for identity essentially, and hardly 
coincidentally, identical to John Stuart Mill’s definition of nationality114—and  
assumes that against an outside enemy, this identity holds obligations higher than 
immediate individual concerns. When he attributes such a sentiment to the Athenian 
delegation, it is reasonable to assume that such a sentiment would be considered valid 
to his target audience—other Greeks. 
There are plenty of examples of the call for Greek unity against the others. The 
Parthenon frieze depicted Greeks fighting all kinds of barbarians, Demosthenes called 
for Greek solidarity in the fight against Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander, and 
Alexander called on Greek solidarity in his campaign against Persia to ‘avenge the 
earlier Persian invasions’. The last example shows how Greek identity was somewhat 
flexible, to the extent that it could be a debate whether the Macedonians were 
barbarians or pseudo-Greeks. By adhering to the idea of a common identity beyond 
the confines of their city states, or colonial filial relations, they set up the idea of a 
universal identity, with the potential for inter-city collaboration and sense of common 
loyalty beyond the individual borders. 
Another idea that the Greeks famously put forward was that of democracy, which 
found its strongest proponent in Athens. That it was not similar to a modern 
democracy is a debate that is not necessary here, but the very basic idea of 
democracy, that government rests with the peoples, specifically citizens, is an 
important founding principle for all the later political philosophers who based the 
legitimacy of power in the people, even when they didn’t use that basis for a 
democracy. The Athenian democracy had many critics, Plato noticeably among them, 
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but Pericles’ Funeral Oration may be considered one of the strongest eulogies of it, 
formulating the finest ideas, if not realities, of the system: 
Let me say that our system of Government does not copy the institutions of our 
neighbours. It is more a case of our being a model to others, than of our imitating 
anybody else. Our constitution is called democracy because power is in the hands not 
of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, 
everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before 
another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a 
particular class, but the actual ability which a man possesses. No one, so long as he has 
it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in obscurity because of poverty.115   
Thus does Thucydides, through the oration of Pericles, open his praise of Athens, 
expressing key ideals of democracy so succinctly that any democratic thinker today 
could use the same definitions.  Further on in the Oration, it is declared how the 
democratic system has led Athens to have the greater wealth and a stronger military 
force,116 a sentiment that Herodotus supports in book five, where he writes “[...] 
equality of rights shows, not in one instance only, but in every way, what an excellent 
thing it is. For the Athenians, when governed by tyrants, were superior in war to none 
of their neighbours; but when freed from tyrants, became by far the first”117 In this 
way, both Thucydides and Herodotus connects democracy to military and economic 
power, and democracy thus becomes instrumental to Athenian achievement, with the 
understanding that similar benefits could be gained by other states adopting it. 
According to Herodotus, Athenian power enabled them to be “the saviours of 
Greece”, because their decision to fight Persia rather than flee or negotiate,118 gave 
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the other Greek cities the chance to fight, and he has a Spartan delegation say to the 
Athenians that “you, [...] always, and from of old, have been seen to assert the 
freedom of many nations”,119 supporting the notion of the Funeral Oration that Athens 
was dedicated to the welfare not only of itself, but also of its friends, and that the 
Athenian dedication to liberty went beyond the private sphere. The sentiment of 
Athens being the leader of the Greeks was much later echoed in Plutarch’s Life of 
Alexander, where he had Alexander ordering Athens to take good care of its own 
affairs “since, if anything should happen to him, it would have the rule over 
Greece.”120 Plutarch also stressed Alexander’s understanding of the importance of 
political freedom to the Greeks, stating “And being desirous of honour among the 
Greeks, he [Alexander] wrote them that all their tyrannies were abolished and they 
might live under their own laws; moreover, he wrote the Plataeans specially that he 
would rebuild their city, because their ancestors had furnished their territory to the 
Greeks for the struggle in behalf of their freedom.”121 While Plutarch wrote his work 
more than four hundred years after the death of Alexander, and at a time when the 
Roman Empire was at its height, he was of Greek birth and it reflects his impression 
of what was important to the Greeks.  
The idea of the major powers securing the freedoms of the smaller cities leads to the 
last point mentioned, in relation to the idea of empires as something positive. Being 
powerful allowed Athens to help others which in turn conferred benefits on Athens 
itself. According to the Funeral Oration “We [Athens] make friends by doing good to 
others, not by receiving good from them. [...] When we do kindnesses to others, we do 
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not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, 
relying on our free liberality.”122 Here, clearly, the benefits for Athens, apart from a 
good reputation, are not named, but earlier it has been mentioned that “the greatness 
of our city brings it about that all the good things from all over the world flow in to it, 
so that to us it seems just as natural to enjoy foreign goods as our own local 
products”,123 and that free flow of international products clearly is seen as a benefit. 
Between Herodotus and Thucydides it is thus possible to make out a representation of 
Athens as a major democratic power, that was using its economic and military wealth 
not only for its own benefit, but also for that of its allies, and on a greater scale for 
Greece, or the Greeks as a people. Those ideals—clearly, this was not all reality—
represent a relevant foundation for the idea of empire as a form of international 
organisation benefitting not only the core power state, but also its minions. 
2.1.2 Romans and ‘empire’- 
It is the Roman part of antiquity to which we owe the concept of empire that has 
continued as a relevant political idea in Europe ever since. Within a European context, 
the Roman Empire must be considered the empire par excellence, at the very least 
until the British Empire, and its currency in political debate has not yet been outspent 
–references to it will still occasionally turn up in debates about the European Union. 
The practical historic importance of the Roman Empire is indisputable, everything 
from the spread of Latin languages to the remnants of Roman baths in the furthest 
corners of the empire show how vast and influential it was. Equally, European 
political ideas since have repeatedly returned to key concepts connected to the 
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Empire, first and foremost the idea of Pax Romana, the Imperial Peace with all its 
benefits, and the concept of universal citizenship throughout the Empire. The Roman 
concept of Pax, peace, was, according to Parchami, understood as “a condition that 
could only result from a successful war” which meant that it was conceptually linked 
to the holder of Imperium.124 The appeal of the idea of the Roman Empire, was so 
strong that the idea of translatio imperii (transfer of empire) was introduced by Otto 
of Freising in his Chronica from the mid twelfth century to give legitimacy to the 
Holy Roman Empire.125 Similarly, in Russia, the title of Czar and Autocrat were 
Caesar and the Greek translation of Imperator and in fact another attempt to claim 
legitimacy from the Roman Empire.126 
-Roman Sources- 
As in the case of Greece, it is also from the Roman period relevant to look to the 
historians, some of whom are a clear link between Greek and Roman antiquity.  
The earliest extant history of Rome is by Polybius (c.200-118 BC), who was a Greek 
by birth and wrote his Histories in Greek, describing “by what means, and under what 
kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the 
dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within a period of not quite fifty-
three years?”.127 In other words, it was about the creation of the Roman Empire of his 
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time, with a clear belief that it was of crucial relevance which type of government it 
had. 
From the Augustan period with its end of the old republic and formalising the Roman 
state as an empire with an imperator for life, Livy and his History of Rome stand out. 
Unlike Polybius, Livy was of Roman birth. He used Polybius as a main source for 
many parts of his books, but also plenty of other sources, including some that he 
acknowledged were entirely mythical. Livy’s near contemporary, Vergil, wrote the 
Aeneid –a Roman complement to the Iliad and Odyssey- with the founding myth of 
Rome that led it back to the fall of Troy. Though the Aeneid is entirely a work of 
fiction, its comments as Aeneas is allowed a vision of the future—the Augustan 
period—give a good insight into the concept of the purpose and use of empire as seen 
by Vergil. Slightly earlier than Livy and Vergil is Cicero (106-43 BC), the famous 
orator, who wrote many political and philosophical treatises, among others De Re 
Publica. Though his open engagement in political ideas could have made him an 
obvious main source for use in the present context, many of his considerations related 
more to the internal strife in the Roman political system, in which he was himself an 
active participant, and were less directed at the imperial aspects of Roman Rule.   
As can be seen in chapter three, the classical authors used in this thesis are largely, 
though not entirely, the same that were typically studies in classical studies at Oxford 
in the late nineteenth century. This strong overlap was not necessarily a deliberate 
choice but rather a simple focus on the most famous texts. It was also these texts that 
would have helped to influence the views about empire developed by the imperialist-
internationalists who form the focus of this thesis. 
-The Romans and Alexander- 
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Bridging the time from the heyday of Athens to the rise of Rome was Alexander the 
Great and his conquests. In his decade of conquests, Alexander managed to subdue 
greater territories than any had done before him, but due to the lack of consolidation 
and his early death in 323 BC it never really became an empire in any sense of 
coherent rule, though it left four strong successor dynasties after the struggle for 
power had ended. Nevertheless, the sheer achievement in conquest left Alexander as a 
towering figure, whom the Romans felt that they had to measure up to. Plutarch took 
the approach of comparing Alexander and Caesar in his parallel lives, while Polybius 
and Livy chose to compare the achievements of Alexander and his Macedonians with 
those of Rome and both found Rome superior.  
Polybius argued that Rome was greater because the Macedonians had only conquered 
part of the known world, leaving in particular Europe virtually untouched, while “The 
Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world 
was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not to be 
paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future.”128 To him, the essential point of 
Roman superiority was size and completeness of conquest. Livy took a different 
perspective and asked “What would have been the results for Rome if she had been 
engaged in war with Alexander?”129 focusing on a hypothetical direct match of the 
two powers. His answer compared numerous Roman generals through the centuries 
with Alexander in habits and successes, pointing out that one cannot compare 
Alexander’s a ten year period with the several centuries of Roman expansion and 
expect to find a similar consistent string of successes. However, his actual conclusion 
follows straight upon the question asked: “The things which tell most in war are the 
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numbers and courage of the troops, the ability of the commanders, and Fortune, who 
has such a potent influence over human affairs, especially those of war. Any one who 
considers these factors either separately or in combination will easily see that as the 
Roman Empire proved invincible against other kings and nations, so it would have 
proved invincible against Alexander.”130 In Livy’s case, then, the argument is that of 
an all-round superiority based on greater ability of the commanders and people of 
Rome, though supported by good fortune. 
All the same, the Romans did not discount the Greeks, but saw Rome as their 
successors, something that was also true of Virgil’s Aeneid. Polybius pointed out that 
the Romans had copied aspects of Greek armament being willing to adopt the best 
practices of other peoples.131 Likewise, Livy boosted the claim to legitimacy of 
Roman rule over the Greeks by having a delegation from Rhodes state that “At one 
time they [the Greeks] too grasped at empire in their own strength, now they pray that 
where the seat of empire is there it may remain; they count it enough to protect their 
freedom with your arms.”132 All in all, Rome was presented as a superior successor to 
the Athenian and Macedonian leadership of the Greeks, having created a true world 
empire by willingly embracing the best aspects of other civilizations, and being 
accepted by the Greeks because of their respect for the people they have conquered. 
-Values of the Roman Empire- 
- Citizenship- 
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Looking back to the Greek universal ideal of being Greeks above the specific identity 
of Spartan, Athenian or Melian, the Romans brought the idea of universalising 
people’s identity and rights a big step further. Where the Greeks had generally been 
reluctant to extend citizenship to foreigners in their city, the success of Roman 
conquests in Italy, and later across Europe and the Middle East, were significantly 
helped by their tradition of extending the status and rights of citizenship to people 
from the conquered territories. Originally reserved for the elite, it was ultimately 
made universal with the Antonine Constitution of AD 212, but its main effects came 
long before then. 
Livy repeatedly refers to the grant of either citizenship or conubium (partial citizen 
rights) to conquered territories or as a reward to allies throughout his work.133 The 
case for it, is however most strongly put, in the speech he lets Camillus give to the 
senate on the subjection on Latium: 
We are growing weary of their constant renewal of hostilities, it is for you to consult as 
to the best means of binding them to a perpetual peace.[...] as the Latins are concerned, 
you can secure for yourselves a lasting peace by either cruelty or kindness.[..] do you 
wish to follow the example of your ancestors and make Rome greater by conferring 
her citizenship on those whom she has defeated? [16] The materials for her expansion 
to a glorious height are here at hand. That is assuredly the most firmly-based empire, 
whose subjects take a delight in rendering it their obedience.134 
It is worth noting that the term “perpetual peace”, later used by Rousseau in the Projet 
de Paix Perpetuelle (1756), Bentham in his Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace 
(1789), and in the English translation of Kant’s Zum Ewigen Frieden (1795) (evig can 
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be translated as either eternal or perpetual), is a direct translation of the Latin, 
perpetua pace, used by Livy in the text above.135 With the speech of Camillus, Livy 
makes a clear case for the use of citizenship to stabilise Roman rule by making the 
conquered enemy a proud Roman. The policy of inclusion is stressed again, much 
later, when in the speech of the delegation from Rhodes, they tell the Romans that 
“Wherever your arms have penetrated there should the laws of Rome also 
penetrate.”136 This supports the concept of an empire taken by military might, but held 
together by a policy of inclusion and the spread of political rights and order, giving 
sufficient benefits to make the conquered peoples loyal to their conqueror.137 
-Roman Constitution- 
Pericles’ idea of the importance of the type of rule as a precondition for greatness was 
shared by the Roman writers,138 though it was the Roman constitution that was 
proposed as the ideal model. Polybius lists the three great powers that have come 
before Rome to compare their constitutions, but Athens is not among them, as pure 
democracy was not considered a relevant political model for a great power. Instead he 
described the Roman constitution as a mixed constitution using a modified Aristotlian 
framework that combines taking the best parts out of the three main types of 
government, with the consuls representing the monarchy, the senate the aristocracy, 
and the power of the plebs the democratic element.139 This perception of the Roman 
constitution as a realisation of Aristotle’s ideal, with a sort of internal checks and 
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balances between the social classes, was later echoed by Cicero,140 for whom, 
however, it was already a paradise lost, (as with all the ideas presented in the ancient 




According to Polybius: 
The result of this power of the several estates for mutual help or harm is a union 
sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a constitution than which it is impossible to 
find a better. For whenever any danger from without compels them to unite and work 
together, the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary, that 
everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager rivalry shown by all classes 
to devote their whole minds to the need of the hour, and to secure that any 
determination come to should not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual 
works, privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business in hand.141 
In other words, common interest and general competition between the classes made all 
Romans cooperate when the interests of Rome were threatened. 
In a similar manner, Polybius echoed Pericles and Herodotus in arguing that the 
Roman soldiers were the best because of the system that produced them. While the 
Athenians had suggested that their soldiers fought best because they were fighting for 
their own freedom, Polybius  emphasised that the Romans army was strong because it 
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was based on ‘native citizen levies’ rather than mercenaries like the Carthaginians. 
With an argument often repeated since, he argued that “as the Romans are fighting for 
country and children, it is impossible for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but 
they persist with obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies.”  
Mercenaries employed by the enemy could be expected to run away at the first 
encounter of defeat.142 While the Roman model was not based on pure democracy it 
was  presented as basing its legitimacy in the Roman citizens, who like the Greeks 
before them had a mix of political rights and military obligations. 
-Purpose of (Roman) Empire - 
Summing up, a clear ideal of the imperial organisation as a force for good goes 
strongly through the texts reviewed here. While the sheer scale of conquest and 
military power was celebrated in its own right, it was combined with a strong sense 
that the Roman Empire was a positive force not only to the Rome but also to those 
conquered people, who like St Paul had the chance to say “I am a Roman citizen”. 
Vergil sums it up in a few potent lines from Aeneas’ decent to the underworld when 
Anchises, his dead father, tells Aeneas about the future of the civilisation that he will 
found: 
But thou, 0 Roman, learn with sovereign sway 
To rule the nations. Thy great art shall be 
To keep the world in lasting peace, to spare 
humbled foe, and crush to earth the proud.143  
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This command ‘To keep the world in lasting peace’ (pacisque imponere morem144)  is 
similar to Camillus asking the Senate in Livy to bind themselves to “a perpetual 
peace”,145 and it is this concept of Pax Romana that political philosophers kept 
returning to for the next two millennia - leading some British imperialist to speak of 
the Pax Britannica and the imperialist-internationalists to see the imperial peace as a 
natural precursor to international peace. 
Finally, it is clear that the Roman empire was supposed to give not only a military 
peace, but also, as Athens before it, “to protect from the tyranny of monarchs the 
liberties of an ancient people” which if achieved “the whole world will regard [...] as a 
more striking proof of your greatness than even the winning it.”146 
2.2 The Middle Ages 
With the fall of the Western Roman Empire, Western Europe entered a period of open 
competition between its many peoples, several of which achieved temporary 
predominance in Europe, but none of which achieved any real kind of Empire until 
Charlemagne. The importance of Charlemagne and the concept of translatio imperii 
has already been discussed in connection with the Roman Empire, but it is only one 
aspect of the veneration of the ideal of the Roman Empire from the twelfth century 
onwards. 
From the perspective of political thoughts, the ideal of the (Holy) Roman Empire 
became particularly important in the struggle between church and state, dominantly 
between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. The Donation of Constantine was a 
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late eighth century fraud claiming to be a fourth century document wherein the 
Emperor Constantine handed over the Western Roman Empire to Pope Sylvester. The 
Donation was frequently used in debates about church vs. state power in the eleventh 
and twelfth century and was only refuted by Lorenzo Valla in mid-fifteenth century, 
though suspicions as to its originality had existed since the eleventh century.147 Since 
the coronation of Charlemagne in 800, the popes had claimed the right of the papacy 
to ratify or reject the emperor chosen by the electors of the Holy Roman Empire, 
including the right not only to crown but also to de-crown the emperors. 
It was a high-conflict setting complicated by the internal schism of the church and 
general accusations of corruption. A burgeoning Italian sense of nationalism infused 
the developing Renaissance, leading two key writers from the early fourteenth century 
to revive the idea of the empire as a way to peace. Born only ten years apart, Dante 
Alighieri (1265-1321) from Florence and Marsilius of Padua (1275-c.1342) both took 
on the task of defending the secular power of the state from the claims of the papacy, 
and more broadly to argue the case for the Empire as the guarantor of peace. 
-The Secular Empire- 
In the context of the schism between church and state in the 13th century, Dante and 
Marsilius placed themselves firmly on the side of the state. The questions whether the 
church had the right to jurisdiction over the clergy and the right to confirm or reject 
the secular choice of rulers—especially the Holy Roman Emperor—were key issues 
of contention on which the church had developed a comprehensive set of arguments 
based on interpretation of Scripture and the Donation of Constantine. Both Dante and 
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Marsilius argued that the open competition over areas of jurisdiction between the 
church and state was the most persistent cause of strife and unrest in Western Europe. 
In the words of Dante, “what state the world has been in since that seamless garment 
was rent on the nail of cupidity we may easily read –would that we could not behold 
it!”148 In this declaration, the ’seamless garment’ referred to the Roman Empire under 
Augustus, in Dante’s imagination a world empire of peace and justice, and the cause 
of its being torn apiece was the Donation of Constantine, granting temporal powers to 
the papacy. Marsilius echoed Dante’s sentiment when he introduced it as:  
This singular cause of strife. [...] –which Aristotle could not perceive, and neither has 
anyone else after him, who could have done, undertaken to define it – it is our will to 
lift the veil in such a way that it can henceforth be excluded from all realms and civil 
orders, and once excluded, virtuous princes and subjects can live in tranquillity more 
securely.149   
Here, as in Dante, the ‘singular cause’ is revealed to be the adoption of temporal 
powers by the church, thus a cause that even Aristotle could not perceive, as he 
antedated both Christ and the church by several centuries. This is a very strong 
condemnation, since Marsilius singles out the temporal powers of the church as the 
root cause of the destabilisation of civil society.  
Given the situation, Dante and Marsilius used their strong openings as a starting-point 
only. Both De Monarchia and Defender of the Peace were written in three books—or 
discourses—and both used an entire book or discourse to argue why the church 
should not hold temporal power. 
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In the case of Dante, the concluding book debates, “whether the authority of the 
Roman Monarch (who is Monarch of the world by right as we have proved in the 
second book) is immediately dependent on God, or whether his authority comes from 
some other, a vicar or minister of God (I am referring to the Successor of Peter), who 
is entrusted with the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”150 After briefly rejecting various 
arguments in favour of papal authority over the emperor, Dante concluded, “that the 
temporal Monarch receives his authority directly, and without intermediary, from the 
Source of all authority”151, the ‘Source’ being God. Nevertheless, he thought that the 
emperor owed filial reverence to the pope “so that when he is enlightened by the light 
of paternal grace he may the more powerfully enlighten the world”152, conceding to 
the pope a privileged role of spiritual guidance. 
Compared to Dante, Marsilius launched a much stronger attack on the power of the 
church. While Dante’s three books are of roughly equal length, and none of his three 
topics of debate thus outweighs the other, Marsilius dedicated far more than twice the 
amount of space to the second discourse against the papacy than to the two other 
discourses added together.153 Thus, while secularism can be seen as simply one of 
three aspects in De Monarchia, the defence of the secular state is unquestionably the 
main issue in Defender of the Peace. Like Dante, Marsilius attacked the Decretalists, 
who focussed on the Papal Decretals, for corrupting the meaning of Scripture and 
ignoring the traditions of the original church.154 However, while Dante based the rest 
of his argument on stating and then rejecting the church’s various claims to temporal 
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power155, Marsilius merely listed most of those arguments in Discourse II chapter 
3,156 and used the rest of the discourse to develop extensive counterarguments. 
Marsilius’ key arguments in favour of a secular state came from the Bible, counter 
arguing the papal claims by presenting Scriptural passages that supported a division 
between secular power and religion. He argued that Christ had upheld the right of the 
Roman Empire to jurisdiction separate from religious considerations in his teachings 
and by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the Empire through its lawful 
representative,157 and that Christ had dictated a life of poverty for his disciples.158  
The last, Marsilius argued, was in open contradiction of the needs of a prince, and 
thus a sign that Christ did not intend his disciples, and thus priests, to be temporal 
princes. In particular, two pieces of scripture stood out. The first was “Render 
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are 
God’s” (Matthew 22. 17-19), implying that the things of God and the things of Caesar 
are separate and that all men owe Caesar, the secular power, the tribute he is due.159 
This dual argument simultaneously stripped the church of it claims to secular power 
and to exemption from taxes, both of which were significant problems for the secular 
leaders at the time.160 The second key Scripture is the texts connected to the Passion 
of Christ, because they demonstrated that Christ had chosen to be subjected to the 
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Roman Emperor, through his representative Pontius Pilate. Marsilius argued that by 
choosing to be handed over from the religious court to the secular, and by accepting 
and suffering the verdict of the secular judge, Christ demonstrated by example that the 
secular power had the blessing of God and that no one, even the son of God, was 
exempted from temporal jurisdiction. 161 In this perspective, Paul’s appeal unto 
Caesar confirmed that the disciples—and, as a consequence, all priests—were under 
secular authority just as Christ had been.162 
The focus on separating the secular government from religious control is an essential 
development in the perception of how an empire should secure peace. While the 
ancient Greeks considered the communality of basic religious tenets part of their 
Greek identity and the old Roman Empire demanded respect for the main gods of the 
Empire, the ancient systems were not based on universal religious agreement and they 
allowed a high degree of religious tolerance(though monotheism was considered 
problematic). The connection that had developed between the Roman Empire and the 
Roman Church was therefore a new situation which had reached a peak during the 
middle ages. The insistence of Marsilius and Dante on separating the secular from the 
religious powers and setting the secular power above the priesthood was crucial in 
that it would allow the empires of the future to adopt a degree of religious tolerance 
again, and with that the possibility of a universal identity beyond religion. 
-Dante: Introducing the World State- 
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A lasting legacy of Dante’s Monarchia is his introduction of the concept of the World 
State. Though Dante himself thought that the concept went back to the ancient Roman 
Empire, modern sources would disagree. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in 
the article on ‘World State’ (updated July 2012), lists Dante as the first philosopher to 
promote explicitly the idea of a world state, and as the person who “best articulated 
the Christian ideal of human unity and its expression through a world governed by a 
universal monarch”.163 It will be seen later that this is the argument made by York in 
her Leagues of Nations, where the first chapter covers antiquity broadly, while the 
second chapter focuses on Dante and his Monarchia specifically, with a short 
comparison of Dante to Marsilius included.164 Dante’s argument in favour of a World 
State, first posits that monarchy is necessary in general, starting with an authoritative 
reference to Aristotle: 
Thus the first question is whether temporal monarchy is necessary for the well-being 
of the world. Now no substantial objection either from reason of authority can be 
urged against it, and its truth can be demonstrated by the clearest and most cogent 
arguments, the first of which is derived from the authority of the Philosopher in his 
Politics. There the acknowledged authority states that when several things are directed 
towards a single end it is necessary for one of them to act as director or ruler and for 
the others to be directed or ruled.165  
That Aristotle, in fact, did not argue that monarchy is the necessary and best form of 
rule, does not appear to concern Dante.  
From the general assertion that monarchy is necessary, Dante moved on to declaring 
that there should be only one monarch: 
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But mankind is most one when the whole human race is drawn together in complete 
unity, which can only happen when it is subordinate to one Prince, as is self-evident. 
Therefore when mankind is subject to one Prince it is most like to God and this implies 
conformity to the divine intention, which is the condition of perfection, as was proved 
at the beginning of this chapter.166 
For Dante, the case for having one monarch only for all humankind was not just 
bolstered by Aristotle’s authority and the fact that it would make human governance 
most God-like. One of his key arguments, often used in variations since, is that the 
person who is monarch of all has nothing left to desire, and freed of personal desires 
is able to judge justly, without reference to own advantage, because nothing will give 
him more advantage than he already possesses.167 But if more than one monarchy 
exist, then the various monarchs would still be left with the desire for the possessions 
of each other, and could not be trusted to judge impartially in disputes between them. 
Thus the only way to secure justice, and with that a truly universal peace, is to gather 
all parts of humanity under one monarch, compared to whom no other human can 
have anything worth desiring. Therefore, he can judge justly, not only in disputes 
among individuals, but also in disputes among peoples.  
It is clear, then, that Dante considered lack of justice to be the cause of strife, 
internally or external as well as external; that he thought that a supreme judge above 
all people and peoples could settle disputes, and thought that it was possible to create 
an un-biased judge. The combination of these three assumptions made him support of 
a universal monarchy or World State. The appeal of these ideas to any imperial design 
is easy to see, as they explicitly justify having one overreaching empire, in Dante’s 
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mind a restored Roman Empire. This laid the basis for several centuries worth of new 
suggestions of a World State, unsurprisingly always with its power-centre in the home 
of the author. However, in a broader sense, Dante’s suggestion highlighted the 
possibility of an international court with binding authority on all parts of the world, as 
a solution to strife between the nations, and in that respect, York, for instance, 
liberally interpreted Dante’s monarchy as a precursor of the League of Nations 
idea.168   
 
- Marsilius: Legitimacy and Constitution- 
Defender of the Peace is a text that bridges antiquity and modernity, containing a 
wealth of ideas related to both ancient political ideas and modern practises. Marsilius’ 
focus on the secular state is only one aspect of several, where his ideas can be 
connected to the present.  
Like the political thinkers of antiquity, Marsilius’ civic starting point was the city-
state, even when his contemporary scope was the Holy Roman Empire. In the first 
discourse, he used that basis to describe what constitutes a legitimate political 
government: 
Let us say, then, in accordance with both the truth and the counsel of Aristotle, Politics 
II Chapter 6, that the ‘legislator’, i.e. the primary and proper efficient cause of the law, 
is the people or the universal body of the citizens or else its prevalent part, when, by 
means of an election or will expressed in speech in a general assembly of the citizens, 
it commands or determines, subject to temporal penalty or punishment, that something 
should be done or omitted in respect of human civil acts. (I say ‘prevailing part’ taking 
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into consideration both the quantity and quality of persons in the community upon 
which the law is passed). 169 
In this quote, Marsilius makes three things clear: First, that the legitimate cause of 
law, the ‘legislator’, is the “universal body of citizens”, in contrast to divine law, 
natural law, or even Dante’s “source of all authority”. Secondly, that the legislator 
acts through elections or the general assembly of citizens, which is a clear nod to the 
city state, where a general assembly of citizens was feasible. Finally, his caveat, “or 
the prevailing part” is explained as being both quantitative and qualitative, and could 
thus either mean the majority decision, or the decision of the ‘better’ men, by which 
one would understand the aristocrats.  
Marsilius’ use of both a quantitative and qualitative base for rule, suggests a 
continuation of the Aristotelian ideal of mixed government that Cicero (and Polybius 
before him) had considered realised in the Roman Republic.  Support for a mixed 
constitution is further seen in his description of the daily running of the executive 
power: 
[A] Although the legislator, as the primary and proper cause of this, ought to determine 
which men should exercise what kind of functions in the city, nevertheless it is the 
princely part that commands, and if necessary enforces, the execution of such 
decisions, as he does other matters of law. [B] For it is more convenient for the 
execution of legal matters to take place through him than through the universal 
multitude of the citizens, since one or a few persons exercising the function of prince 
are enough for this business, in which the universal community would be 
unnecessarily occupied and would moreover be distracted from other necessary tasks. 
[C] For when these individuals do something, the entire community does it: since those 
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who exercise the function of prince do it in accordance with the determination (sc. 
legal) of the community; and because they are few or one in number, legal matters are 
more easily carried out170 
It is worth noting the set of constitutional points set out by Marsilius. First, section A 
is, at least in theory, very democratic, as it implies that the body of citizens should 
choose their officials, not in the abstract, as if he had said ‘which class of men’, but in 
the concrete ‘which men’ for ‘which functions’, as highlighted by the underlining. 
Section B then makes clear that executive power should be placed in the hand of one 
or a few people, because this delegation of power is more efficient than unbridled 
direct democracy and a few executives are sufficient for the job (see underlining). 
Finally, section C stresses that there is no disconnection between what the individual 
executive does, and what the community does, on the assumption that the executive is 
acting in accordance to the rules he has been appointed to administer. In addition to 
the previous points, Marsilius argued in favour of elective rather than hereditary 
princes,171 supported the possibility of stripping a prince of his office if he did not 
adhere to the laws,172 and even suggested that the office of prince could be time-
determined as well as for life.173 Not surprisingly, his ideas held appeal for 19th and 
early 20th century liberals, as one can read in a short American tract on Marsilius from 
1920, The Defensor Pacis of Marsiglio of Padua, and indeed in York’s Leagues of 
Nations.174 
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The prince of Marsilius was envisioned as an administrator, a bureaucrat even, whose 
job was to administrate the laws that had been established for the common good. 
Discourse I, 17, elaborates the need for only one supreme ‘principate’, or government, 
per realm, which should hold authority over any lower principates, thus securing a 
clear line separation of their powers.175 This has much in common with Dante’s 
arguments in Monarchia on why the power should be gathered in one monarch, but 
unlike Dante, Marsilius specifically makes clear, that the principate should not per 
definition be understood as resting in one person only. For Marsilius, the principate is 
the executive function, which can be delegated either to one person or to a group of 
persons, who hold the executive function together. 176 
In this administrative apparatus, the prince administers the laws by relying on the 
specialist knowledge of people called in to inform in a dispute, while his function is to 
apply the laws justly according to the evidence presented.177 It will be seen in a later 
chapter that this perception has some similarities to Duncan Hall’s ideas on the value 
of specialist boards to promote certain areas of knowledge and advise the 
administrations.178 
The basis of legitimacy and mixed constitution presented by Marsilius owed a clear 
debt to Aristotle and the political ideas of the Roman Republic. At the same time, his 
explicitly bureaucratic perception of government was well suited as a model for 
administration of the modern empires, and his co-option by early twentieth century 
writers can be seen in York’s description of him as a “Liberal thinker and writer”.179 
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-Purpose of (Roman) Empire – 
We must desire peace, seek to acquire it when we do not have it, keep it once acquired, 
and fight off its opposite, strife, with every effort.180 (Marsilius) 
This is the task to which that protector of the world must devote his energies who is 
called the Roman Prince. His office is to provide freedom and peace for men as they 
pass through the testing-time of this world.181 (Dante) 
That the troubled thirteenth and fourteenth centuries should bring forth promoters of 
peace is hardly surprising and, as shown above, Dante and Marsilius both identified 
the church’s assumption of temporal powers as the primary cause of strife. However, 
it is interesting to notice that the suggested solution was a strong empire. For Dante, it 
was based in his belief that a time of universal peace had indeed existed at the 
beginning of the Roman Empire: 
At no time do we see universal peace throughout the world except during the perfect 
monarchy of the immortal Augustus. The fact that mankind at that time was resting 
happily in universal peace is attested by all the historians and the illustrious poets.182 
Dante’s Augustus had, in the words of Marsilius, been the Defender of the Peace. 
Dante also believed that the Romans had shown their worthiness of power, by their 
dedication to universal peace: 
For that holy, pious and glorious people [the Romans] repressed all that greed which is 
harmful to the community, preferring universal peace and liberty; so much so that they 
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seem to have sacrificed their own advantage in order to secure the general well-being 
of mankind.183 
Thus the Roman Empire was a divinely ordained leader of the world, populated by a 
uniquely noble people. This perception of the Romans being uniquely suited to 
universal leadership, through their cultural values such as liberty, self-sacrifice and 
the dedication to “the general well-being of all mankind” was exactly the same kind 
of self-perception in regards to the British people that in the early twentieth century 
made the imperialist-internationalists believe that the British Empire was a suitable 
model for the League of Nations. The world monarchy, or world state, that Dante was 
calling for was largely a restoration of Pax Romana by re-establishing the Roman 
Empire with Italian rule. In this perspective, Dante’s ideas appear less progressive, 
and more of a conservative wish to bring back a golden age when his own people 
ruled. 
Marsilius, on the other hand, was more in the line of translatio imperii, though he 
only briefly referred to the concept.184 It was the German Holy Roman Emperor who 
had his support, and it was the benefits of the well-governed realm that he wishes to 
restore, rather than the resurrection of the defunct Empire. He was ambivalent about 
whether there should be only one empire. On one hand, all his examples of how the 
early church had correctly accepted the authority of the secular power related to the 
Roman Empire, and he consistently used the Holy Roman Emperor as the example of 
the prince whose rights were infringed upon by the Pope. Likewise, his idea that the 
power to convene councils to determine matters of religious doctrine rests with the 
secular prince strongly suggests that he thought there should be only one prince, or 
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principate, with the power to convene such councils. And, finally, Marsilius 
specifically used the term “the universal Roman Empire” in discourse II in connection 
with his charge that the church is responsible for stirring up sedition.185 On the other 
hand, in the passage just referred to, Marsilius charged the church with stirring up 
sedition in “all kingdoms” and in the first discourse he specifically left the question 
unanswered as to whether there should be one or several empires: 
As to whether it is appropriate for the universal body of those who live a civil life 
throughout the whole world to have one single principate that is supreme over all, or 
whether at any one time it is appropriate to have different such principates in different 
reaches of the world, separated almost of necessity by their geographical situation, and 
particularly in those which do not share a language and are very far apart in manners 
and custom; this being propelled by a celestial cause, to avoid the over-propagation of 
humanity; this is a topic for rational examination, but a different one from the present 
enquiry.186 
This open-ended acknowledgement that one could argue in favour of either one 
principate only, a world state, or of a diversity of states shows that at the very least 
Marsilius realised that it was an interesting topic, though it is not clear if he had read 
Dante’s Monarchia. It also shows that he found it unnecessary to his work, 
specifically calling it “a different one from the present enquiry" which he did not 
engage with any further.187  
It is tempting to read Defender of the Peace as a more practical proposal when 
compared with Dante’s more utopian ideas. Where Dante argued that a universal 
                                                             
185 Marsilius, Defender of the Peace, II, 21, 13 (p. 388). 
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prince would be just for lack of things left to desire, Marsilius took a more sceptical 
approach and included the possibility of holding a prince to account if he had abused 
his powers, on the assumption that all men are corruptible, and that every so often a 
prince will make transgressions big enough for him to have to be suspended from 
office. It could well be practical considerations of a similar kind that kept Marsilius 
from throwing full support behind the idea of one world empire, as the practical 
reality of many existing states would make it highly improbable that world unity 
could be achieved. Nevertheless, the split between Dante and Marsilius in terms of the 
purpose of the Roman Empire is one of scope, rather than of aim. While Dante’s 
scope was universal, Marsilius was willing to consider the possibility that peace 
should be obtained internally in a range of realms instead, though much of his writing 
clearly supports a very strong Roman Empire. In spite of that difference, it remains 
clear that both authors believed that the purpose of the empire was to secure peace 
and justice.   
2.3 Modernity 
While the previous sections have covered large periods of time, based on a small 
selection of sources, the eighteenth century was so full of peace proposals that it has 
been split into two periods here—that is the first and second half of the century—a 
division that represents a watershed in the development of ideas on empires and their 
role in securing perpetual peace.  
The first section reviews a variety of proposals on perpetual peace, representing the 
views of some generally lesser known thinkers in the early eighteenth century from 
England, France and Italy, before finishing with a discussion of Rousseau’s views on 
perpetual peace published in 1756. During this period it is argued that ‘empire’, 
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specifically in the tradition of the Roman Empire, was still a significant influence on 
ideas about how to organise internationally to secure lasting and even perpetual peace 
among the European nations. Compared to Dante’s Monarchia and his idea of a 
World Empire, the early eighteenth century scope was, in some ways, more limited, 
as most projects specifically referred to the European sphere (though in some cases 
including the Turks and the Russians). However, given European colonial expansion 
into the Americas, and increasing penetration into Asia, it could be argued that a 
perpetual European peace would mean a wider peace around the colonial world. 
This section then goes on to look at developments in the second part of the eighteenth 
century, focusing on a more decidedly British selection of texts, along with Kant’s 
proposal for perpetual peace. The British texts selected are Bentham’s proposal for 
peace, along with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and John Stuart Mill’s On 
Representative Government. It is immediately noticeable that only two of the texts are 
peace proposals raising the question of why Smith and Mill are included here. It is 
argued that the American Declaration of Independence, which resulted in the United 
States becoming independent, put questions of empire and colonialism under critical 
review. The selected British authors stressed all the problems inherent in an imperial 
structure that was centralised and—importantly—gave different rights to its citizens 
depending on where in the empire they lived. As demonstrated in detail further on, 
these issues led to certain aspects of the empires being seen as causes of war rather 
than allowing them to act as defenders of peace. However, in spite of the criticisms 
against colonialism, the idea of the Roman Empire and Pax Romana as the main 
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relevant precedent remained very much alive in the discussions of international 
peace.188 
One of the conceptual problems in the debate about perpetual peace was the lack of a 
non-imperial framework of language. It was only in the late eighteenth century 
onwards that the words ‘international’, and ‘organisation’ first started to gain traction 
in their modern meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary Bentham is mentioned as 
the first user of the word ‘international’ in his 1780 tract An introduction to the 
principles of morals and legislation.189 Meanwhile, ‘organisation’ in the meaning of 
“An organized body of people with a particular purpose” is first traced to 1793.190 On 
that background, it is tempting to speculate that the American Revolution and its 
impact on political ideas was really the starting point for reconceptualising the British 
Empire as an international organisation, in an attempt to salvage what was considered 
best of the institution. 
The majority of the texts used in this section have all been printed in Early Notions of 
Global Governance by Esref Aksu,191 with the exception of Adam Smith and John 
Stuart Mill. Curiously, many of the translated editions used by Aksu are the same that 
appear in York’s Leagues of Nations, which makes them particularly useful, as 
examples of the language used in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.192 In 
                                                             
188 See Parchami, Hegemonic Peace and Empire, pp. 74-77. 
189 “international, adj. and n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, September 
2014). 
190 “organization, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
191 Aksu, Early Notions of Global Governance.  
192 One interesting example is the translation of Rousseau, where the original French République 
Europenne, is translated as ‘Commonwealth of Europe’ in the 1917 edition reprinted by Aksu (and 
York). 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         94 
 
the case of Rousseau and Kant, editions in the original language have been consulted 
to compare with the language usage of the translations.193  
2.3.1 The early eighteenth century  
The seventeenth-century wars, such as the Thirty Years War, the Turkish wars, and 
the English Civil War, combined with significant developments in political 
philosophy visible in the political tracts of writers like Hobbes and Locke to fertilize 
the ground for a new interest in questions of international order. Starting with William 
Penn in 1693, a whole string of proposals for perpetual peace were published during 
the eighteenth century, although by its end there was no longer any strong successor 
of the Roman Empire around. The Holy Roman Empire, though still existing, was an 
empire in name only with little real coercive power, and unlike the many absolute 
monarchs of the period, in his role as emperor the Holy Roman Emperor had little 
personal power.  
The proposals for creating the basis for a lasting peace came from around Europe. The 
texts used here are William Penn, An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of 
Europe by the Establishment of an European Diet, Parliament, or Estates (1693); 
John Bellers, Some Reasons for An European State, Proposed to the Powers of 
Europe (1710); Abbé de Saint-Pierre,  A Project for Settling and Everlasting Peace in 
Europe (1713); Cardinal Alberoni, Scheme of a ‘Perpetual Diet’ for Establishing the 
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Public Tranquillity (1736); and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,  ‘Abstract’ and ‘Judgment’ of 
the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace (1756).194 
As may be noticed, these texts come from both England, France, and Italy, indicating 
an interest in the topic across Europe. They all share some common ideas, primarily 
the formation of a common European ‘diet’, ‘congress’, ‘Senate’, or ‘parliament’ in 
which all the established countries and regions of Europe would have the right to 
representation. Actual representation should be arranged according to a formula, for 
which some made suggestions, and all agreed that the specifics should be settled in 
the actual negotiation of starting such a congress.195 
Some of the similarities are due to common sources. Bellers, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, 
and Rousseau all referred to the Grand Design of Henry IV, and Cardinal Alberoni 
largely copied it. The Grand Design was published by the Duke of Sully in the years 
1638 (first part) and 1662 (second part), the author claiming that Henry IV had 
masterminded the plan and had managed to get the agreement of Queen Elizabeth to 
his proposal.196 It is now commonly assumed that the Grand Design was the work of 
Sully himself and that his claims about Henry’s authorship and secret negotiations 
were fabricated, but none of the writers of the eighteenth century airs such 
suspicions.197 Given that they used the Grand Design as proof that great monarchs 
                                                             
194  All printed in Aksu, Early Notions of Global Governance.  
195  W. Penn, An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of an 
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also had serious interests in a peace scheme, they had no motivation to doubt Sully’s 
version. 
In addition to their adherence to the Great Design, Rousseau—as the title of his work 
suggests—was using the work of l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre as the basis, and perhaps 
justification, for his own text. Though Rousseau has generously added his own 
thoughts, the core of the work of Abbé de Saint-Pierre remains. It is interesting to 
notice that Carr considered the work of Abbé de Saint-Pierre “one of the earliest 
schemes for a League of Nations”,198 thus suggesting a very straight line of thought, 
not only from the mid-nineteenth century, but from the early eighteenth century and 
on to his interwar utopians. 
- Importance of the Roman Empire- 
Although the Roman Empire and it successors were almost gone, it remained the main 
reference for international peace and order into the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The Grand Design opened with a long tribute to the Roman Empire, 
including its own version of translatio imperii leading via Charlemagne to Henry IV, 
thus establishing both the credentials of Henry and of his plan.199  
In a different manner, Rousseau paid homage to the importance of the Roman Empire 
in giving much of Europe a common political heritage, and the ideal of a world of 
law, order and rights.200 He stressed the importance of the universality of political 
conditions across the Empire, writing:  
when half of the known universe had passed beneath the same yoke, a common bond 
of laws and government was established, and all found themselves members of the 
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same [Roman] empire. This bond was still further tightened by the recognized 
principle, either supremely wise or supremely foolish, imparting to the conquered all 
the rights of the conqueror; above all, by the famous decree of Claudius, which placed 
all the subjects of Rome on the roll of her citizens.201 
Rousseau insisted that the Empire had made its component parts “one body politic” in 
which “the mutual rights and duties of the ruler and the subject” were defined as 
clearly as possible.202 Highlighting these lofty ideals, Rousseau treated the Roman 
Empire as a kind of precedent for a well-functioning modern state, implying that 
lessons could be learned from it when thinking about international order—although 
Rousseau himself did not want a restoration of the Empire. 
Penn did not give a similar long tribute to the Roman Empire, but he considered one 
of the benefits of lasting peace to be the restoration of, “the ease and security of travel 
and traffic - an [sic] happiness never understood since the Roman Empire has been 
broken into so many sovereignties.”203 In this way, Penn too, validated the importance 
of the Roman Empire as a positive reference for international order in Europe. 
It is worth noting, that while a century separated Sully and Rousseau, their arguments 
for the importance of the Roman Empire only seemed to be strengthened over time 
rather than weakened. When Rousseau’s description is compared that of Dante or 
Marsilius, he does not appear any less taken with the ideal of Rome than were his 
medieval predecessors. This reflects the fact that the Roman Empire had become an 
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ideal to the political philosophers that could guide contemporary reflection and 
practice rather than being seen simply in terms of the past. 
-“the Germanic body”, using the  Holy Roman Empire as a contemporary example- 
The Roman Empire was not the only imperial example used in the early eighteenth 
century texts. The Holy Roman Empire was also a common framework of reference, 
consistently used as a positive example, in spite of its decline into insignificance. 
However, it is interesting to notice that rather than calling it ‘the Holy Roman 
Empire’, Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau referred to it as “the Germanic body”, or 
“the German Union” when using it as an example,204 while Penn used the term 
“Empire of Germany”.205 This reluctance was reflected in a point made by Rousseau 
when he stated that: “Respect for the Roman Empire has so completely survived her 
power that many jurists have questioned whether the Emperor of Germany is not the 
natural sovereign of the world.”206 Avoiding the term ‘Holy Roman Empire’ was thus 
a way to avoid accepting the idea that translatio imperii made the German Emperor 
the heir to the power of Rome. 
Nevertheless, the German Diet was directly and implicitly used as a model by Penn, 
Bellers, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Cardinal Alberoni, and Rousseau in their suggestions 
for a European assembly of some kind. This is seen both in direct references to the 
German Diet as a model for how a European assembly might be made, but also, more 
discreetly, in the prevalence of the use of the word ‘Diet’ as the name for the 
European assembly. 207 Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau both made specific 
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references to the ‘Germanic Body’ or ‘Germanic Union’ as an example of functional 
international cooperation. According to Rousseau, in spite of its deficiencies, the Diet 
provided cohesion of its members, so that “there is not one of them, who would chose, 
even if he had the power, to win absolute independence at the cost of severance from 
the Empire.”208 In this way, the theme of empires as organisations that provide 
structure and cohesion was continued, along with the notion that membership of the 
empires is something to be desired, and a privilege that no one would choose to lose. 
This line of thought can also be seen in Penn’s use of the word ‘imperial’ when 
formulating his organisational framework. Penn suggests an ‘Imperial Diet’ or 
‘Imperial Parliament’ be created composed of ‘Imperial States’.209 While Penn also 
uses the terms ‘Sovereign Diet’ and ‘Sovereign States’, it is the terms based on 
‘Imperial’ that are predominant in his writing, suggesting that his international 
framework was naturally ‘imperial’ by virtue of joining a number of states under a 
higher international authority. 
-Collaboration rather than World State- 
Based on the German example, the idea expressed by many of the writers reviewed 
here was to create a European diet or assembly, in which the established powers were 
represented, and which would meet at regular intervals. This is the standard idea, 
going back to the Grand Design, though with some variations between the authors as 
to exactly how many representatives each state should have (for example Bellers 
suggested that Europe should be divided into 100 equal provinces, based on which the 
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right to representatives and duties of contributions should be calculated).210 This Diet 
would have the power to make some common rules, settle disagreements, impose 
penalties on members who violated the agreements, and ultimately use physical force 
against unruly members.211 At the same time, it would be able to call up common 
support, to protect the ‘Union’ (Abbé de Saint-Pierre) or ‘Confederation’ (Rousseau) 
from outside attacks.212 In short, according to Rousseau, the states of Europe were to 
take on “the strength and firmness of a genuine body politic.”213  
However, it would not be the purpose of the Diet to standardise the internal 
governments of the member states—in fact, it was commonly suggested that it would 
have the responsibility of supporting, even securing, status quo.214 The member states 
were to remain independent units within the organisation, just as the German States 
were independent inside the Empire. This suggests that the writers discussed here 
thought in terms of cooperation between independent states –a principle so important 
to later international organisations—rather than of a world state (in spite of 
Rousseau’s talk of one body politic). Penn specifically rejected the idea of a world 
state, saying of his proposed Imperial Diet: 
This leads to the benefit of a universal monarchy, without the inconveniences that 
attend it, for when the whole was one empire, though these advantages were enjoyed, 
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yet the several provinces that now make the kingdoms and states of Europe were under 
some hardship from the great sums of money remitted to the imperial seat.215 
A key issue then, was the participation of all members in the decision-making 
process, creating, in the words of Rousseau, a federation where the interests of all 
members were taken into account and without an imperial centre as such. 
The late seventeenth and early eighteenth century thus show a clear tendency to use 
the imperial models as a precedent while simultaneously trying to set up a new system 
where all participant parts had similar rights in the decision-making processes. This 
was clearly an issue to be followed up by the development of the British Empire in the 
nineteenth century, and by British thinkers up to the imperialist-internationalists.   
2.3.2 The late eighteenth to mid nineteenth century 
In spite of the generally very brief attention paid in this thesis to the historical context 
of the writers, it is worth stressing the crucial importance of the American 
Independence to both the political thinkers of the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and, equally, to the imperialist reformers of the early twentieth century. For 
the imperialist-internationalists at the centre of this study it was the end of an epoch, 
the transitional moment that brought the British Empire from its first to its second 
stage,216 and which provided a clear warning of what would happen to the Empire of 
the twentieth century if the lessons of 1776 were not taken to heart.217 
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For Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations was published during the push for 
independence, as well as for Bentham and Kant writing in the first decades after the 
event, and J.S. Mill writing with nearly a century’s perspective, American 
Independence was proof of the limits of colonialism. Although both Adam Smith and 
J.S. Mill thought that largely speaking the English colonies had been treated decently 
by the English government, it was clear to all that the colonial system had failed to 
make the colonists feel like they had equal rights with their British ‘brothers’ across 
the Atlantic. Indeed most of the writers would admit that they had not. The American 
revolution had also demonstrated clearly that the supposed benefits of being part of an 
empire, even as a settler colony with a fair degree of local governance, were not so 
tempting as to make severance unappealing (as Rousseau had suggested was the case 
with the Holy Roman Empire). Nor did being part of the Empire prevent one part 
from going to war with another part, namely the mother country. The fact that trade 
between the new United States and Great Britain soon normalised to pre-
independence levels were, if anything, an indication that colonialism was not even 
necessary to stabilise international trade. 
 
 
-Late Eighteenth century anti-colonialism and universal peace- 
Adam Smith wrote during the “present disturbances” in the American colonies 
without yet knowing their ultimate outcome,218 but he was certainly clear about their 
direction. With a perspective more economic than political, he argued that, excepting 
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foreign trade, the settlers were “in every respect equal to that of their fellow-citizens 
at home, [...] secured in the same manner, by an assembly of the representatives of the 
people, who claim the sole right of imposing taxes for the support of the colony 
government” and in addition they enjoyed a greater degree of equality between 
them.219 However, in spite of that apparent political equality, colonialism was bad for 
colonies, because of the effects of the mother country monopolising their international 
trade, which tended “to diminish, or, at least, to keep down below what they would 
otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and industry of all those nations in general, and 
of the American colonies in particular”. This meant that in spite of the certainty of a 
market, all parties ended up the poorer for lack of a free flow of capital and ideas.220 
Whatever the virtues of its internal government, colonialism, when tied to trade 
monopolies, was an economic loss for the colonies that they could not be expected to 
suffer willingly.  
On the other side of the issue, Britain was likewise harmed economically by the 
consequences of the monopolies, irrespective of how much they might favour a few 
individuals, and additionally: 
 
The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military force for the 
defence of the mother country. Their military force has never yet been sufficient for 
their own defence; and in the different wars in which the mother countries have been 
engaged, the defence of their colonies has generally occasioned a very considerable 
distraction of the military force of those countries. In this respect, therefore, all the 
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European colonies have, without exception, been a cause rather of weakness than of 
strength to their respective mother countries.221 
Bearing the military cost in mind, colonialism was presented as an even worse deal 
for the mother country than for the colonies, as they were bound always to be an 
expense rather than a source of profit.222 
Though Bentham did not directly refer to Smith, Bentham’s 1789 Plan for An 
Universal and Perpetual Peace223 he clearly accepted the economic claims from the 
Wealth of Nations.224 Furthermore, he specifically argued, that the possession of 
colonies was the main cause of war in his time,225 and consequently considered “the 
emancipation of the distant dependencies of each state” one of his two fundamental 
principles for securing perpetual peace.226 His remedy was for Britain, and other 
colonial powers, to give independence to their dependencies, as that would, with one 
fell stroke, remove the bones of contention, all the while relieving the mother 
countries of an economic burden, and securing fairer and better political and 
economic life within in the former colonies.227 Smith had also considered the 
advantages of voluntarily giving up the colonies, which he thought included the 
probability of quickly (re-)establishing friendly relations such as those “which used to 
subsist between those of ancient Greece and the mother city from which they 
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descended” as well as the economic advantages to both sides.228 However, he argued, 
“No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome 
soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the revenue which it afforded 
might be in proportion to the expense which it occasioned”,229 and thus this 
theoretically great idea was unlikely to be realised. 
Kant, meanwhile, in his Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (1795),230 objected 
wholly to colonialism on moral grounds, stressing “the injustice which they [the 
European nations] exhibit on visiting foreign lands and races—this being equivalent 
in their eyes to conquest.”  He emphasised the many ills of oppression, famine, 
disease and strife that the Europeans brought with them, as well as the contribution of 
imperial conflict to the continued wars in Europe.231  With Smith, Bentham and Kant, 
a pattern of seeing colonialism as intrinsically bad, whether economically, politically, 
or morally presents itself. There is a clear divide between the British writers’ focus on 
settlers and economic and political considerations, and Kant’s moral focus on the 
negative impact of colonialism on the non-European populations, but all concluded 
that colonialism was an obstacle to peace.   
-Suggestions for World Peace- 
As demonstrated, one of Bentham’s main points was the need to emancipate the 
colonies, the other being the reduction of forces, especially standing armies.232 The 
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second point will not be further discussed here, except to point out the obvious, that is 
has remained a fixture of most peace debates since. However, though not listed in his 
initial two main points, Bentham also raised the suggestion of creating a “Common 
Court of Judicature” to arbitrate when nations disagreed or felt their rights infringed 
on, in order to avoid such disagreements escalating into war.233 Bentham did not 
intend the court to have coercive power, but rather that “Its power would consist: (1) 
in reporting its opinion; (2) in causing that opinion to be circulated in the dominions 
of each state”.234 Accepting that this might not always be enough, Bentham added a 
third power, “after a certain time, in putting the refractory state under the ban of 
Europe”.235  
It is worth noting, that Bentham was clearly envisioning a society of broadly liberal 
states, as he thought it best that “a clause guaranteeing the liberty of the press in each 
state” should be included in the creation of the court, to allow the free circulation of 
its judgements.236 Bentham’s court was thus supposed to depend on freedom of the 
press, combined with a freedom of speech (though he did not specify that), which 
would together allow an enlightened population to pressure its own government into 
following the judgement of the court. The importance of the enlightened population 
can also be seen in Bentham’s rejection of any kind of secret negotiations in foreign 
affairs. Essentially, Bentham appears to be setting up a liberal democratic paradigm, 
and his idea about the value of public opinion was to be broadly shared by many of 
those who later helped to form the League of Nations. It is indeed interesting to notice 
that Bentham, when speaking of his international court, returns in part to the imperial 
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language, referring to the German Diet and speaking about the new ‘organisation’ that 
he wants to create as “a Congress or Diet”.237 
Kant’s proposal has few obvious similarities to Bentham’s, containing far more and 
more varied articles on how to procure a permanent peace. Nevertheless, certain 
similarities stand out. Like Bentham, Kant believed that an enlightened population 
with influence on the government was one of the best guards against war, “for in 
decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war 
upon their country”, miseries bound to fall upon the citizens themselves.238 On that 
account, Kant wanted all states to have a “republican” constitution, i.e. one that is 
based on the fundamental equality of its citizens, though he made quite clear that 
‘republican’ was not synonymous with democratic, and in fact he considered it almost 
impossible for a democratic constitution to be ‘republican’, but entirely possible for a 
monarchic constitution to be so.239 Kant pleaded for the introduction of the rule of law 
in international relations, to pull international society out of its Hobbesian state of 
nature and instead create a “federation of nations”.240 In an ideal situation, Kant 
argued, a “world-republic” gradually including all humans should be created, but 
since that would never be accepted, a “federation averting war” should at least be 
adopted.241 Kant thus suggested a “covenant of peace” in which the republican 
member states would strive “merely at the preservation and security of the state for 
itself, and of the other allies at the same time”.242 Consequently, just as no state stood 
to gain anything from the covenant in terms of power or territory, likewise none stood 
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to lose, but all would gain by avoiding the miseries of war, which would make the 
desirability of permanent peace clear for all to see. Finally, Kant, like the writers of 
the early eighteenth century, stressed that “no state shall violently interfere with the 
constitution or administration and another”,243 a principle since adopted as a basic 
tenet of international relations. 
When looking at Bentham and Kant’s suggestions for permanent peace, and 
comparing them to the debates in the formation of the League of Nations, it is clear 
that their ideas helped to shape the development of the ideas expressed by the 
imperialist-internationalists discussed in later chapters.244 
-The reforming of the British Empire as a model for World Peace- 
While Kant spoke of a world federation, Adam Smith had considered some sort of 
union of Great Britain and her colonies. Duncan Hall called Smith’s proposal “the 
most thorough scheme of Imperial Union” but insisted that “it is impossible to think 
that any of them would have dreamed of accepting it”.245 In contrast to the many 
political writers who had hailed the extension of Roman citizenship to Italians and 
later to barbarians, Smith argued that it had led to the end of the Roman constitution. 
He argued, however, 
there is not the least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union 
of Great Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be 
completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates 
and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly 
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informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, 
however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties and great difficulties might not 
occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which 
appear insurmountable.246 
With these words, Smith suggested a solution to the problem of colonialism that could 
be achieved without breaking up the Empire, by fully including the colonies into the 
greater whole and allowing them to have their own representation in Parliament, with 
perhaps some 50-60 delegates.247 What Smith had thus put on the table was the idea 
that an internal transformation of the Empire, granting fuller representation to its 
outposts, was a real (if hard to achieve) alternative to letting the Empire continue to 
exist as an uneconomic entity vulnerable to collapse because of internal resentments. 
The later Round Table and Imperial Federation movements would owe much to this 
analysis. 
John Stuart Mill, in Representative Government (1861), dedicated the last chapter to 
‘The Government of Dependencies by a Free State’.248 The fact that more than sixty 
years separated Mill’s writings from those of Smith, Bentham, Kant is important 
given that the British (and French) Empires had started expanding explosively into 
Africa, and that Britain had only three years earlier officially taken over the rule of 
India from the British East India Company. While Smith and Bentham had mainly 
referred to settler colonies, Mill and his audience were entirely aware of the two types 
of colonies within the British Empire. Mill openly divided the colonies into two 
different classes when it came to how they could and should be ruled. Like most men 
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of his time, he accepted the idea that the coloured colonies were incapable of 
representative government, and that it was in the best interests of the native 
populations to be ruled by civilised Europeans acting like benevolent despots.249 His 
following section on how to secure the best rule for the natives under these conditions 
is interesting but of little relevance here. 
Regarding the rule of the settler colonies, however, Mill took an entirely different 
view. Nearly a century after American independence, Mill held that 
 
It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain, professed in theory and 
faithfully adhered to in practice, that her colonies of European race, equally with the 
parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government. [...] The veto 
of the Crown and of Parliament, though nominally reserved, is only exercised (and that 
very rarely) on questions which concern the empire, and not solely the particular 
colony.250 
The settler colonies, later to be named Dominions, were self-governing equals, albeit 
under control of the mother country in regards to foreign affairs. In fact, Mill held, the 
result was like a loose federation: 
 
Every colony has thus as full power over its own affairs, as it could have if it were a 
member of even the loosest federation; and much fuller than would belong to it under 
the Constitution of the United States, being free even to tax at its pleasure the 
commodities imported from the Mother Country. Their union with Great Britain is the 
slightest kind of federal union; but not a strictly equal federation, the mother country 
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retaining to itself the powers of a Federal Government, though reduced in practice to 
their very narrowest limits.251 
In these glowing terms, the colonies were seen by Mill as having advantages that 
compared favourably to those of the former colonies that now made up the United 
States, and the fact of not having control of foreign affairs was suggested by him to be 
of small importance. However, small importance was not the same as no importance. 
Mill stressed that as long as Britain alone held the right to declare war, it had to cover 
the expense of war and standing armies, and could not legitimately ask the colonies to 
foot the bill for anything beyond their own immediate interests and defence, nor ask 
them to participate in wars that were did not concern their interests.252 One solution 
might be, as Smith had suggested, to have an imperial parliament with representatives 
from the colonies, but Mill rejected the idea as unacceptable to anyone in Britain, as 
the colonial representatives could not know enough about British affairs to make their 
involvement reasonable.253 A better answer, he thought, was to make sure that “every 
office or dignity in the gift of the Crown” was available to the best men of the 
colonies, just as they were to the citizens of Great Britain.254 By showing that place of 
birth was no blocking stone for a man of quality, the people of the colonies would see 
that they had an opportunity of excelling within the Empire.255 
Nevertheless, the challenge remained, why keep the Empire at all, especially 
considering the inequality that it was bound to confer upon its colonies? Mill’s answer 
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would later be echoed by the imperialist-internationalists of the early twentieth 
century: 
Though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though on 
every principle of morality and justice she ought to consent to their separation, should 
the time come when, after full trial of the best form of union, they deliberately desire 
to be dissevered; there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of 
connexion, so long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party. It is a step, as 
far as it goes, towards universal peace, and general friendly cooperation among 
nations. It renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent 
communities.256 
The British Empire, for Mill, was the defender of the peace, just as the Roman Empire 
had been in its time, and given the best possible democratic rule, it was a model to be 
followed. 
2.4 Conclusions 
The focus throughout this chapter has been on the European tradition of seeing 
empires as a constructive form of peaceful international organisation, helping to 
preserve the liberty of the citizens within its confines. Drawing a line from Greek 
antiquity through the Roman and Holy Roman Empires, and up to the mid-nineteenth 
century, it has been demonstrated that such a tradition did indeed exist. Though the 
ancient Greeks did not speak of empires as such, they still provided ideas of 
universality and models of colonial relations that helped shape later notions of 
Empire. Greek writers also expressed the notion that ‘state’ power depended on 
having the right kind of constitution – and that with such power came a responsibility 
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towards the weaker peoples under the protection of the hegemon. The Roman Empire 
then subsequently provided a precedent of universal citizenship and (theoretically at 
least) the rule of law which served as a model for many writers both in the middle 
ages and early modern periods.  
In the Medieval debate about church and state, the importance of a separation between 
secular and ecclesiastic power was stressed by writers like Dante and Marsilius, who 
also argued that a well governed secular empire represented the best way to secure 
peace. The final part of the chapter then showed how the Holy Roman Empire, even 
when weakened, was held up as a model of international cooperation in the early 
eighteenth century. It also showed that although American Independence caused 
British thinkers to critically re-evaluate their ideas about colonialism, the fundamental 
idea that an empire (in this case the British Empire) could be used to secure universal 
peace began to attract attention—something later expressed strongly in the nineteenth 
century by John Stuart Mill. At the heart of this chapter, then, has been an attempt to 
show that the idea that empires could provide a basis for international peace has a 
long lineage, an idea that was still influential in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, at a time when the imperialist-internationalists received their education.  The 
next chapter focuses on the education of the imperialist-internationalists in an effort to 
see in more specific terms the ideas and assumptions that shaped their own 
intellectual development and attitudes on questions of empire and peace. 
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3: The Classical Education and the formation of political ideas in the 
“group”  
If the eighteenth century witnessed a growing interest in the concept and development 
of plans for perpetual peace, the nineteenth century brought a strong interest in using 
classical history as a model for thinking about contemporary issues facing Britain. As 
classics was the education of choice for the “best and the brightest”, the texts that 
were taught, and not least the way they were taught and the lessons drawn from them, 
had a significant impact on British public debate and politics at the time, across the 
political spectre, with competing interpretations of the lessons of antiquity being 
offered by conservative and liberal historians. Furthermore, the combination of these 
two developments—the increase of peace proposals and rise of classics—helped 
shaped the outlook of the imperialist-internationalists of the early twentieth century. 
The argument presented is therefore not that their classical education was in any way 
unique at the time, but that consciously and subconsciously it affected their view on 
the Commonwealth and the League, and that the fact that classics was a common part 
of curriculum for the higher educated classes, made it a natural framework of 
reference when arguing their causes, and it is therefore crucial to understanding the 
mind-set of the imperialist-internationalists.  
While John Stuart Mill was given the final word in chapter two, it was his father, 
James Mill, along with Jeremy Bentham, who helped inspire one of the most 
significant nineteenth century contributors to Ancient Greek studies: George Grote. 
Grote’s twelve volume History of Greece257 was such a success that it continued to be 
regularly in print until at least 1909, with reprints of the 1909 edition appearing into 
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the 1920s and 1930s. Abridged editions were on the market in the 1940s, and as 
recently as 2010 the whole twelve volume series was reprinted by Cambridge 
University Press. According to CUP’s publicity material:  
Widely acknowledged as the most authoritative study of ancient Greece, George 
Grote's twelve-volume work, begun in 1846, established the shape of Greek history 
which still prevails in textbooks and popular accounts of the ancient world today.258  
In spite of Grote never attending university, his scholarly achievement was so 
universally accepted that he was given honorary doctorates by both Oxford and 
Cambridge Universities, in 1853 and 1861 respectively. It goes without saying that his 
History of Greece is among the works examined in this chapter, with the main focus 
being on Volume V, in which he covered the rise of the Athenian Empire until the end 
of the third year of the Peloponnesian War.259  
This chapter demonstrates how the nineteenth century saw a change in the perception 
of ancient history in Britain, with a growing focus on using antiquity as illustrative of 
the nineteenth century present. Through a brief outline of Tory usage of Ancient 
Greek history after the French Revolution, followed by an analysis of the Radical-
Liberal counter-analyses that dominated the latter half of the nineteenth century, it 
will be seen how narratives of ancient history helped to shape the perspectives of the 
imperialist-internationalists during their years as students. While both Ancient Greece 
and Imperial Rome were used as templates for the British Empire in the late 
nineteenth century, it will be argued that Imperial Rome and Sparta were most often 
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favoured as a model by those of Tory inclination, while democratic Athens and 
Hellenism (not in the sense of a historic period) were the favoured by Radicals and 
Liberals. As was seen in the first chapter, most of the imperialist-internationalists 
belonged to this latter camp. And since a significant number of those belonging to the 
group of imperialist-internationalists studied classics, particularly at Oxford, this 
chapter will also focus on Classics education at Oxford from the 1880s down to the 
end of the century, the years in which Murray, Zimmern, and the rest took their 
degrees. 
3.1 Classics in the early 19th century  
It has been seen that this thesis rests on an understanding that the development of 
ideas is heavily dependent on the historical context in which they develop (even 
though considerations of space sometime make it hard to set down the context in 
much detail). This is no less true when examining how and why interest in antiquity 
shaped contemporary understandings of Britain in the nineteenth century. It has 
previously been argued that American Independence changed the way that some 
British writers thought about questions of colonialism.  However, in the broader 
political view of the early nineteenth century, the French Revolution of 1789 and its 
consequences was at least as important in influencing political ideas. The threat of the 
overturn of all established order in the name of some uncontrolled mob-rule was 
famously the central theme in Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, commonly considered a foundational text of the conservative principle. It 
also inspired William Mitford, a Conservative MP and man of independent means, to 
use the History of Greece260 he was writing to denounce the evils of democracy, using 
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Athens as a warning against the moral and political decay brought by democracy to an 
otherwise vibrant and successful state. Mitford also praised the virtues of autocratic 
rule as practiced in Sparta and Macedon, as best suited to secure the protection of 
personal security and property. Published between 1784 and 1810, Mitford’s History 
was not a great piece of historical scholarship, but it was a powerful piece of partisan 
writing which was read by many Tory politicians, who regularly quoted it well into 
the 1820s.261    
The processes set in motion by the American Declaration of Independence and the 
French Revolution did not end with the fall of Napoleon, and conservative attempts to 
restore l’ancien régime did not prove successful, with radical-liberal forces pushing 
against conservatism in favour of reform and democracy both in continental Europe 
and Britain. The historiography of Ancient Greece in Britain was shaped by the waves 
of reform, and it was considered an important radical project to write an alternative 
history of Greece to counter the conservative interpretation by Mitford and others. 
John Stuart Mill mentioned in his Autobiography that his father had presented 
Mitford’s History to him as the best history of Ancient Greece on offer, though 
warning him of its dangerous tendencies,262 and as T.H. Irvin points out in ‘Mill and 
the Classical World’ (1998),263 “the fact that the careful and well-informed James 
Mill could find nothing more suitable than Mitford for his son to read on Greek 
history shows why a history free of Tory prejudice would find some eager readers.”264  
If Ancient Greece was a model for contemporary Britain, it was a matter of political 
                                                             
261 G.P. Gooch, History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century (Longmans, 1913. 2nd ed. 1952), pp. 
289-290. 
262 J.S. Mill, Autobiography. Preface H.J. Laski (Orig. 1873. Oxford University Press, Reprint with 
unpublished speeches 1924), p. 10. 
263 T.H. Irvin, ‘Mill and the Classical World’ in J. Skorupski, The Cambridge Companion to Mill 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 423-463. 
264 Irvin, ‘Mill and the Classical World’, p. 426. 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         118 
 
urgency that it was presented as a positive model for one’s own political standpoint. 
The question, however, was who would have the capacity to write a good counterpart 
to Mitford’s History which, in spite of its inadequacies, was so eminently readable 
that Mill in spite of his father’s warnings found it one of his favourite books.265 
The circle around Bentham and James Mill saw the threat presented by Mitford’s 
argument: that democracy had been tried and failed. Challenging that narrative was 
not an easy task, given that democratic Athens had ultimately been unable to defend 
itself from both demagoguery and defeat by the Macedonians. Additionally, Plato and 
Aristotle had argued against democracy as mob-rule, and democratic Athens had 
chosen to execute Socrates, one of the founders of western philosophy. The man 
chosen to challenge that narrative was found among the younger men in Bentham and 
Mill’s inner circle. George Grote, who John Stuart called the man among his father’s 
friends “with whom I most associated”,266 had cultivated a strong interest in antiquity 
since he left school, in spite of having been put to work in banking at the age of 
sixteen. Grote’s wife later noted that she had suggested her husband should write his 
own history of Greece in 1823, but Lionel Tollemache, who interviewed Grote in the 
1860s, claimed that the suggestion came from James Mill, while Kyriacos Demetriou 
argues in George Grote on Plato and Athenian Democracy (1999) that the project had 
been thought of several years earlier.267 All considered, it seems fair to assume that, 
irrespective of his wife’s involvement, Grote was in fact encouraged by James Mill to 
take up the writing of a counterpart to Mitford. However, in spite of Grote’s interest 
in the project, his obligations as both a banker and a leading Radical Member of 
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Parliament (1832-41) left him insufficient time to finish any part of his planned 
history until after his retirement in 1843.268 
At the universities the history of Greece and Rome became an official part of 
curriculum from 1830, though the actual curriculum was untouched by modern 
scholarship until the eighteen forties,269 strengthening the need for a Radical 
alternative to Mitford. More broadly, the early nineteenth century was marked by the 
introduction of examinations in Classics at Oxford and Cambridge between 1800 and 
1824.270 This was the start of reshaping the classics curriculum into what it would 
become by the late nineteenth century, at a time when the imperialist-internationalists 
attended university, and classics at Oxford was the education of choice for the civil 
services.271 At Oxford Aristotle was favoured over Plato, and Greek studies over 
Latin, though Latin, of course, was part of the curriculum.  
3.2 Grote’s History of Greece  
It was in this context that Grote’s twelve volume History of Greece started to be 
published. Grote aimed to repudiate Mitford’s conservative view, by treating Athens 
as an example of the advantages of democracy and as a parable to the developing 
democratic system in Britain. The animus against Mitford does not have to be read 
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between the lines, as Grote made it quite clear within the opening lines of the preface 
to volume one: 
The first idea of this History was conceived many years ago, at a time when Ancient 
Hellas was known to the English public chiefly through the pages of Mitford; and my 
purpose of writing it was to rectify the erroneous statements as to matter of fact which 
that history contained, as well as to present the general phænomena of the Grecian 
world under what I thought a juster and more comprehensive point of view.272 
Given that Grote’s History was unquestionably partisan—J.S. Mill supported it with 
his reviews—it is worth noting that it was, for its time, very good scholarship (it was 
as recently as 2000 hailed as, “the pre-eminent modern history of Greece in English; 
its main historical and political argument has not been superseded … because it is 
based on care and close argument from the main literary sources”).273 In spite, or 
perhaps because, of Grote’s lack of formal higher education, he was able to break 
away from some of the more stale aspects of Oxbridge classical scholarship of the 
time. Grote knew Greek and Latin well and had taken the time over the decades to 
closely study his sources, and he tried to approach them with proper source criticism, 
which allowed his work to be seen as authoritative rather than simply as a partisan 
answer to Mitford. 
The years of publication coincided with the wave of democratic revolutions across 
Europe in 1848-1850, and rather than Mitford’s warning example of the calamities of 
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mob-rule, Grote presented Athenian democracy in positive terms. He praised the reign 
of Pericles,274 along with Demosthenes’ opposition to Philip, and condemned 
Alexander as an autocratic despot who had ended democracy by means of violence. 
The scope of Grote’s History is interesting in its own right as it shows his ideological 
as well as scholarly interests. Acknowledging the lack of even remotely verifiable 
sources for early antiquity, Grote nevertheless treated the start of the “real history of 
Greece with the first recorded Olympiad” in 776 B.C..275 More important for our 
purposes is his end point, 300 B.C., which was chosen on ideological grounds, since 
“after the generation of Alexander, the political action of Greece becomes cramped 
and degraded”.276 
The second half of volume five of Grote’s History covers the rise of the Athenian 
Empire and the rule of Pericles until the middle of the Peloponnesian war, and 
provides a rich source for his opinions on democracy as well as on empire. Chapters 
such as Chapter XLV ‘Grecian Confederacy under Athens’ and XLVI ‘Changes at 
Athens under Perikles’277 not only described the Athenian democracy of its time, but 
did so in a tone that made Grote’s support for democracy clear. One of the famous 
issues of the period was Pericles’ decision to build the so-called ‘long walls’ to defend 
Athens, which Grote considered a valuable and far-sighted meassure, but which was 
opposed by the oligarchs (who as the richest men in Athens would have to provide 
most of the funding).278 Of this conflict Grote wrote that 
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The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to 
Perikles, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret 
negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating 
their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long 
Walls, but also of subverting the democracy.279  
The whole paragraph accuses the oligarchs of betraying Athens to its enemies and 
encouraging an internal uprising against the legitimate democratic rule, moving the 
discussion away from whether democracy can secure good decisions or not and into 
the realm of oligarchs versus the Athenian people. Effectively comparing these 
ancient factions with his own time, Grote stated that “it was to this democratical 
party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against 
conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Perikles devoted his 
greatest rank, character, and abilities.”280 But if the democrats or “reformers” were 
represented by Pericles, a statesman of great vision, then the party of resistance, the 
conservatives, were represented by oligarchs who were so focussed on preserving 
their own privileges that they were willing to sell out their own city to Sparta, the 
main competitor of Athens (and, in the eyes of Grote, a bastion of conservatism). By 
using contemporary political names for the factions, Grote effectively condemned 
opponents of reform more generally.  
Grote used the funeral oration of Pericles as the obvious choice to illustrate the ideals 
of the Athenian democracy of the fifth century B.C., though he appears to have 
assumed that the ideals were actually implemented to a higher degree than most 
modern authors would believe. His interpretation is strongly liberal as well as 
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democratic, and he focussed not only on the political rights of participating in 
decision making, but just as importantly on the right, under proper vigilance of the 
law, for the individual to act as they wished without undue interference by regulation 
or sour neighbours.  It was of course this principle that John Stuart Mill put forward 
so powerfully in his 1859 On Liberty.  According to Grote: 
it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse --an un-
restrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of 
cheerful indulgence between one individual and another -- and an absence even of 
those “black looks” which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of 
fact. This portion of the speech of Perikles deserves particular attention, because it 
serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity 
as contrasted to modern societies --- an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed 
the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been 
left free to the proper extent.281  
It is clear that Grote stressed that this meant that democratic Athens supported the 
rights of the individual compared to the state, and he continued to explain its 
importance, stating that the toleration in Athens of “individual impulse, taste, and 
even eccentricity” helped to explain the “striking career of Sokrates” (denounced by 
others as “democratical licence”).282 With his focus on individual liberty, which he 
considered best aligned with democracy,283 Grote argued that the emergence of Greek 
philosophy showed that democracy was best-suited to providing growth for the 
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development of new ideas.  The charge of “democratical licence” was therefore 
simply an empty insult against people who wanted the possibility of progress. 
While Grote’s defence of liberalism and democracy was the least to be expected, it is 
also interesting to note his views on the empires of Athens and Alexander. In view of 
the last section of Chapter 2, which looked at the views of Smith, Bentham and J.S. 
Mill on Empire and peace, it should come as no surprise that Grote also had an 
ambivalent attitude towards the concept of Empire. On one hand, as a Radical he was 
sceptical of Empire inasmuch as it tainted the character of the imperial people as well 
as its subjects. In the case of Athens and its former confederates of the Delian League, 
Grote suggested that the relationship transformed the lesser city states “from allies 
free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining –into subjects isolated, sending their 
annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. […] And what was still worse, it altered 
the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former 
into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere subjects.”284 The 
establishment of Empire degraded not only the smaller city states but also Athens 
herself, whose democratic nature appeared to be perverted, at least as far as intercity 
relations were concerned. However, Grote also suggested that for the Athenians the 
two principles of democracy and empire were distinct and compatible, “altogether the 
exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a 
necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home.”285 Though he did 
not make the specific comparison, it seems reasonable to read these statements as a 
reflection on Britain in the mid-nineteenth century as much as on Athens in the fifth 
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century B.C.—that is as a defence of the principle that a democratic state can exist in 
an imperial setting. 
Grote also noticed something that Adam Smith had said, namely that “It would have 
required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any 
state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily 
an immense ascendency as well as lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea 
likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their 
power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendency was both passion and 
patriotism.”286  It was a sentiment later echoed by Zimmern in the Greek 
Commonwealth when he wrote that, “Athens could no more step back than most 
Englishmen feel they can leave India. She had woken up to find herself an Empire and 
was resolved to play the part.”287 Achieving Empire, for Athens as for any other 
country, Britain clearly included, appeared to be like falling into a trap, where the 
walls were made of the sense of glory and honour that no nation would want to give 
up. However, in spite of Grote’s rather sceptical evaluation of the impact of obtaining 
Empire on Athens and the Athenians—or, perhaps, on Britain and the British—he did 
not follow Bentham into any call for an end to all empires. He instead provided 
arguments in favour of the Athenian Empire including the idea that empires could be 
effective in securing peace. 
It was seen in Chapter 2 that Rousseau believed no member of the Holy Roman 
Empire, or Germanic Body as he called it, would wish to leave since the value of 
complete independence was less than the advantages lost by being member of it. 
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Rather in the same vein, Grote argued that in spite of the position of dependency in 
some cases being forced upon them, “to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the 
Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of 
commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been 
purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.”288 The parallel to the 
British Empire was at times made directly, and certainly tended towards defending the 
imperial position. For the origin of the change from the Delian League into the 
Athenian Empire, Grote wrote that “the military force of these subject-states [of the 
Delian League] was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just 
as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the 
English.”289 It was an example that seemed in one stroke to justify the development of 
imperial power in Ancient Athens and contemporary Britain. In a more discreet 
comparison, Grote highlighted the following aspects of importance in Athenian 
imperialism: 
Professing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for 
holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, 
calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which 
seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the 
progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement part of her policy.290  
Grote’s focus on “mastery of the sea” and “common democracy” as the sole bonds of 
empire was a precedent tailor-made for British imperialists of a more liberal 
persuasion. 
                                                             
288 Grote, History of Greece. Vol V, p. 311. For the relevant quotes from Rousseau, Rousseau, 
‘‘Abstract’ and ‘Judgment’’, p. 110 and quote p. 116. 
289 Grote, History of Greece. Vol V, p. 155. 
290 Grote, History of Greece. Vol V, p. 296. 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         127 
 
It should be made clear, that any support of Grote’s for Empire, lukewarm or not, was 
contingent on its promoting the democratic form of government. Close to the end of 
his History, in volume XII, when writing on the end of Alexander, Grote, having 
declared that Alexander was trying to apply Persian despotism to the Greeks and 
Macedonians rather than spreading Hellenic political traditions in Asia, stated that, 
Though the philosopher's [Aristotle] full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we 
are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader 
or president, or limited chief –and to the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master: a 
distinction substantially coinciding with that pointed out by Burke in his speeches at 
the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be 
followed by England in the American colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker 
believed that the Asiatics would be capable of that free civil society upon which the 
march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the 
Asiatics below the level to which they had become accustomed, but rather to preserve 
the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognised no such 
distinction as that drawn by his preceptor.291  
It is interesting to notice, that apart from censoring Alexander for not being willing to 
listen to Aristotle’s advice about maintaining the free tradition of the Greeks, Grote 
also implicitly appears to accept the argument that the Europeans should have a 
different rule than the “Asiatics”. This was of course similar to J.S. Mill’s argument, 
presented in Chapter 2, that representative government was only relevant for the 
settler colonies. 
In summary, it is fair to say that Grote’s History presented a strong defence of 
Athenian democracy, and though certainly not uncritical of the concept of Empire in 
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general, he nevertheless in some aspects defended the Athenian Empire as well (not 
least by noting that many of the weaker subject cities has originally submitted 
voluntarily to Athenian control).  And, by a string of direct and indirect comparisons, 
Grote can be read as implying that the British Empire could also by and large be seen 
as a beneficial force. His rejection of Alexander’s Empire was largely based on the 
premise that it undermined democracy (though Grote appeared to agree with the 
notion that democracy is only really achievable for people of European descent). 
Grote’s more attentive readers cannot have failed to understand some of the parallels 
between the Athenian age and their own.  
3.3 Classics in the late 19th century  
-Grote, Jowett, and Green-  
The publication and reception of Grote’s History was a watershed in the British 
interpretation of Ancient Greece, and with the ongoing developments in the Classical 
education it soon became standard a standard read at Oxford University—as well as 
other universities—for those who wished to consult “modern authorities” when doing 
Ancient history.292 There can be little doubt that Grote’s History still dominated the 
understanding of Ancient Greek history when Murray and Zimmern studied at 
Oxford. According to one former student, the archaeologist G.B. Grundy, as late as 
1889 the lectures in Greek history were either “merely precis of Grote” or 
“destructive criticism of Greek authors”.293 Zimmern, in his Greek Commonwealth, 
clearly assumed that any reader would be familiar with Grote. In his discussion of the 
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development of Athenian democracy, Zimmern suggests that “it is wholesome for the 
idealist to lay aside his Grote and his Mazzini and turn over the pages of an election 
issue of Punch”,294 indicating that not only does he expect you to have—mentally at 
least—a Grote to lay aside, but that as a rational liberal you might realise that Grote 
was occasionally too idealist. 
Grote followed up on his History with the publication of Plato and the Other 
Companions of Sokrates (1865), in which he debated Plato’s life, scholarship, and his 
place among other philosophers, not least the “sophists”, of his time. Like his History, 
Grote’s Plato, revised many existing interpretations of history, noticeably arguing that 
Socrates and Plato belonged in the tradition of the sophists, rather than being a 
separate (and better) class apart from them.  He also criticised Plato’s authoritarian 
tendencies, while holding some of his ideas up as evidence of support of the freedom 
of thought and some basic utilitarian ideals.295 The long-term impact of this piece of 
scholarship can be seen in Karl Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I 
(Routledge, 1945) on Plato, where he frequently referred to Grote. 
Grote’s work on Plato was timely, as the earlier focus on Aristotle alone had been 
superseded by a renewed interest in Plato. At Oxford, William Sewell had started to 
lecture on Plato during the 1830s, and by the 1840s he was succeeded by Benjamin 
Jowett, who was to become a major influence on classics at Oxford for the next forty 
years. Jowett produced a string of popular translations of Plato, though the quality of 
his scholarship was often questioned, and was a dominant figure as both tutor and 
Master of Balliol College, where he nurtured promising students and helped them into 
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significant public careers (helping to secure Oxford dominance in the Civil 
Service).296 
Jowett openly acknowledged his debt to Grote as a leading authority within the area, 
though not without his faults. His preface to The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I (1871) is 
worth a lengthy extract: 
I have also derived much assistance from the great work of Mr. Grote, which contains 
excellent analyses of the Dialogues, and is rich in original thoughts and observations. I 
agree with him in rejecting as futile the attempt of Schleiermacher and others to 
arrange the Dialogues of Plato into a harmonious whole. Any such arrangement 
appears to me not only to be unsupported by evidence, but to involve an anachronism 
in the history of philosophy. There is a common spirit in the writings of Plato, but not 
a unity of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect unity in any single Dialogue. The 
hypothesis of a general plan which is worked out in the successive Dialogues is an 
after–thought of the critics who have attributed a system to writings belonging to an 
age when system had not as yet taken possession of philosophy. 
If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read any portion of this work he will probably 
remark that I have endeavoured to approach Plato from a point of view which is 
opposed to his own. The aim of the Introductions in these volumes has been to 
represent Plato as the father of Idealism, who is not to be measured by the standard of 
utilitarianism or any other modern philosophical system. […] 
I cannot agree with Mr. Grote in admitting as genuine all the writings commonly 
attributed to Plato in antiquity, any more than with Schaarschmidt and some other 
German critics who reject nearly half of them. […] It will be seen also that I do not 
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agree with Mr. Grote’s views about the Sophists; nor with the low estimate which he 
has formed of Plato’s Laws; nor with his opinion respecting Plato’s doctrine of the 
rotation of the earth. But I ‘am not going to lay hands on my father Parmenides’ [Soph. 
241 D], who will, I hope, forgive me for differing from him on these points. I cannot 
close this Preface without expressing my deep respect for his noble and gentle 
character, and the great services which he has rendered to Greek Literature.297 
As may be noticed, Jowett rejected both some specific points of scholarship (e.g. 
discussion of the canon of Plato) and several of the more controversial points of 
Grote’s interpretation (evaluation of sophists, connecting Plato to utilitarianism, and 
rejecting parts of Plato such as the Laws as authoritarian), and yet highlighted Grote 
for his “excellent analysis”, “original thoughts” and “great services … to Greek 
Literature”. All in all, this lengthy tribute to Grote, some two thirds of the preface, 
clearly demonstrates that by 1871 Grote was the authority to both acknowledge and 
challenge within British studies on Ancient Greece and Plato. Even as late as 1891, in 
the preface to the second and third edition of his Dialogues, Jowett still found it 
necessary to defend his choice to differ from Grote in the original work.298 Another 
noticeable element of Jowett’s preface to the first edition was his statement that the 
point of his work was to present Plato as the father of Idealism, a philosophical line of 
thought continued and strengthened by one of Jowett’s pupils, Thomas Hill Green. 
T. H. Green (1863-1882), took a first in Greats from Balliol College and became 
lecturer of Ancient and Modern history in 1860. From 1878 he was professor of moral 
philosophy, developing his own version of Hegelian idealism, although he died quite 
early, at the age of 45, he became very influential at Oxford, not least in the years 
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following his death and the posthumous publication of his Nachlass. His ideas 
remained influential throughout the final decade of the nineteenth century.299 The 
impact of Green’s philosophy was acknowledged by H.A.L. Fisher, friend and 
contemporary student at Oxford with Gilbert Murray, who in his Unfinished 
Autobiography wrote that: “There was one book, inspired by Hegel, to which we were 
introduced from the first and which made a deep impression on my mind. T.H. Green 
died in 1883, but his powerful influence survived. His Prolegomena to Ethics served 
as introduction to morals.”300 
In the Prolegomena Green wrote, among other things, about the relationship between 
the individual and society or the state, arguing that individuals can only see 
themselves as persons though their interactions with others. Without a community, 
there can be no persons, nor any morals. The concept of the higher “good” is defined 
on the basis of being a common good, and “It is in fact only so far as we are members 
of a society, of which we can conceive the common good as our own, that the [divine] 
idea has any practical hold on us at all, and this very membership implies confinement 
in our individual realisation of the idea.”301 Similarly, he argued, the society or state 
could contain no good that was not contained in its members,302 so bettering the 
population would better the whole, but that without society people would have no 
morals to aim at in the first place. His idealism was openly elitist, stating that, “the 
moral judgment at its best in any age or country [is] in those persons who are as 
purely interested in the perfection of mankind and as keenly alive to the conditions of 
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that perfection as is then possible”.303 This evaluation of the best moral judgement, 
along with Green’s general focus on progress, clearly called for clear-sighted people 
to take action, not only for their own people or society, but indeed for mankind, 
irrespective of the station of the fellow men “who in undeveloped possibility, and in 
the claims which arise out of that possibility, are all that he himself is.”304 In this 
view, then, the state was the essential framework to allow any human to realise 
themselves as humans, and it was not only an option but an obligation for the elite to 
serve the state by taking charge and setting an example that would lead society to a 
higher level of enlightenment or “perfection”. It was a line of thought that can clearly 
be traced back to Plato’s Republic with its system of enlightened Guardians as the 
rulers of society.  
Green’s call to action appeared to support Jovett’s cause of sending Oxford men off to 
the Civil Service, and his ideas inspired people such as Millner and his Kindergarten, 
the founders of the Round Table movement: “The philosophic idealism of T.H. Green 
caused them to view the State as a positive moral good and to see social improvement 
and reform as a duty.”305 That view was consistent with Gilbert Murray’s long 
affiliation with public education, such as the Oxford Extension courses, originally 
championed by Jowett and later supported by Green, as well as his editorship of the 
Home University Library series.306 It was also more broadly consistent with the 
ambition of men like Murray and Zimmern to apply themselves both to the 
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development of ideas and through public service to help bring those ideas to 
fruition.307 
-Classics at Oxford- 
The shift in the way the Classics were studied at Oxford was not only in terms of 
ideals. From 1850 Oxford University introduced separate examinations in 
Moderations and Literae Humaniores, and the study of ancient history became a 
larger and larger part of the curriculum, along with philosophy and composition and 
verse. The texts most read in philosophy were those of Plato, particularly The 
Republic, 308 and the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle.309 With Jowett’s focus on Plato 
and Green’s emphasis on idealism, it is easy to underestimate the continuing influence 
of Aristotle, but in fact an Oxford Aristotelian Society was founded in the 1880s, 
bearing testament to his ongoing importance.310 In history the most read works were 
the perennial classics—Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, and Tacitus—with Grote the 
modern author of choice for the study of Greek history. Composition typically 
focused on Homer, Virgil, Demosthenes, and Cicero.311 Homer was particularly 
favoured by Gladstone, who believed that Oxford students should be reading the 
entire works of Homer for their four years of study, as the Iliad and Odyssey together 
in his view constituted “a complete course of Mods and Greats in themselves, 
containing a ‘world of religion and ethics, of civil policy, of history and ethnology, of 
manners and arts’”.312 As late as 1886, Gladstone was still reading the Iliad, which he 
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referenced copiously in his published writings.313 Homer’s works were indeed popular 
in the late nineteenth century, not only at university level, but also at the public 
schools, and would be very familiar to any educated man irrespective of his later line 
of studies.314   
In some ways, it appears that the connection from prep to Oxford was too strong, at 
least to some people’s liking. In his Unfinished Autobiography, Murray writes that, “I 
was in some ways disappointed in my first experience of Oxford. I had expected so 
much; new lights on life, new learning, enlightenment and philosophy. I found, on the 
contrary, much the same influences as I had felt at school.”315 Not only was there a 
general shortage of new ideas, he also found Oxford broadly speaking at variance 
with his political leanings as a Liberal: “all my classical teachers up to that time had 
been orthodox Conservatives with no interest in the problems and aspirations and 
crusades that exited me,” with the noticeable exception of his moderations tutor, 
Arthur Sidgwick, a “real straightforward Liberal” with whom he had long and frank 
discussions.316 Murray’s contemporary, H.A.L. Fisher, had other favourite teachers to 
remember, but discreetly also suggests that Oxford started off underwhelming, 
commenting that “my undergraduate years at Oxford were not among the happiest of 
my life. […] The Oxford climate did not appear to suit me, and I felt slightly out of 
sorts during much of the time.”317 Of Jowett, still active, he commented that, “the 
bright star had lost some of its earlier shine. […] His lectures on pre-Socratics, though 
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marked by shrewd observations, were desultory; his private teaching was marred by 
the tendency to settle big controversies by a phrase or an epigram”.318 In spite of his 
positive comments on some tutors, Fisher felt it necessary to excuse himself by stating 
that, “I would not, however, leave the impression that I am ungrateful to my Oxford 
lecturers. They taught me much,” a claim that seems at best to damn with faint 
praise.319  
However, Fisher did indeed praise his favourite lecturers, not least Alfred Robinson, 
who lectured on logic and Aristotle’s Ethics. Fisher’s interest in ethics has already 
been mentioned in connection with his highlighting of Green as an introduction to 
morals, but in his autobiography he otherwise rejected the Hegelian influences that he 
declared dominant at Oxford in the 1880s: 
it was the fashion among all our instructors to pull J.S. Mill to pieces and consign 
Herbert Spencer to the nethermost pit. My own Philistine proclivities led me to think 
more highly of both Mill and Spencer than my tutors would have approved, but I 
succeeded at catching the Hegelian phraseology and was prepared to reproduce it in 
examinations.320  
As a young man of mildly Liberal leanings, his preference for Mill and Spencer was 
natural, and his description supports Murray’s claim that Oxford was something of a 
desert for Liberals. However, given that Fisher’s autobiography was written in 1939-
40, when war with Germany had recently broken out again, it is also possible that 
Fisher overstated his own rejection of the dominant Hegelianism at Oxford in his 
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youth in order to suggest a consistent rejection of German ideals going back to before 
World War I. 
On balance, then, it seems fair to suggest that to young men of a Liberal bent, 
Conservatism rather than Liberalism was dominant at Oxford. A 1984 biography of 
Murray by Francis West shows that most of Murray’s friendships were with other 
liberals, both dons and students,321 suggesting that liberals at Oxford had their own 
social circle even though it was not a formal grouping. While the dominance of 
Grote’s History had settled the standard interpretation of democratic Athens as a 
model for democracy, rather than an argument against it, his works do not seem to 
have convinced the majority of the Oxford Dons to apply a liberal interpretation to 
Plato or indeed to philosophy in general.    
-Rome as a model 1880-1900-  
So far, then, this chapter has exclusively focused on the study of Ancient Greece in 
the classics curriculum, both because of Murray and Zimmern’s lifelong use of 
Hellenism as a model for great issues, and because of the repeated comparisons 
between the Greek and the British colonies and empires (however much or little 
historical sense such comparisons really made). As shown in Chapter 2, though, the 
Roman Empire also served as a point of reference and comparison for many of those 
interested in drawing parallels with the past.322 In Hegemonic Peace and Empire. The 
Pax Romana, Britannica, and Americana (2009), Ali Parchami makes a thorough 
analysis of the concept of ‘Pax’ and its inherent militaristic overtones, as well as its 
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connection to the Greek concept ‘Arche’,323 which again relates to issues of 
command. Because his focus on the British Empire in the late nineteenth century is on 
the Pax Britannica, Parchami naturally focusses on the use of Rome as a model for 
the Empire, showing how it often served as a counterpart to Hellenism. Where 
conservative thinkers like Burke and Mitford had linked the French Revolution to the 
concept of democracy and mob-rule, more liberal thinkers, who favoured Hellenism, 
rejected that connection, citing the French Revolution’s “self-identification with the 
Roman Republic”.324 On this view, Rome was the model of tyranny, with the end of 
the Republic leading to despotic imperialism (paralleled in the case of France by the 
rise of Napoleon). From a Liberal perspective, the Roman Empire and ‘Imperialism’ 
was therefore in some sense ‘suspect’, encouraging a focus on the Ancient Greeks, as 
in Gladstone’s promotion of Homer at Oxford. 
For the Conservatives, however, the Roman Empire became an increasingly attractive 
model to promote a vigorous British Empire, in spite of Disraeli’s earlier rejection of 
the colonies as “a millstone round our neck”.325 From the 1870s, Disraeli actively 
promoted the comparison between the Roman and the British Empires, with initiatives 
such as making Queen Victoria Empress of India in 1876, and promoting the image of 
Britannia in celebration of Britain’s Empire. Pax Britannica became a conservative 
cause to be carried on well into the twentieth century, with its robust, militaristic 
interpretation of imperial duty. Claiming the inheritance of the Roman Empire for 
Britain made sense, in the 1870s, when one considers that the concept of the Roman 
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Empire still held political currency in Continental Europe, where the newly unified 
Germany and Italy were both laying some claim to the Roman mantle (Italy from 
location, Germany from position of power). The Tory argument became a 
continuation of translatio imperii, with the British Empire as the latest successor to a 
long and honourable tradition. But when Disraeli quoted Tacitus saying that 
“Imperium et Libertas […] would not make a bad programme for a British Ministry”, 
Gladstone replied that it meant “Liberty for ourselves, Empire over the rest of 
mankind”.326    
Although somewhat simplistic, in these basic terms the battle lines between the 
conservative and the liberal view on the Roman Empire may well be laid out, and they 
reflected a perception of fundamental difference in views of Empire that became 
represented by the split in attitudes towards the Greek and the Roman model. The 
Greek model, favoured by the Liberals, was considered to be based on culture, 
democracy, and knowledge, rather than on of brute force (a utopian view as Carr 
might say). The Roman model was far more robust, the realist view, perhaps, with a 
focus on the material factors that made the Empire successful: a model that 
highlighted the victories of the Imperial armies across the globe and the ideology of 
Rule Britannia327 as a demonstration of the worthiness of the British Empire. 
3.4 Conclusions 
As this chapter has shown, the historical treatment of Ancient Greece, especially 
democratic Athens, underwent a significant change during the nineteenth century, as 
liberal thinkers like Mill and Grote emphasised the value of the democratic tradition 
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both in its Hellenistic setting and for the modern world. Yet Greek philosophy was 
still typically interpreted and taught in a conservative manner, creating a somewhat 
uncertain ideological climate for those like Murray, Zimmern, Fisher and other young 
men who were educated at Oxford in the final decades of the nineteenth century. In 
the case of Murray, his autobiographical writings say nothing of Rome, except to 
offer praise for his tutor of Latin language and literature, instead emphasising how his 
interest was dominated by the study of Ancient Greece.328 Fisher too, made only 
passing mention of a good tutor of Roman History, while his Greek studies received 
his most developed comments.329 Both by way of curriculum and published 
recollections, it seems evident that the Greek rather than Roman studies dominated 
the Classic studies at Oxford in the last decades of the nineteenth century, even as in 
public life the Roman model was gaining ascendency. It will be seen in the following 
chapters that both lines of thought influenced the attitudes of the imperialist-
internationalists towards the new Empire/Commonwealth and the League of Nations 
in the years after World War I. 
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4: The British Empire as an international organisation  
From the purely formal point of view the Imperial Conference of 1926 denotes a 
surrender of power, probably the greatest surrender of power ever made by any single 
government at any single moment. But in light of political reality, it represents a leap 
forward in the organisation of the British Commonwealth from an eighteenth-century 
to a twentieth-century system.330 
                                                                                                                 Zimmern, 1929 
The transition from Empire to Commonwealth in the years after World War I was, 
depending on one’s perspective, either a ground-breaking move forward for political 
ideas and international relations or a rather irrelevant renaming of old wine emptied 
into new newly labelled bottles. This chapter analyses how the imperialist-
internationalists re-envisioned the British Empire as a kind of international 
organisation, renamed it, and pushed for political recognition of their new status quo. 
The first section examines the impact of World War I on intra-imperial relations, 
illustrating the importance of considering the historical context for the ideological 
developments. It demonstrates how a common agreement was being reached that the 
Dominions should, in fact, be considered fully autonomous and—at least 
theoretically—of equal status to Great Britain (in practical political terms breaking 
with the model of a centrally governed empire). It will be seen how the imperialist-
internationalists used the impact of the War to promote their agenda, pushing for 
public recognition that the Empire had already changed into a type of organisation 
that could not be categorised as an empire any more. Additionally, it will be seen how 
already in 1914 they saw the War as presenting an opportunity for creating a stronger 
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basis for international cooperation in the long run. Furthermore, this chapter also 
analyses the views of the imperialist-internationalists in regards to whether the new 
structure of the Empire/Commonwealth was the result of a particular English/British 
genius, or whether Englishness was a coincidental feature that should not be stressed. 
This debate is analysed with particular attention to Murray, Smuts and Zimmern, 
suggesting that while the dominant opinion was that British culture was essential to 
the whole Commonwealth project, Zimmern in particular believed that too strong a 
focus on ‘Englishness’ as an essential quality would undermine the entire basis of the 
whole project. 
The second section of this chapter then analyses the re-naming of the Empire as the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, showing how the question was bound up with a 
very conscious attempt to reformulate what kind of political structure the 
Empire/Commonwealth both was and should be after World War I. The analysis 
draws upon aspects of Discourse Analysis, specifically Discourse-Historical 
Analysis,331 in investigating how the imperialist-internationalists sought to impose 
their interpretation of the Empire by determining how it should be renamed. This 
section also uses more traditional historical methods to show the prevalence of the use 
of the word “commonwealth” both in translations of political texts and more broadly 
in late nineteenth and early twentieth century newspaper discourse (necessary to put 
the term “Commonwealth” into a broader perspective). It is a central argument of this 
section that the imperialist-internationalists were consciously aiming at controlling the 
agenda by setting up the suggested re-naming of the Empire as the de facto reality, 
repeatedly speaking about “the British Commonwealth of Nations”332 as an existing 
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entity and as the new name of the Empire, in spite of the fact that it would take 
decades before the name “British Empire” actually faded from official use and the 
term “Commonwealth” became dominant. 
While this chapter uses a wide range of sources, one speech deserves special mention 
since it repeatedly turns up in the analysis. On 15 May 1917, Smuts was the guest of 
honour at a dinner offered by the House of Lords, which was attended by members of 
both Houses of Parliament. After a toast in Smuts’ honour had been offered by Lord 
French—an opponent of Smuts in the field during the Boer War—Smuts replied with 
a lengthy speech that set out his vision for the British Empire “which I prefer to call 
“the British Commonwealth of Nations.””.333 Virtually the whole speech is of 
relevance to this chapter, as well as to this thesis in its entirety, as it is an extremely 
clear formulation of Smuts’ ideas and policies as he promoted them in 1917. The 
version used in this chapter is the one published in The Times on 16 May 1917 in their 
report of the dinner. The full article includes the toast of Lord French, and most of 
Smuts’ speech, though only a summary of one section in which he spoke about the 
system of Imperial Conferences. The importance attached to the speech can be seen 
both in the headline given to the article in the Times, “The Empire of the Future”, and 
in the fact that  the paper continued to refer to the speech in articles for days 
afterwards, including an editorial on 19 May 1917. Likewise the Manchester 
Guardian reported on the speech on 16 May and in several articles afterwards, while 
Hall quoted it in his British Commonwealth of Nations of 1920, and the Oxford 
English Dictionary uses a quote from the speech to illustrate the introduction of the 
concept ‘the British Commonwealth of Nations’. The frequent, and frequently 
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lengthy, quotations from that one single speech do not, therefore, indicate a lack of 
alternatives, but rather reflects the fact that the speech was and is of great relevance to 
the topic at hand.    
4.1 Defining the Empire as an international organisation 
As was shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the concept of empire had been under attack and 
re-evaluation since the Declaration of American Independence, and was by the late 
nineteenth century by no means an uncontroversial term. From Benjamin Disraeli’s 
rejection of the colonies as a “millstone around our neck” —an economic perspective 
similar to Adam Smith’s—to the radical charge of imperialism as inherently immoral, 
the basic concept of “empire” had become problematic. The debate across the 
political spectrum made the term “Empire” increasingly less appealing for politicians 
and others who wanted the institution to progress without hanging on to the negative 
conceptual baggage of “Empire”.  
The creation of the Dominion of Canada in the British North America Act of 1867, 
the Federation of the Australian colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia in 
1901, and the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 had all confirmed 
the new position of the white self-governed colonies (New Zealand included) as 
something more independent than traditional colonies – something recognised in the 
first instance by referring to them as “Dominions”. However, not only were they 
growing increasingly politically independent, two of the Dominions, namely Canada 
and South Africa, had large European populations of non-British origin, the French-
Canadians and Afrikaners, who could not be expected to feel a natural loyalty to the 
British Empire. Re-defining and re-naming the Empire—as well as the concept of 
Britishness itself—was also a question of securing their present and future loyalty. 
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The example of the introduction of the concept of “Dominions” shows the awareness 
in intra-imperial politics of the importance of names. In legal statute, there was no 
definition of a “Dominion”, it was neither more nor less than a different name used 
for a sub-set of the British colonies. However, in practical terms, it was generally 
acknowledged that the Dominions were different from the rest of the colonies, in as 
much as they were fully self-governed in internal affairs, and could be expected to 
express strong opinions on foreign policies that impacted their interests. Canada, in 
particular, had shown interest in taking over the control of its relations with the 
United States. Though the transition was slow and gradual, the Foreign Office was 
beginning to take notice. In the same way that it was accepted that the white colonies 
were no longer regular colonies, and should not be called colonies if cohesion of the 
Empire was to be maintained, it was increasingly suggested that the Empire of mother 
country, Dominions, and Colonies was no longer a traditional empire, and should 
therefore be renamed if the institution was to survive.  
In short, the name “Empire” had become potentially toxic, while simultaneously 
being considered at least partially misleading as a label for the kind of institution that 
the British Empire had become by the end of World War I. In words of Duncan Hall, 
These developments may be summed up by saying that a complete change has been 
wrought in the meaning of the term “British Empire” since 1914. In 1914 it signified a 
central government surrounded by a number of more or less dependent States; in 1919 
it signified a new type of political association, namely, a group of autonomous States 
organised on a basis of complete constitutional equality under a common Crown.334 
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4.1.1 The impact of WWI on intra-imperial structure 
Few issues in this thesis are as uncontroversial as the claim that World War I marked 
a change in intra-imperial relations between Britain and the Dominions. Certain basic 
historical facts are clear. At the start of the war, most of the Dominions declared that 
they were de facto at war the moment Great Britain declared war, because, in their 
interpretation, the declaration of the mother country automatically meant that all its 
colonies, Dominions included, were at war. Australia and New Zealand therefore 
declared their state of war not as a conscious decision, but simply as an affirmation of 
an already existing condition, entirely dependent on the decision of the United 
Kingdom government that had declared war on behalf of the British Empire. 
However, when World War I ended, the Dominions were independently represented 
at the Peace Conference, and were given independent membership of the League of 
Nations from its creation in 1920. A look into wartime developments reveals how 
much the imperialist-internationalists were part of shaping these changes rather than 
simply being passive observers responding to things that were outside their control. 
A brief comment is in order here about terminology. During World War I and the 
Interwar Period it was more common to speak about inter-imperial relations than 
intra-imperial relations but, logically speaking, ‘inter-imperial relations’ should refer 
to relations between the various empires, while ‘intra-imperial relations’ refers to the 
relations between the various parts of the specific empire. Therefore, this thesis 
consistently uses the formulation intra-imperial, except when quoting any text that 
used ‘inter-imperial’ in its original version. 
-Perceptions at the beginning of the War- 
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As already mentioned, the decade and a half preceding the start of World War I had 
seen significant changes to the structure and official perception of the predominantly 
white colonies now known as Dominions. Though the development went back to the 
British North America Act of 1867, it was the federation of Australia and formation 
of the Union of South Africa that really emphasised that the principle that full self-
governance was applied to all the settler colonies, rather than applying just to Canada 
as a specific measure to prevent another American declaration of independence. 
World War I was not therefore the cause of the development of Dominion autonomy, 
but rather a catalyst that accelerated the process of developing a new institutional 
framework, along with official and indeed public recognition of the new conditions. 
When the War started, Duncan Hall was still studying at the University of Sydney, 
Gilbert Murray was well established as Professor of Greek at Oxford, Alfred 
Zimmern was working under H.A.L. Fisher at the Board of Education, and Jan Smuts 
was one of South Africa’s leading politicians, second only to Botha in his position in 
government. With the exception of young Hall, all soon took action that would mark 
out their course for the War. Murray surprised many by abandoning his general 
pacifism in favour of a strong defence of the war-effort. Smuts along with Botha drew 
South Africa firmly into the War alongside the Empire that had so recently conquered 
them. Zimmern at first did something rather less ostentatious, issuing a second edition 
of The Greek Commonwealth, his classics success from 1911. Although the second 
edition had been in progress before the War broke out, Zimmern took the opportunity 
to address recent international developments in his Preface to the 1914 edition, dated 
2 December 1914: 
While this book has been passing through the press war has broken out, bringing 
Great Britain face to face, for the first time since she became a Democracy, with the 
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full ultimate meaning of civil responsibilities, both of thought and action, with which, 
in the narrower field of the City-State, the fifth-century Athenians were so familiar. 
Greek ideas and Greek inspiration can help us today, not only in facing the duties of 
the moment, but in deepening and extending the range and the meaning of Democracy 
and Citizenship, Liberty and Law, which would seem to be the chief political task 
before mankind in the new epoch of history on which we have suddenly entered.335 
A few points are worthy of note in this quotation. The first is that Zimmern only 
referred to Great Britain without any comment on the Empire, though in later sections 
of the book he drew comparisons between Athens (“the Athenian Empire”) and the 
British Empire,336 and too much should not be made of the omission. The second 
point is Zimmern’s willingness to use “Greek ideas and Greek inspiration” for his 
own times, specifically on the topics of democracy, citizenship, liberty, and law, 
which reinforces the view presented in chapter 3, that the classical education of the 
imperialist-internationalists was relevant to their world view. The third point to note is 
that Zimmern considered the start of the War a “new epoch of history” in which 
building democracy and law are the main political task not only for Britain but the 
whole world. This sentiment was further developed on page 98 of the Greek 
Commonwealth, which Zimmern in the 2nd preface mentioned as a page where he had 
expanded the comments to reflect the situation of 1914. A paragraph relating to 
arbitration in the chapter on ‘The City Magistrate’ concludes: 
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City law has abolished fisticuffs, as some day, when mankind has become conscious 
of a common citizenship in the world and a common need for World-Law, the World-
State will abolish war.337 
Combined with the comments in the Preface, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Zimmern already a few months after the start of World War I saw the War as an 
opportunity to make political changes on a worldwide scale. Following up on his 
Greek Commonwealth, Zimmern included the terminology “the British 
Commonwealth of Nations” in his 1914 article “German Culture and the British 
Commonwealth”,338 suggesting that he saw a parallel between the fifth-century 
Athenian state that he named “the Greek Commonwealth”339 and the newest form of 
the British Empire that he was calling “the British Commonwealth”. In the 
introduction to the book of collected essays of which his article was a part, Zimmern 
defined Commonwealths of Nations as “States composed, like the British Empire and 
the United States, of a variety of nationalities and cultures”,340 while the article 
“German Culture” not only referred to this new concept of ‘the British 
Commonwealth’ in its title but also repeatedly throughout the text, which also 
introduced the full formulation “the British Commonwealth of Nations”.341 Later in 
the article, similar to his call for a world-state, was his call for the creation of a world-
commonwealth in due time. In contrast to his comparisons between Ancient Athens 
and Britain, he aligned German culture with Sparta and Rome, citing its 
“governmental disciplinary machine”, 342 and by association its military dictatorship, 
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using the ancient parallels to promote or condemn contemporary states. While 
Zimmern’s later involvement in the drafting of the British proposal for the League of 
Nations did not try to propose a world-state or world-commonwealth, his League of 
Nations and the Rule of Law from 1936 continued to promote the idea of world-law 
as an essential road to world peace. 
While Zimmern aimed to use words to advance his ideas, Smuts and Botha did it 
through actions. The decision to bring South Africa into the War on the side of the 
British Empire was certainly not the only possible choice when World War I broke 
out, given that many Afrikaners were sympathetic to the Germans, and saw the War 
as a possibility to break out of the Empire while British forces were elsewhere 
engaged. Other, more moderate, voices assumed that a course of neutrality was the 
obvious choice for the Union, as the sympathies of the population were obviously 
split, and the cause and aims of War seemed too far removed from South African 
interests to make participation a sensible option. Smuts, however, used the War as an 
opportunity for South Africa, and specifically himself, to become an active participant 
in shaping the future of the Empire. When the Botha government declared war on 
Germany on behalf of South Africa, Smuts resumed his old role as a general, and by 
leading South African forces against German interests in Africa boosted his own 
political capital in Great Britain (though he put his popularity among Afrikaners under 
strain). As a former enemy turned defender of the British Empire, Smuts built up a 
unique platform for being heard in London, as it allowed him to formulate the case for 
the Empire while retaining some of the authority of an outside observer. Smuts 
already had many friends in England from his years at Cambridge, and he was well 
known within the Round Table movement given its origins in South Africa, and his 
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actions and speeches gave them the chance to promote him as a man of singular 
vision as regards the future of the Empire.  
Smuts’ letters and speeches from the first year of the War yield an insight into the way 
he both privately and publicly presented his views, and, when combined with mentions 
of him in the House of Commons and British newspapers such as the Times and the 
Manchester Guardian, shows how his platform was being built. A couple of his letters 
written shortly before and after Britain’s entry into World War I—both otherwise 
unrelated to the War—end with a paragraph dedicated to the new situation in Europe. 
In a letter dated 30 July 1914 to his friend H.J. Wolstenholme, Smuts wrote that “I do 
hope it will be possible to stave off a general conflict which is bound to put Europe 
back fifty or more years and to bring untold suffering and loss in its train.”343, while his 
letter of 21 August to Sir Benjamin Robinson stated that “This war is terrible business, 
which may put Europe and white civilization permanently back and hasten the day of 
the yellow peril. Our European system has pent up and focussed force which no man 
can control, and so the end has come.”344 As can be seen, both letters express Smuts’ 
grave concern about the situation, not least on its impact on European civilization and 
its position relative to Asia, but neither letter mentions the Empire at all. 
By late September 1914, however, Smuts consistently supported the Empire and 
promoted the official South African line that when Britain declared war South Africa 
was automatically so, too. He argued that not only did the country not have a choice, 
but also insisted that it had a moral obligation to fight, as shown in the open letter in 
which he reproachfully accepted General Beyers’ resignation as head of the South 
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African forces.345 The letter was published both in South Africa and in Britain, where 
papers as different as the Times and the Manchester Guardian printed large selections, 
openly praising his arguments. The following selection from the open letter shows why: 
You forget to mention that since the South African War the British people gave South 
Africa her entire freedom under a Constitution which makes it possible for us to realise 
our national ideals along our own lines, and which, for instance, allows you to write with 
impunity a letter for which you would without doubt be liable in the German Empire to 
the extreme penalty.  
As regards your other statements, they have been answered and disposed of in 
Parliament. From these discussions it will be apparent that neither the British Empire 
nor South Africa was the aggressor in this struggle. War was in the first instance declared 
by Austria-Hungary, and thereafter by Germany, under circumstances in which the 
British Government employed its utmost powers to maintain the peace of Europe and to 
safeguard the neutrality of Belgium. [...] Under these circumstances it is absurd to speak 
about aggressive action on the part of the Union, seeing that together with the British 
Empire we have been drawn against our wish and will and entirely in self-defense into 
this war.346 
Even if the arguments were in the first instance intended for a South African audience, 
they gave a ringing endorsement of the principles of the British Empire and of its 
reasons to go war, while his previous wish for Britain to stay out of the conflict given 
his concern for European civilization had disappeared entirely. 
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Smuts’ private correspondence supported the new line. In a letter to another of his 
English connections, Arthur Gillett, dated 27 September 1914, he wrote that: 
I don't think England could have done otherwise then, nor could she without infamy 
have backed out now. I love German thought and culture and hope it will yet do much 
for mankind. But a stern limit must be set to her political system which is much a menace 
to the world even worse than Bonapartism was. [...] We are also fighting in the awful 
desert of German South West Africa and will lose many valuable lives there. But such 
was the wish of the English Government and Botha and I are not the men to desert 
England in this dark hour. Many Boers cannot forget the past and bitterly disapprove or 
our action. But I think we are doing our duty.347   
While the tone varies from the political to the reflective, it is clear that the sentiments 
expressed could perfectly well be published without harm to Smuts’ reputation in 
England in 1914. 
Smuts’s position was positively noted in the House of Commons. In a discussion about 
Ireland and its possible role in the Empire and the War, published on September 16 
1914 in The Times, John Redmond referred to Botha and Smuts stating: “General Botha 
and General Smuts have been able to say that the concession of free institutions to South 
Africa has changed men who little more than 10 years ago were your bitter enemies 
into your loyal comrades and fellow-citizens in Empire”.348 South Africa was set up as 
an example of the benefits of applying the liberal principles of the Empire to potentially 
hostile parts of it. With such public sentiments, Smuts cemented his reputation as not 
only a military leader but also a vocal defender of the Empire. 
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Professor Murray, like Smuts, took a strong and clearly considered position at the start 
of the War. Between late July and the actual declaration of war, Murray had, like many 
of his regular correspondents, signed an open letter protesting that Britain should stay 
out of the conflict. But, like Smuts, Murray changed his opinion shortly after war was 
declared, following his attendance at a debate in the House of Commons where he heard 
Sir Edward Grey, the minister of Foreign Affairs, defend Britain’s participation. Much 
to the dismay of many of his pacifist friends Murray quickly became a staunch defender 
of the British war effort. His change of heart was probably genuine, but a private letter 
to his friend H.A.L. Fisher suggests that it was also strategic. On 10 August 1914, 
Murray wrote: 
It seems to me to be important that the liberal feeling in England should keep fully in 
touch with the war … for the sake of the peace settlement afterwards… If we win, as 
seems on the whole probable, we must do our very best of a generous treatment of 
Germany… I think we should also go for a strengthening of the Concert and reducing 
armaments by treaty.349 
This little segment suggests a fairly cynical approach or at least one based on 
Realpolitik: support the War for the sake of influencing the peace or become irrelevant 
by alienating public opinion. Murray’s focus on a generous settlement for Germany 
appears foresighted, given the strong debates and struggles that took place when the 
Peace Treaty was negotiated, and his intention of using the War to “strengthen the 
Concert and reducing armaments by treaty” shows how he already had ideas and 
insights that were natural predecessors of his subsequent involvement with the creation 
of the League of Nations at the end of the War. 
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When taken together, it seems fair to conclude that Zimmern, Smuts and Murray all 
had a clear idea in 1914 about the potential long-term impact of World War I, both on 
the future of the Empire and the international order more broadly. They all took public 
stands that helped to set them up as active participants in the political debate during the 
war years. 
-Using the progression of the War and setting the agenda- 
As the War dragged on, the Dominions continued to contribute fresh supplies of men 
and materials, demonstrating that they were active participants in the Empire. As 
shown in Chapter 2, J.S. Mill had argued many decades earlier that since the power to 
declare war rested with the British Parliament alone, the expenses of war should also 
rest with Britain, and could not be extracted from the self-governing colonies without 
their consent. While the Dominions accepted Britain’s declaration of war was binding 
on themselves, and contributed significantly to the costs of running the war effort 
beyond their own defence, they unsurprisingly also sought increased participation in 
the decision making process regarding war and peace and other big issues of foreign 
policy. The creation of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1916 was one of the 
consequences, acting as a symbol to show the Dominions that they were being heard. 
As Botha was fully occupied in South Africa, he appointed Smuts as his 
representative in the Imperial War Cabinet. Smuts came to London in 1917 and used 
his time there to draw political capital from his active promotion of the British war 
effort and the moral cause of the British Empire. Across England, he was hosted as an 
honoured speaker, and many of his speeches were given full and very positive press 
coverage. He used the attention to promote two parallel causes: reforming the Empire 
into a more cooperative organisation named the Commonwealth and creating a 
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League of Nations that included the Dominions as fully independent members. The 
leading argument for both causes was the active participation of South Africa and the 
other Dominions in the War, which Smuts held up as a sign that the settler colonies 
were now independent communities, willing and able to take on international 
responsibilities. Given his concerns for European civilization, voiced in the first days 
of the War, the idea of a League of Nations was intended by Smuts not only to cement 
the position of the Dominions as essentially autonomous in international affairs but, 
equally, to help protect European civilization against its own worst excesses. 
Zimmern worked largely behind the scenes during the War, in the Foreign Office, 
where he supported the idea of an Empire/Commonwealth based on free cooperation 
between the constituent parts (one part, as he saw it, of international cooperation in 
action). As his most significant work during the War years was for the Foreign Office, 
drawing up the draft of the British proposal for the League of Nations, his views 
towards both Empire/Commonwealth and the League of Nations will be discussed in 
the following chapter (which examines debates about the Empire as a model for the 
League of Nations). The second section of this chapter, on the re-naming of the 
Empire to Commonwealth, will stress the importance of Zimmern in the process both 
before and after the War. 
Murray, meanwhile, focussed his efforts on promoting international cooperation. 
During 1917 he became acquainted with Smuts, swiftly laying the grounds for a 
friendship of mutual respect, and the two men became allies in working for the 
creation of a League of Nations, to the point that Smuts in 1922 chose Murray to 
represent South Africa in the general assembly of the League. Compared to Smuts and 
Zimmern, Murray was far less vocal as an ‘imperialist’, though he defended the 
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Empire through his support for the rightness of the British cause.  He also believed 
that British culture was superior to other cultures which, as shown both below and in 
Chapters 5 and 6, reflected in his tendency to align British culture with the Hellenic 
culture that he admired so much.  
4.1.2 The importance of English/Anglo-centric culture 
In the Unfinished Autobiography of Gilbert Murray, Salvador de Madariaga, one of 
Murray’s fellow representatives at the League of Nations, notes that Murray 
commented in one of his letters to Smuts about how he was struck by the number of 
“small dark Latin Nations” in the League.350 According to Madariaga, Murray saw the 
League with an English mind-set, but never realised how this represented a particular 
form of bias. Rather, Madariaga contends, Murray considered the English perspective 
as one of open, disinterested fairness, which represented the only way forward for 
international peace, unlike the bias of local interests that these “small, dark” 
representatives brought along. In other words, for Murray, Englishness (or 
Britishness) was actually an internationalist mind-set of its own. Whether Murray’s 
perception was really quite so naïve or not, he certainly expressed strong opinions 
about Britain’s role as a model to the world, and it was exactly the same assumption 
of disinterested fairness that many of the imperialist-internationalists considered a 
basic precondition for the British Commonwealth. 
In one of his speeches from May 1917, Smuts declared that: 
You talk of an Imperial mission. I think the British Empire has only one mission, and 
that is a mission for liberty and a mission for greater self-development. You represent 
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the only system in history in which a large number of nations has been living in unity. 
You talk about a league of nations. You are the only league of nations that has ever 
existed. If the lines I am sketching here are correct, you are going to be even more a 
great league of nations in the future; and if you are true to your old traditions of self-
government and freedom and are true to those views of your future, you must exercise 
far greater and a far more beneficial influence on the history of mankind than you have 
ever done before.351 
Notice how Smuts highlights the achievements of the Empire as a unique achievement 
of international collaboration. Simultaneously, by calling the system and achievement 
“yours” rather than “ours”, Smuts marks it out as a specifically British achievement, 
which echoed his earlier acknowledgement that the Empire had done something 
unique by giving South Africa full and free rights within a decade of the Boer War.352 
While the Smuts’ formulations may have been deliberately pandering to British 
prejudice as a way to further his intended cause, there is little doubt that it was widely 
accepted as a valid view both in Britain and in the Dominions. 
Looking into Hall’s British Commonwealth of Nations of 1920, and keeping in mind 
that he was heavily influenced by Smuts, one can find regular indications that he too 
considered that there were certain ‘British’ attributes and experiences that helped 
make the Empire/Commonwealth particularly effective. One of the—otherwise rarely 
mentioned—features that Hall highlighted was the importance of voluntary 
associations (especially those that ranged across the Empire). According to Hall, 
Conditions within this large and intimate group of peoples [the British 
Commonwealth] are particularly favourable to the germination and rapid growth of 
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new political, social, and cultural ideas or movements. The general tendency is for 
these ideas or movements, having arisen in some one unit of the Group, to spread 
throughout the whole Group, as the immediate and most fertile expansion area, and the 
to spread in widening circles, first perhaps to the United States –the other great section 
of the English-speaking race- and onwards into foreign countries.353 
As the quotation shows, Hall considered that the Empire/Commonwealth was 
particularly well-placed to develop new ideas, believing that “the English-speaking 
race”, whether in the Empire or the United States, provided a fruitful setting for new 
ideas to germinate before being passed on to the rest of the world.354 He considered 
this aspect so important that his only appendix to the complete book, apart from a 
select bibliography, was a listing of “Inter-Imperial Voluntary Associations” that he 
thought were of particular importance.355 However, Hall also thought that the 
catalysts for new political ideas no longer came from Britain itself, but rather from the 
younger and more dynamic Dominions, who in his view were at the centre of the 
development of the Empire/Commonwealth. Britain, the mother country, was at the 
periphery: 
Generally speaking they [the people of the Dominions compared to the people in 
Britain] show a far keener sense of the historical tradition of the British 
Commonwealth—that is, of the road whereby it has reached its present position—than 
is shown by British people. This is due to the fact that the problem of government in 
the British Commonwealth was created by, and is conditioned by, the national 
development of the Dominions. The people of the United Kingdom have been on the 
whole passive spectators of the growth of Responsible Government. […].Thus, in a 
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sense, the people of the Dominions are in a better position to understand the Imperial 
problem and to see the conditions of its solution than are the people of England.356 
 
While Smuts and Hall had focussed on the exceptional character of the British 
political system, Zimmern’s approach was more complicated. In an article ‘Britain 
after the War’, first published in 1923, he argued that the British Empire was “broadly 
speaking, the creation and expression of Englishmen, of the characteristic English 
genius”, but conceded that it was no longer suitable for the present world.357 
However, he considered it possible for it to undergo a “transformation of what has 
hitherto been an English Empire into a true multi-national Commonwealth—perhaps 
even into the nucleus of a World-Commonwealth”,358 thus repeating his main lines of 
thought from the 1915 War and Democracy. By 1925, however, he made a point out 
of stressing that the Britishness of the British Empire or Commonwealth had no 
nationality as such tied to it and that this was the result of a gradual development over 
more than a century. The following quote from The Third British Empire is long, but 
it clearly shows the individual steps: 
The first decisive step dissociating Britain from European methods of cultural 
imperialism was taken in 1774 in the Quebec Act. That Act committed us once and for 
all in our overseas Empire against the policy of an English Empire. It committed us to 
tolerance of Non-English and even non-British institutions, as the word British was 
understood at that time. The British Empire, as a result of the Quebec Act, was set on a 
course under which it could neither become an expansion of England nor of Greater 
Britain. You can see what I mean if you think for a moment of the gradual expansion 
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of the meaning of the term ‘British’. It started on its career as an adjective of 
nationality. That is what it was the time of Shakespeare. To-day it has no national 
significance whatever. If you are told to-day that a man is British or a Britisher, it does 
not convey anything at all as to his language or colour. ‘British’ has become nationally 
colourless, in order to become politically significant. It has passed through a number of 
intermediate stages. First, ‘British’ applied to England and Scotland, which were called 
Great Britain. Then it included Ireland; when Dilke wrote his book Greater Britain, 
referring to the overseas Empire, the title shows that he was thinking of the two islands 
as a unit –something than which the overseas Britain was greater. Next you have the 
term applied to the overseas Britain, that is to say, to the English, Scotch, Welsh, Irish, 
who had gone to Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and so on. Then 
gradually it was extended to include the overseas whites, and in that sense it is still 
often used to-day—the peoples under the British flag who have a white skin. Finally it 
has reached its true sense, when it is simply an adjective to denote a subject of King 
George.359  
As the quotation makes clear, by 1925 Zimmern saw the non-national character of 
British culture as the culmination of an organic, progressive development that allowed 
a more and more inclusive understanding of “Britishness” to grow over time. For 
Zimmern this was not simply an interesting quirk of history, but in fact an essential 
prerequisite of the success of the Empire/Commonwealth, and he took very strong 
exception to the idea that the organisation should remain Anglo-centric: 
There is still lingering in the minds of many the idea that, though we do not have an 
English Empire, we ought to have an Anglo-centric Empire. On this theory, while we 
tolerate Non-English nations and cultures, we should persuade the subjects of King 
George who are not English by nationality to regard England as their centre and as the 
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model and exemplar of true culture. Thus one sometimes reads panegyrics on English 
education or government which assume that what we call ‘English character’ is just 
character par excellence. […] 
It cannot be said too strongly that all such doctrines are simply a pale reproduction of 
the German doctrine of Kultur which we so reprobated during the war. […] It would 
be a very evil day for the British Empire if we took it over, and took it over, as we 
necessarily should, on a very much larger scale. […] 
As an Oxford man, I should like to express my strong dissent from the idea that my 
university should be used to promote cultural imperialism, to impose or dictate or in 
any way inculcate English national standards as universal standards.360  
What Zimmern so strongly defended was the idea that transcending a national 
interpretation of Britishness was what gave the British Empire the chance to become 
an international organisation of a new kind. His reproach against the assumption that 
‘British character’ was “just par excellence” can easily be seen as a reproach against 
exactly the attitude that de Madariaga claimed Murray exhibited in his attitude at the 
League (and which, indeed, Murray’s own letter to Smuts discussed earlier suggests 
that he did have – at least up to a point). 
Interestingly, in the same speech in which Smuts had hailed the special genius of the 
British model, he also supported the notion that its genius was to be naturally 
internationalist: 
All the empires we have known in the past and that exist to-day are founded on the 
idea of assimilation, of trying to force human material into one mould. Your whole 
idea and basis is entirely different. (Cheers.) You do not want to standardize the 
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nations of the British Empire; you want to develop them towards a greater nationality. 
[…]  
That is the fundamental fact that we have to bear in mind –that this British 
Commonwealth of nations does not stand for standardization or conventionalization, 
but for the fuller, richer, and more various life of all the nations comprised in it.361 
Curiously, Smuts and Zimmern thus appeared to be making very similar claims, 
namely that Britishness correctly understood was essentially internationalist in 
character. In Smuts’ speech, this British ingrained internationalism had helped to 
shape the character of the Empire, just as Zimmern saw it as a reason to use the 
Empire/Commonwealth as a model for the League of Nations (see chapter 5). But the 
whole idea of tolerance and dedication to liberty and self-governance as something 
quintessentially British can still be seen to be exactly the sort of attitude that underlay 
the idea of the British being uniquely fair-minded and disinterested (and thus the 
natural leaders of international society). The imperialist-internationalists have indeed 
been so named not simply because they saw empires as precursors to internationalism, 
but also because they maintained a sense of superiority in their own kind of 
internationalism. As such, for all Zimmern’s lofty intentions of not singling out 
Englishness or an Anglo-centric model as the ideal, and for all his heartfelt writings 
about the importance of cultural give and take at the universities between people of 
different nationalities, it is difficult to avoid concluding that he was promoting British 
ideals and a specifically the British liberal view of internationalism. 
Zimmern did, however, stand far apart from Smuts in regards to people of colour.  
Smuts was most concerned about the preservation of European civilization. Zimmern, 
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as will be seen in the next section, was dedicated to the idea of the political equality of 
the races, even if he acknowledged that full self-governance was still a project 
requiring much development in some of the colonies.  
4.2 Renaming the Empire 
4.2.1 New Names 
The British Empire was from the 1926 Balfour Declaration increasingly referred to as 
the “British Commonwealth of Nations” (a name that was formalised in 1931), 
although the term ‘Empire’ continued to be widely used for many years to come.  The 
imperialist-internationalists had for many years been preoccupied about what to call 
the new organisation which they believed had emerged from the old British Empire.  
This section analyses the range of names suggested for the new empire, and the 
meanings associated with them, in order to illustrate what the imperialist-
internationalists believed the new organisation actually was. 
Two works—Halls’ Commonwealth of Nations (1920) and Zimmern’s Third British 
Commonwealth (1926)—help give a sense of the scope of new terms used for the 
Empire. Between them, Hall and Zimmern spoke of “the Empire”, “the 
Commonwealth”, “the Group”, “the Society”, and “the Entente”. While Empire was 
obviously the old name that they tried to phase out, “Commonwealth”, “Group”, 
“Society” and “Entente” were all explained with slightly different meanings. In the 
analysis that follows, proper names have been identified where nouns have been 
capitalised and given the definite form like “the British Group” or “the Group”, while 
use of the indefinite form, “a Group of States”, has been registered as a description 
rather than a name.  
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--Hall-- 
The following tables only list the names Hall used himself (that is disregarding the 
names used in any quotes given in his book). The names were divided into three main 
categories and one secondary category as shown in the table below: 362 
Table 1.1 Names in The British Commonwealth of Nations Times used in 
book 
“the British Empire”, “the Empire” 338 
“The British Commonwealth of Nations”, “the British Commonwealth”, “the 
Commonwealth” (referring to the British Commonwealth, not to the 
Australian)  
107 
“the British Group of States”, “the British Group”, “the Group” 111 
“this Society of States”, “this Society of Peoples”, “the British Society of 
Nations” 
3 
As table 1.1 shows, Hall mostly used the names “the Empire” and “the British 
Empire” in spite of his book being entitled The British Commonwealth of Nations. He 
also used names based on the word “Group” slightly more than the ones based on the 
word “Commonwealth”, while names based on “Society” appears only three times in 
the entire book (and may be considered only marginally relevant). Given Hall’s strong 
interest in the League of Nations, there is little doubt that “the British Society of 
Nations” is inspired by the French name for the League, “Société des Nations”.  
The following table, 1.2, shows the distribution of the use of the three main types of 
names across the book according to chapter. The table tells an interesting story. At 
first glance, it is seen that the name “the British Group” is used in two chapter titles, 
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while “Commonwealth” is used in the title of the book, but not in the title of any 
chapter. Meanwhile, “Empire” as a concept, but not necessarily as a name, appears in 
the title of one chapter. This shows the fluidity of use of the different names. 





Preface 7 10 2 
1: ‘Introductory’ 15 20 6 
2: ‘The old Colonial System and the Coming of Responsible 
Government’ 
8 0 2 
3: ‘The Meaning of Responsible Government –Ideas as the 
to the Nature of the Colonial Relationship, 1840-1900’ 
23 0 1 
4: ‘The Rise of Colonial Nationalism and of the Colonial 
Idea of Alliance’ 
10 0 0 
5: ‘The Imperial Conference, 1887-1911, and the 
Development of Dominion Nationhood’ 
21 1 0 
6: ‘The Working of the British Group Before the War’ 32 6 11 
7: ‘The Development of Imperial Co-operation During and 
After the War’ 
26 6 7 
8: ‘The Principles of the Settlement: Freedom and Co-
operation –the Rejection of Imperial Federation’ 
31 9 8 
9: ‘The Problem of Dominion Status –the Reconciliation of 
Absolute Equality of Nationhood with the Formal Duty of 
Empire’ 
63 13 25 
10: ‘The Machinery of Co-operation’ 47 22 21 
11: ‘The British Group and the League of Nations’ 55 30 28 
Furthermore, a distinct pattern in usage can be determined. In the preface and 
introduction there is a distinct dominance of the names based on the words 
“Commonwealth” and “Group”, but they are barely used in the next four chapters, 
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although the term “Empire” is used freely. In chapters 6-9 “Empire” remains 
dominant, but there is an increasing use of the names based on “Commonwealth” and 
“Group”, and in chapter 10 the division is half and half between the old names and the 
new ones. In the final chapter the new names again achieve a slight dominance over 
the term “Empire”. 
An explanation for this distribution of the usage of the different names is found in the 
chapter titles. Chapters 2-5 are essentially historical chapters, covering the period 
from 1840-1911, a period when the British Empire clearly was an empire and 
therefore referred to by that name. Hall is thus using the name “Empire” consistently 
both with its usage in the period he is covering and the dominant political 
understanding of what that term implies. From chapters 6 onwards, however, Hall was 
discussing the processes that had taken place in the previous decade, along with those 
that were still needed to fully transform the Empire into its new state, which he 
referred to by the name of “the Commonwealth”. Similarly, the preface and 
introduction explains his views on the new situation and what is demanded of it, and 
thus primarily rely on the new terms. In fact, the introduction specifically introduces 
the name of “the Commonwealth” as the new proper term for the transcended Empire:  
This [Colonial 1887] Conference had been partially an expression of the 
colonial conception of the relation between the Dominions and the United 
Kingdom as that of an “alliance” between autonomous states; but as the 
Imperial Conference developed, it became apparent that the word "alliance" 
very imperfectly expressed the real nature of this relationship. Being a word 
which is normally used to describe a limited and temporary contractual 
relationship between states, it gives a thoroughly misleading conception of the 
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natural and organic relationship which exists between the group of kindred 
states now becoming known as the British Commonwealth.363 
The distribution shown in table 1.2 thus reflects a perspective where the author 
understands “Empire” as a historically correct and commonly understood name, while 
he is introducing the names “Commonwealth” and “Group” as modern replacements. 
The underlining highlights how Hall formulated and created his own reality, by 
stating that the Empire was “now becoming known as the British Commonwealth” as 
an established fact, in spite of the name having no official recognition in any statute 
yet, nor to any significant degree in political debate in either of the Houses of 
Parliament. It is also noticeable, that he used the distinctly Hegelian language of 
referring to the “natural and organic relationship” between the different parts. 
--Hall: Sample Analysis— 
Analysing a two page sample of Hall’s British Commonwealth of Nations –found in 
the appendix - from the beginning of chapter eight, ‘The Principles of the Settlement: 
Freedom and Co-operation –the Rejection of Imperial Federation’, helps give a better 
understanding of the different names he presented as he used a wide selection of his 
new terms for the Empire in it.364 In the sample, he uses ‘the British Commonwealth 
of Nations’, ‘the Empire’ or “British Empire”, and ‘the Group’ or ‘the British Group’ 
in relation to the entity broadly known as the Empire. The Dominions are specifically 
mentioned as being part of “the Group”.  
The sample uses the name ‘the British Commonwealth of Nations’ once,  ‘the 
Empire’ or ‘the British Empire’ on three occasions (on one of which British Empire is 
                                                             
363 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp. 11-12. My underlining. 
364 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp. 198-99. The sample can be found in Appendix B. 
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given the predicate ‘a Group of States’), and ‘the Group’ or ‘the British Group’ three 
times. The joint occurrence of the names ‘the Empire’ and ‘the Group’, along with the 
fact that the Empire is described as ‘a Group of States’ in line 30, suggests that Hall 
uses the two names to refer to the same entity, but with the specification that ‘Group’ 
implies that the Empire is as a ‘Group of States’ of which a basic principle is “the 
equal and autonomous nationhood of each self-governing State of the Group” (lines 
13-14). Referring to the Empire as ‘the Group’ is thus intended to imply a specific 
political meaning, namely that of the free collaboration of autonomous group- 
members. This makes the sample ambiguous, because it both suggests that “the 
Group” and “the Empire” refer to the same thing, namely the complete Empire 
including the non-self-governing parts, and, in the very next words, predicate the 
member states of “the Group” as “absolutely free and equal” (line 30), which could – 
at that point in time – logically only refer to Britain and the Dominions.   
While the sample only once uses the name ‘the British Commonwealth of Nations’, it 
is also the title of the entire book, which gives it more salience than the sample might 
suggest. In this particular case, the name is used in connection with “the new ideas as 
to the nature and purpose of the British Commonwealth of Nations” (lines 4-5), which 
semantically presupposes the existence of something named ‘the British 
Commonwealth of Nations’ while suggesting that it is related to new ideas and the 
future. Thus it appears that ‘the British Commonwealth of Nations’ is given as the 
new name of the entity commonly known as ‘the British Empire’, which could 
correctly be referred to as ‘the British Group of Nations’ considered as a group of 
independent states. Thus all three (or five counting the short-forms) names refer to the 
same entity, but implies slightly different meanings with ‘Empire’ being the historical 
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name, ‘Group’ an explanatory name probably limited to Great Britain and the 
Dominions, and ‘Commonwealth’ the new name for the future.  
-Zimmern- 
Given that Zimmern’s Third British Empire was published in 1926, six years after 
Hall’s British Commonwealth, it is noticeable that he used the term “Empire” rather 
than “Commonwealth” in the title of the book. The same use is consistent in the titles 
of the five chapters that each correspond to a lecture given at Columbia University in 
1925.  
Table 2.1 presents a simple break-down of the main names for the Empire used: 
2.1 Names in Zimmern, Third British Empire (1926) Times used in 
book 
“Empire”, “British Empire” 137 
“British Commonwealth of Nations”, “Commonwealth of 
Nations”, British Commonwealth”, “Commonwealth”365 
48 
“British Entente”, “Entente” 11 
This shows the absolute dominance of the use of “Empire” or “British Empire” when 
naming the empire, with the names based on “Commonwealth” a distant second. The 
third type of name was based on the word “Entente”, used as “British Entente” or 
simply as “the Entente”. In chapter II of ‘The British Empire and the League of 
Nations’, Zimmern explained why he used the term entente: 
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quote from the 1917 Imperial Conference that Zimmern feels the need to explain, and he never adopts 
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Let us face the fact that, viewed coldly, the resultant political entity [coming from the 
concessions Britain had granted the Dominions after WWI] is something looser that a 
sovereign state, something looser than a confederacy of even an alliance, because no 
written bond exists between the Dominions and Great Britain or between the 
Dominions themselves. It is, in fact, most accurately described by the word Entente. 
The British Empire of 1914 has become a British Entente, a group of states, each 
independent and with full control over its policy, but bound together by cordial 
feelings and by arrangements for mutual consultation and more or less regular 
intervals.366 
Purporting to take the view of a neutral rational observer, Zimmern listed various 
types of relations that he believed did not reflect the actual relations between Britain 
and the Dominions. He then proceeded to state as an uncontested fact that the 
relations were “accurately described by the word Entente”, and in the following pages 
the definite article was consistently used, making it “the British Entente”367 (ie a 
proper name). But if the relationship between Britain and the Dominions was one of 
entente, the quotation below shows that Zimmern also tried to assess whether or not 
the Dominions were included in the term “the British Empire” in regards to the 
League on Nations: 
The British Members of the League consists of ‘The British Empire’, the five self-
governing Dominions, and India. Does ‘The British Empire’ include the whole Empire 
or only that part of it (Great Britain and the non-self-governing Dominions) not 
separately represented? The British Cabinet seems committed to the former view, but 
there are strong considerations leading to the other conclusion. It must not be forgotten 
that the Dominions received a written assurance in 1919 from the President of the Paris 
                                                             
366 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p. 42. 
367 A. Zimmern, The Third British Empire, pp. 43-44, pp. 60-62. 
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Conference which drew up the Covenant of the League that they should be eligible for 
election as non-permanent members of the Council, in spite of the permanent seat 
assigned in that body to ‘the British Empire’. It seems difficult to maintain that M. 
Clemenceau and his colleagues admitted the right of the Dominions to be double 
represented on the Council.368 
Zimmern’s conclusion thus appears to be that, at least in so far as the League was 
concerned, the Dominions though part of the British Group should not be counted as 
part of the British Empire. The international complications of their unknown status 
are further explored in Chapter 6. 
Interestingly, Zimmern explained the “British Entente” as “a group of states”, just as 
Hall did with “the Empire”, suggesting that they may have had essentially the same 
concept in mind with their two different names (though Zimmern never referred to 
Hall or any of his work). The similarity is strengthened by Zimmern’s mention of the 
‘independence’ and ‘consultation’ of the members of the entente, in a manner similar 
to Hall’s talk of ‘autonomy’ and ‘consultation’ between members of “the Group” – 
though Zimmern mitigated the scope of consultation by suggesting that it should be 
‘more or less regular’, whereas Hall consistently called for it to be ‘continuous’ (Hall, 
lines 14 and 31). The main difference between Zimmern’s use of “British Entente” 
and Hall’s use of “British Group” lies in the frequency with which the name was used. 
While Tables 1.1 and 1.2 showed that Hall used the name “Group” regularly 
throughout his book, Table 2.2 below shows that Zimmern only used the name 
“Entente” in chapter II. This strongly suggests that Zimmern mainly saw the Entente 
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as most relevant in a League of Nations context, while Hall viewed it in a wider 
scope, relating both to intra-imperial and international relations.  
Table 2.2 Names per chapter in Third British Empire “Empire” “Common
-wealth” 
“Entente” 
I. ‘The Third British Empire’ 58 12 0 
II. ‘The British Empire and the League of Nations’ 14 10 11 
III. ‘The Empire and the Non-White Peoples’ 33 10 0 
IV. ‘The Empire and International Economic Co-
operation’ 
12 5 0 
V. ‘The Empire and Nationality’ 369 20 11 0 
 
  --Zimmern and the use of “Commonwealth”— 
Given a context in which the former Empire had in effect split up into two entities—
that is the dominions and the colonies—Zimmern needed to find some way to bring 
the parts back together as one whole. In the beginning of Chapter 1, Zimmern stated 
as a fact that “The British Empire of 1914 has now become the British 
Commonwealth of Nations”, noting that the name had first appeared in 1914, without 
mentioning that he himself had been the one to publish the name.370 However, as 
already shown, he defined a Commonwealth of Nations as a multi-cultural and multi-
national state. That does not however in itself explain how the Commonwealth 
differed from the old Empire except in name, and since the name had not yet been 
formally changed Zimmern, had to explain what the term implied was needed. The 
explanation was left until the third lecture, on the Empire and its relation to race 
                                                             
369 Chapter V. uses the term “English Empire” 5 times, but every time in the context of what the 
Empire is not. It is therefore not counted as an actual nomination of the Empire, but as a nomination 
shown and rejected as an argumentation technique. 
370 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, pp. 43-44, p. 3.  
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issues.  The following two quotations form part of a long discussion of the political 
relations between the white and non-white people of the Empire. 
The duty of facing the race problem is one that is especially incumbent on British 
citizens. For the British Empire, on a majority vote, is not a white empire but a 
coloured empire. Hitherto, the whites have borne rule; but if the Third Empire is to be 
a Commonwealth of Nations, based on the idea of equal partnership, we must discover 
how to transform the relationship of prestige to which I have already referred into a 
more equal co-operation for common ends.371 
Is the British Empire to be run on the basis of white supremacy? Does it represent a 
permanent supremacy of the white over the non-white races, based on the conception 
of the innate superiority of the white man and on the policy of ‘keeping the coloured 
man in his place’? 
That is indeed a familiar and a very convenient theory, and one, it can be added, which 
makes a particular appeal to white men of inferior calibre who like to feel that, 
whatever their individual defects, they belong to a superior type. But it is a theory for 
which there is no warrant either in science, or in religion, or in morals, or in any decent 
code of manners.372 
Zimmern here put his finger straight on the sore spot, the simple fact that white people 
were a minority in the Empire, and so would be a political minority in a 
democratically run Empire. While this fact was one of the reasons why the idea of 
imperial federation had been rejected by some, Zimmern made it clear that in his 
view, there was no validity whatsoever in claiming permanent white superiority, and 
that consequently the focus should be on transforming the previous imperial relations 
“into a more equal co-operation”. He explained that the “Commonwealth of Nations” 
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was “based on the idea of equal partnership” which was much the same as what he 
claimed for the “British Entente”, which suggests that the Commonwealth should 
have similar aims to the Entente, as regards the mutual relations of the different 
members or partners. All in all, it appears that the “British Commonwealth” was 
intended to refer to an essentially democratic and inclusive government model, where 
the clear aim was equal political rights for peoples irrespective of skin colour. This 
view is supported by the entire chapter and several other parts of the lecture series.373 
Zimmern therefore showed that “Empire” could either be understood as the complete 
Empire or as Britain and its dependencies. He offered up “Entente” as the term to 
describe the relations between Britain and the Dominions and India, while suggesting 
the term “Commonwealth” both as the new name for the complete Empire, and as a 
signal that it both could and should become an egalitarian partnership of nations of all 
races.  
4.2.2 Why “Commonwealth”? 
The previous section has shown why the term “Empire” was increasingly problematic, 
and examined how imperialist-internationalists like Zimmern and Hall sought to 
present new names to capture the character of the organisation they believed it was 
becoming, the question remains as to why they favoured terms like the British 
Commonwealth of Nations rather than (for example) the British Society of Nations. 
In the context of the recent Empire, the term “Commonwealth” had been used to 
describe the federation of Australia, but not in the case of South Africa or Canada, 
and so there was no clear imperial precedent. Among the former British colonies in 
                                                             
373 For examples read the entire chapter III, or chapter V on the Empire and Nationality, where it is 
stressed that not only is white-ness not a cause for superiority, neither is English culture, pp. 134-139. 
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the United States, a number such as the Commonwealth of Virginia had taken the 
name “Commonwealth” at the time of independence, but only as individual states in 
the greater American federation, which was of course the United States of America 
and not “the Commonwealth of America”. In the context of Great Britain, the only 
historical Commonwealth was Cromwell’s republican Commonwealth of the 1650s, 
which does not seem the most obvious precedent when considering the successor of 
the British Empire. In short, none of the most recent political uses of 
“Commonwealth” in a British connection seem to have been of obvious relevance to 
debates about the changing character of the British Empire (nor, indeed, to be 
particularly closely aligned to Zimmern’s definition of a Commonwealth of Nations). 
However, looking at the Oxford English Dictionary one finds that two of the main 
definitions of “commonwealth” are: 
2. The whole body of people constituting a nation or state, the body politic; a state, an 
independent community, esp. viewed as a body in which the whole people have a 
voice or an interest.  
3. a. A state in which the supreme power is vested in the people; a republic or 
democratic state.374 
As can be seen, definitions 2 and 3a both highlight the common interest of the whole 
people in a commonwealth, with definition 3a specifically designating it republic or 
democracy, which is in line with the views Hall and Zimmern advanced when setting 
down their concept of the new Commonwealth of Nations (i.e. as an institution in 
which the democratic polity should include all the participant parts). 
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In British political philosophy, both Hobbes and Locke had used the term 
‘commonwealth’ in Leviathan and Two Treatises of Government respectively, in both 
cases specifically connecting it to the Latin term civitas, a meaning similar to the 
OED’s definition 2 of commonwealth (and distinct from its use to describe 
Cromwell’s government of the 1650s).375.  A perusal of translations of ancient texts 
actually shows that “Commonwealth” has not generally been the standard translation 
of civitas, though it was certainly commonly used: a basic search of the word 
“commonwealth” in the Perseus Digital Library of ancient texts, hosted by Tufts 
University, shows its presence in 1262 document results from Aeschines to Pseudo-
Plutarch.376 Given that the Perseus collection relies on out of copyright editions, the 
majority of the translations are from the mid 19th to mid 20th century, and thus created 
within a relevant timeframe for the purpose of this thesis. 
In the translations of Greek texts, “Commonwealth” was usually given as the 
translation of phrases involving words like koinos (‘common’, in the Middle Liddell 
Greek-English Dictionary,377 the neuter yo koinon is suggested as a match to the Latin 
res publica), holos (‘whole’ or ‘entire’, used in connection with cities) and polis or 
politea (‘the people’, or ‘community of people’ of a city).378 A different case of the 
                                                             
375 Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), chap. 17, Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), ii. x. §133. 
376 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/searchresults?q=commonwealth (23 March 2015). 
377 The Middle Liddell was the dominant Greek-English Dictionary of the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the dictionary that booth translators and the imperialist-internationalists would have been used 
to use as reference. 
378 Use of “commonwealth” for phrases involving koinos, ‘common’ appears among other places in: 
Demosthenes, Demosthenes, translated by J. H. Vince (Harvard University Press, 1930), 10 45; 
Aristotle, Aristotle, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. (Harvard University Press, 1926), Rh. 1.5; 
Aristotle, Aristotle, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham (Harvard University Press, 1944), Pol. 3.1278b; 
and Plato, Plato, Vol. 1 translated by H.N. Fowler (Harvard University Press, 1966), Crito 50a.  
Use of “Commonwealth” for phrases involving holos in: Aristotle, Aristotle, Vol. 18, translated by 
G.C. Armstrong (Harvard University Press, 1935), Oacon. 2.1346a; and Demosthenes, Demosthenes, 
translated by J. H. Vince (Harvard University Press, 1926), 19 1.  
Using “Commonwealth” for polis, politea and similar designations is common across the translations 
of Aristotle, Plato, Demonstenes etc. but a particularly poignant case is in Thucydides. The 
Peloponnesian War, translated T. Hobbes of Malmesbury. (Bohn, 1843), 6.15, where Hobbes translates 
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use of “commonwealth” in classical studies is Zimmern’s previously discussed The 
Greek Commonwealth of 1911. In translations of Latin texts, “commonwealth” 
regularly occur as the translation of res publica in standard texts by authors such as 
Caesar, Cicero, Livy, Sallust, Tacitus and Suetonius. In the case of Cicero, 
“commonwealth” has also been used to translate communi.379 
What can be seen in both the OED and in the translations, particularly those from 
Latin, is that “commonwealth” has regularly been used as an English synonym for res 
publica or republic. When looking at the 1917 translation of Rousseau’s tract on 
perpetual peace, used in chapter two,380 it is interesting to notice that Vaughan 
translates Rousseau’s République Européenne as “the Commonwealth of Europe”, 
rather than the more straightforward ‘European Republic”.381 Given the context of 
World War I, with its challenges to empires and monarchies across Europe, it is 
probable that the word “commonwealth” was chosen in Vaughan’s translations to 
avoid any implications of “republic” in the sense of a “non-monarchical” form of 
government. In a similar way, the wide use of the term “commonwealth” in 
translations of a variety of ancient texts suggests that it held a position as a neutral 
                                                             
Ἀθηναίων πόλιν (Athenaion polis) into “Athenian Commonwealth” (though Benjamin Jovett in 
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, translated B. Jowett (Clarendon Press, 1881), translates the same 
part into Athenian State). 
379 “Commonwealth” used for res publica in: C. J. Caesar, Caesar's Gallic War, translated W. A. 
McDevitte. & W. S. Bohn. (Harper & Brothers, 1869); M.T. Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, translated C. D. Yonge (Bohn, 1856), Catil. 1.5; M.T. Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, translated C. D. Yonge (George Bell & Sons, 1891), Planc. 37; Livy, History of Rome, 
translated by W.M. Roberts (E. P. Dutton and Co, 1912), 1, 2; Tacitus, Complete Works of Tacitus, 
translated A. J. Church (Random House, 1873. reprinted 1942), Hist. 1.5; Sallust, Conspiracy of 
Catiline, translated J. Selby Watson (Harper & Brothers, 1899), Cat. 3; and Suetonius, The Lives of the 
Twelve Caesars, ed. J.E. Reed. (Gebbie & Co., 1889), Augustus. 27.  
“commonwealth” was used for commune in M.T. Cicero, The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, 
translated C. D. Yonge (George Bell & Sons, 1903), Ver. 2.2.114; and Cicero, The Orations (1856), 
Man. 19. 
380 Rousseau, ‘‘Abstract’ and ‘Judgment’’. 
381 Compare Rousseau, ‘Projet De Paix Perpetuelle’ with Rousseau, ‘‘Abstract’ and ‘Judgment’’, p. 
108. 
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word for state or community that could cover a range of political constellations with 
democratic elements—notably including that of a republic. In a broader context, the 
word “commonwealth” can be found in use in late nineteenth-century British political 
tracts, whether dealing with Britain or the United States. The 1886 work, Oceana, or 
England and her Colonies, by James A. Froude, which promoted the federation of the 
English ‘race’, called for “a 'commonwealth' of Oceana held together by common 
blood, common interest, and a common pride in the great position which unity can 
secure.”382 Froude later defined a “commonwealth” as “The commonwealth is the 
common health, the common wellness”,383 an admittedly rather weak and open-ended 
definition, which he made clear was not automatically consistent with democracy – in 
fact rather the contrary, given that he cited Aristotle as his authority,384 though he also 
conceded that democracy was needed to maintain the unity of the Empire.385 While 
Froude’s work was unclear about whether democracy belonged to the concept of 
“commonwealth”, Goldwin Smith, in his 1902 work Commonwealth or Empire386—a 
book about the United States rather than the British Empire—clearly equated 
“commonwealth” with “democracy” and “republic”.387 He identified “Empire” with 
“a career of conquest and domination over subject races, with the political liabilities 
that such a career entails”.388 Smith’s work expressed a fear that the United States 
might regress from being a commonwealth into becoming an empire (the process 
referred to in its title Commonwealth or Empire). There was in his ideas a certain 
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384 Froude, Oceana, p. 154. 
385 Froude, Oceana (1886), p. 392. 
386 G. Smith, Commonwealth or Empire (Macmillan, 1902). 
387 Smith, Commonwealth or Empire, pp. 2-3. 
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similarity to the ideas subsequently expressed by the imperialist-internationalists who 
of course wanted the Empire to progress into a Commonwealth. 
Finally, looking at the use of the word “commonwealth” in newspaper articles from 
The Times and the Manchester Guardian from 1890-1915, and ignoring the cases 
where it referred to the planned or newly created Commonwealth of Australia, it can 
again be seen to have a broad and generally positive meaning. For example, two 
articles from 1890 and 1893 in The Times use the word “commonwealth” or 
“American Commonwealth” to refer to the United States of America when discussing 
“the most important book upon the American Commonwealth” by James Bryce (The 
American Commonwealth, 1888).389 Other articles from 1890, 1891, and 1894 use 
“commonwealth” as a reference for the unity of England, Scotland, and Ireland, or the 
UK as such,390 while another 1890 article uses “commonwealth” to refer to England 
alone.391  
By 1915 the term “commonwealth” was still used on occasion as an alternative 
designation of the United States, including in an article in The Times about the 
common ideals shared by Britain and the US: “thanks to the liberality of their [the 
USA] institutions, they are able to absorb all elements as loyal members of their 
commonwealth.”392 The term was also used on occasion to refer to “civilised” non-
German Europe. A 1915 advertisement for the Anti-German League stated that “there 
must be no readmission for them [Germany] to the free commonwealth of Europe”.393 
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390 “School For Modern Oriental Studies.” The Times, 13 Jan. 1890, p. 8; “FREE LAND LEAGUE.-
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In this context, it is interesting to see the connotation of “free” linked to the broader 
open entity or a European commonwealth.  
Though Zimmern made first use of the complete name “the British Commonwealth of 
Nations”, McIntyre’s Britannic Vision cites some earlier references to the Empire as a 
commonwealth by Lord Rosebery in 1884 and John Merriman in 1887. McIntyre 
further argues that by the early twentieth century, “commonwealth” was used both for 
a single state and for a group of states.394 From that point onwards, “British 
Commonwealth” and general references to the Empire as Commonwealth became 
increasingly common, as seen, for example, in the Manchester Guardian, which in 
June 1915 quoted a Christian missionary, Dr. Adney, as saying in a speech that “The 
title “British Empire” was a misleading misnomer. It would be more true to speak of a 
“British Commonwealth”, all divisions of which were loyal to the British throne and 
community of British political life, while each of them was self-governing.”395 It is 
striking how similar the sentiment and even wording used here was to the later 
Balfour Declaration on Dominion Autonomy of 1926. 
Likewise, in November 1915, Phillip Kerr of the Round Table spoke about “the self-
governing nations of the British Commonwealth” in a talk given at King’s College 
and published in The Times.396 It is worth noting that “the British Commonwealth” is 
mentioned as an existing entity. The Round table Group fully adopted the name 
Commonwealth, and in 1916 Lionel Curtis, its leading member, published The 
Problem of the Commonwealth, which throughout refers to the British 
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Commonwealth.397 By 1917, the name “the British Commonwealth of Nations” got its 
strongest support, when General Smuts declared: 
 
The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression “Empire” is 
misleading, because it makes people think that we are one community, to which the 
word “Empire” can appropriately be applied. Germany is an Empire. Rome was an 
Empire. India is an Empire. But we are a system of Nations. We are not a State, but 
rather a community of States and nations. We are far greater than any Empire which 
has ever existed, and by using this ancient expression we really disguise the main fact 
that our whole position is different, and that we are not one State or nation or empire, 
but a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations, of many States, and all 
sorts of communities, under one flag.  
We are a system of States, and not, I think, a stationary system, but a system always 
going forward to new destinies. Take the position of that system to-day. Here you have 
the United Kingdom with a number of Crown Colonies. Besides that, you have large 
protectorates like Egypt, an Empire by itself. Then you have a great Dependency like 
India, also an Empire by itself, where civilization has existed from time immemorial. 
We are trying to see how East and West can work together. These are enormous 
problems; but beyond them we come to the so-called Dominions, almost independent 
in government themselves, which have been evolved on the principle of a European 
constitutional system into almost independent States, but who all belong to this 
community of nations, which I prefer to call “the British Commonwealth of Nations.  
You can see that no political ideas which we have evolved in the past will apply to this 
world which is comprised in the British Empire; and any name we have yet found for 
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this group is insufficient. The man who will find a proper name for this system will, I 
think, do real service to the Empire.398 
It is worth noting, that Smuts insisted that the Commonwealth was unlike any 
previous system, and that it was not an empire anymore, but rather an international 
community in its own right. The speech resulted in a more than exponential rise of the 
name “British Commonwealth”, which can be traced through a look at its appearance 
in the press, here represented by The Times and the Manchester Guardian. The 
following table shows the number of articles containing the name by year.  
Paper/year399 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 
Manchester 
Guardian 
1 4 26 36 46 64 
The Times 1 1 21 36 61 45 
 
While the most dramatic increase came in the articles from 1917, where a majority 
referred to Smuts, as the table shows a more moderate but still significant increase of 
numbers of articles continued over the next three years. 
4.2.3 Renaming the Empire: Conclusions 
A change in the name of the Empire, or at least the part of the Empire consisting of 
the United Kingdom and its self-governing white colonies, was considered necessary 
by the imperialist-internationalists because the concept of Empire was increasingly 
beginning to be considered toxic in any discussion about future intra-imperial 
relations. Introducing the term ‘Dominions’ for the self-governing colonies had given 
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them a satisfactory kind of recognition, even when it had no independent legal 
definition, which set a clear precedent that a change of name could in and of itself 
help soften tensions in intra-imperial relations. 
This analysis of new names used in Hall’s British Commonwealth of Nations and 
Zimmern’s Third British Empire showed how they presented “the British 
Commonwealth of Nations” as the de facto new name of the Empire, while using a 
range of terms for particular aspects of the imperial organisation. Meanwhile, an 
analysis of uses of the term “commonwealth” in translations of classical works and in 
British political philosophy, as well as newspaper articles from the late 19th to early 
20th century, has shown how the term was normally used in a positive sense to 
describe quite a broad range of states structures, generally based on a principle of 
state legitimacy deriving from the people. When writers like Hall and Zimmern used 
the term “Commonwealth” they were therefore making use of a word with positive 
democratic overtones, which did not have strongly Cromwellian associations, nor any 
strong revolutionary or anti-monarchical connotations. They used the term to suggest 
a structure open to all the peoples of the Empire, without any central rule implied, 
making it palatable to both the Afrikaners of South Africa and the Francophonie of 
Canada, while the established English use of the word commonwealth both in 
political philosophy and in everyday language made it familiar to the British 
audience.  
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that the imperialist-internationalists, as represented by Smuts, 
Murray, Zimmern, and Hall, from the start of World War I recognised its potential to 
transform the British Empire and its place in the wider world. It has also examined 
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their views about how the process would take place and their attempts to develop 
ideas about how to shape it.   Realising that one aspect of moulding the political 
system of the Empire was to change its name to something reflecting their view of 
what kind of system the Empire should be, they consciously began to promote the 
name ‘the British Commonwealth of Nations’ as the new, de facto, name of the 
British Empire (that is years before it received any statutory official recognition). By 
repeatedly using the new name, especially from 1917 onwards, they managed to make 
it an increasingly accepted part of the political debate as reflected by its growing use 
in the Times and the Manchester Guardian. The analysis in the second section of this 
chapter indicates that the name ‘Commonwealth’ was chosen less because of any 
specific historical significance, and rather because it was a commonly used term for a 
broadly democratic type of political society, familiar both to students of political 
philosophy and the ancient world. Since the term did not have the anti-monarchical 
overtones of ‘republic’ it was favoured by the imperialist-internationalists who 
remained convinced that the common bond of the Imperial Crown was crucial to the 
British Commonwealth.  
The chapter has also demonstrated the degree to which the imperialist-
internationalists –Zimmern’s rejection of white supremacy not withstanding–  
considered  the Commonwealth an essentially British project, made possible by 
specifically British cultural traits and a sense of ‘Britishness’ which they considered 
an inherently internationalist identity. According to the imperialist-internationalists, it 
was this that made the Commonwealth the only relevant model for creating the 
League of Nations, a position discussed and analysed in the following chapter. 
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5: The British Empire and the formation of the League of Nations  
Just as World War I accelerated the development of the Empire into the 
Commonwealth of Nations, it also became a catalyst for new international 
cooperation, culminating in the creation of the League of Nations. And, just as the 
imperialist-internationalists had seen the potential of World War I for changing the 
world when it started in 1914, so they believed that with the coming of peace they had 
an opportunity and a duty to try to shape the League of Nations and the international 
order more generally.  In correspondence between Murray and Smuts on 11 and 12 
November 1918, at the time of the armistice, the responsibility of that chance weighed 
heavily upon them: “the future of the world depends on whether or no we possess 
wisdom and generosity”400 wrote Murray to Smuts on the 11th, who answered back 
the next day, stating “The immediate future is very fateful. The old immobile world is 
once more fluid, and the creator can once more mould it to better ends. But the danger 
of things going wrong is as great as ever.”401 
It was this sense of enormous opportunity and risk that characterised the Paris Peace 
Conference which ran throughout 1919. Largely seen as an opportunity to reorganise 
the world for the twentieth century, there was a widespread perception that everything 
was ‘up for grabs’, an impression that was not altogether countered by the Big Three 
(the American President Woodrow Wilson, the French President Georges 
Clemenceau, and the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George).  All the main 
recognised countries sent delegations, as did many of the embryonic states that had 
emerged in Europe during the early months of peace, along with organisations 
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interested in issues on such questions as Women’s Rights.  The result was that the 
Conference hosted a multitude of delegations involved in numerous and negotiations, 
making it virtually impossible to analyse as a single whole. The sheer scale of the 
Paris Peace Conference means that the vast majority of academic works on the 
Conference choose to focus on specific aspects of it—including works analysing the 
negotiations, motivations, and practical consequences of creating the League—rather 
than offering a really comprehensive coverage.402 This fractured approach means that 
there is not one dominant work on the nature and significance of the Peace 
Conference, nor the creation of the League of Nations itself, that must be evaluated 
for this thesis. Rather, the diverse scope means that there is still plenty of space for 
further specialised research. 
A common approach to the dynamics between the big powers is to see the American 
delegation as idealistic, the British as focussed on restoring trade and securing 
imperial advantage, and the French as narrow-mindedly focussed on punishing 
Germany, either by breaking up the country or by crushing it under severe obligations 
and penalties that would prevent it from threatening France again. As is often the case 
with simplistic views, the idea of this triangle of power and competing perceptions is 
misleading, even if it does capture some of the dynamics involved. In regards to the 
creation of the League of Nations, many British politicians—both those involved in 
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the process and those on the side-lines—did indeed consider that Wilson’s plan for 
such an organisation was idealistic, or utopian as E.H. Carr would later say, but also 
believed that the British proposals were solidly based on practical and indeed imperial 
experience. The dedication of the imperialist-internationalists to the League project 
was neatly expressed by Smuts in a letter written on 21 January 1919, where he 
declared that “The League of Nations, which is the real business of this Conference, is 
progressing very well” (italics added).403  
A wealth of published materials from 1916 onwards—including pamphlets, articles 
and books—demonstrates how the imperialist-internationalists publicly used 
historical examples drawn from imperial experience as illustrations of precursors of 
internationalism. The material, discussed in more detail below, also shows how, in 
their estimate, the British experience of imperialism from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century could provide an ideological and practical foundation for 
internationalism as well as helping to promote the whole League idea in Britain. The 
following pages also examine a range of archival material, including letters and 
internal documents unpublished at the time, which tells a similar story. The chapter 
then concludes with a discussion of the ideas of Leo Amery to show that even some 
politicians who were opposed to the League agreed that it had from the British side 
been based on the model of the Empire.  
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5.1 Internationalism as an extension of imperialism 
“The true imperialist to-day is an internationalist” wrote Zimmern in a 1923 article 
published in the US.404  
Chapter 2 of this thesis traced western ideas on Empires as peace-creators from 
antiquity to the nineteenth century, making the case that their role in keeping 
international peace and order was recognised down to the time of J.S. Mill, while 
Chapter 3 showed that most members of the group of imperialist-internationalists had 
a training in classics which led them to understanding Greece and Hellenism as 
exemplars of liberal ideas. It therefore remains here to show how the imperialist-
internationalists were sufficiently influenced by their cultural and educational 
background to consider imperialism as a prototype internationalism to be part of their 
arguments for creating the League. 
Robert Cecil, as a member of the Foreign Office, promoted the idea of a League of 
Nations to the War Cabinet from 1916, the year when he circulated a memorandum 
that vividly described the horrors of the war and its costs both socially and 
economically to Britain and the World.  He included a proposal for a simple covenant. 
In the memorandum, dated October 1916, he stated that  
It is not too much to say that it [WWI] has endangered the fabric of our civilisation and 
if it is to be repeated the whole European system may probably disappear in anarchy. It 
is surely, therefore, most urgent that we should try to think out some plan to lessen the 
probability of future war.405  
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His alarm closely mirrors Smuts’ misgivings fears about the future of civilisation at 
the start of the War, discussed in Chapter 4, and shows how some in Britain believed 
that securing peace for the future was a matter of urgency. For the United States, 
however, the time was not yet right, as shown in a letter from Eric Drummond, a 
Foreign Office civil servant and later the first Secretary General of the League, to 
Arthur Balfour, dated 15 November 1916, who told him that “the President [Wilson] 
thought it better that the Government of the United States should not in any way be 
committed to a cut and dried plan for the establishment of a League of Nations,” and 
that members of the Wilson administration “were discouraging in the United States 
discussions as to the League of Nations, etc.” 406 As Drummond had receive this 
insight from Wilson’s confidant, Colonel House, further development on the whole 
issue was effectively shelved in Britain for the time being. 
However, by early 1918 the time was considered right to continue with Cecil’s 
proposal, and the Foreign Secretary, Balfour, appointed a “Committee on the League 
of Nations” led by Lord Phillimore, a noted specialist on international law, to 
“inquire, particularly from a juridical and historical point of view, into the various 
schemes for establishing by means of a League of Nations, or other device, some 
alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes”.407 In Cecil’s 1941 
history of the League, A Great Experiment,408 he introduces his discussion of the 
Phillimore Report by listing a few highlights of international cooperation for peace, 
mentioning the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire, and 
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Grotius’ opus magnum, De Jure Belli et Pacis, before going on to quote from the 
introduction of the Phillimore Report itself.409 The Phillimore Report briefly but 
systematically reviewed the proposals for perpetual peace from the seventeenth 
century onwards (generally focusing on those discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis: 
Sully, Abbé de St. Pierre, Kant, Bentham, the Concert of Europe and Czar Alexander 
1.410  
The historical arguments of the Phillimore Report were not far removed from those of 
Elizabeth York’s 1919 Leagues of Nations: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, which 
was briefly mentioned in Chapter 2. Both the conclusions of the Report and the fact 
that the original instructions had focussed on finding historical precedents shows how 
the British sought to create the new League based on the solid example of past 
experience (repeatedly returning to plans reflecting imperial experience when it came 
to formulating internationalism and international peace). One of the members of the 
Phillimore Committee was the historian A.F. Pollard, who published a pamphlet on 
‘The League of Nations in History’ in 1918, in which he first gave the usual summary 
of initiatives for world or perpetual peace, similar to the selection chosen in the 
Phillimore Report and by York. Pollard stated that: 
The only political system which approached the idea of a League of Nations was the 
British Empire, and it achieved success, not by the amalgamation of independent units, 
but by their decentralization.411 
                                                             
409 Cecil, A Great Experiment, pp. 48-49. Phillimore Report is quoted from p. 49-58. 
410 It is striking that it is almost the exact same list of proposals gathered in the later parts of York, 
Leagues of Nations and in Aksu, Early Notions of Global Governance. Though Aksu does not attribute 
his choice of collection to the Phillimore Report, it is tempting to suspect some direct or indirect 
inspiration. 
411 A.F. Pollard, ‘The League of Nations in History’, pp. 11-12. 
M. A. Ebbesen, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth and League of Nations: Intellectual 
roots of imperialist-internationalism, 1915-1926’, PhD in Politics, July 2019         192 
 
In the following pages, Pollard made clear that it was exactly by decentralising and 
letting go of control that the British Empire became a relevant model: 
The British Empire is an example because England conquered its will to dominate its 
Dominions; but while it is an example, it is not an alternative, to the League of 
Nations, and it would cease to be even an example if it were used to dominate 
others.412 
Because, in a world of nation-states, 
It is not by the repression, but only by the expression, of nationality that a League of 
Nations can be formed; for nationality has come to stay, and the purport of a League of 
Nations is to provide means for the expression of nationality in any form but war.413 
Like most of the imperialist-internationalists, Pollard was a Liberal, and the pamphlet 
shows how he shared their characteristic belief that the history of the Empire showed 
how such an entity could evolve in to an open international organisation. 
In January 1919, as the peace negotiations were about to open in Paris, H.G. Wells 
and others published an article in The Atlantic on “The Idea of a League of 
Nations”.414 Among the collaborators behind the article were several of the 
imperialist-internationalists, including Edward Grey, Alfred Zimmern, and Gilbert 
Murray.  Others involved included Lionel Curtis of the Round Table movement, 
Viscount Bryce, J.A. Spender, William Archer and H. Wickham Steed, who were all 
cooperating in The League of Free Nations Association.415 The editorial introduction 
stated that “The remarkable qualifications of this group assures to their treatise a high 
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place in the literature of World Peace”416, and it is fair to suggest that the treatise 
articulated ideas that most of the imperialist-internationalists would have been happy 
to agree on. It is noticeable that the actual paper opens with a recitation of past 
attempts to promote greater unity, the vast majority of which were imperial in nature, 
including many of those discussed in Chapter 2 (and strikingly not used by the 
Phillimore Report which typically focused on more modern ideas and movements). 
De Republica by Cicero is the starting point in this paper, and from there it quickly 
moves through the Roman Empire (mechanical and despotic), Islam and Medieval 
Christianity (“excluding the unbeliever”), De Monarchia by Dante, and the 
federations of small Greek city-states. All are named as attempts to bring about “a 
cessation of war and a world-wide rule of international law”, though in practice only 
creating “unstable empire-systems of subject and sub-ordinate peoples […] rather 
than real unifications”.417 So while the authors of “The Idea of a League of Nations” 
acknowledged that the old empires had failed to deliver free cooperation, the article 
invited the reader to:  
Consider again the numerous nations in the British Empire, which act in unison 
through the Imperial Government, imperfect and unrepresentative as it is […]. What is 
there in common between an Australian native, a London freethinker, a Bengali 
villager, a Uganda gentleman, a Rand negro, and Egyptian Merchant, and a Singapore 
Chinaman, that they should all be capable of living as they do under one rule and one 
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peace and with a common collective policy –and yet be incapable of a slightly larger 
cooperation with a Frenchman, a New Englander, or a Russian?418 
By this progression from the older and more flawed empires through to the British 
Empire which, though not perfect, was presented as a good model of international 
cooperation, the case for the possibility of worldwide cooperation through the League 
of Nations was made. 
In addition to their writings supporting the League of Nations, Lord Philimore, 
Zimmern, and Murray were also—together with David Davies, W.H. Dickinson, 
Viscount Cave, and A.R. Kennedy—all part of a short-lived Advisory Committee set 
up in London to help Cecil consider the developing drafts of the League of Nations. 
Due to the speed of proceedings in Paris, the Committee had only just started holding 
meetings when Cecil realised that it would not be able to give him feedback in time 
for him to use it, as the reports it managed to make arrived after the relevant follow-
up meetings in Paris. However, in spite of the Committee not having any practical 
use, its composition showed which men Cecil personally wanted to rely on for advice, 
and they were men for whom imperialism was a natural precursor for 
internationalism.419  
When it came to the actual drafts of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the idea 
of internationalism as a successor of imperialism was also present. As was seen in 
Chapter 4, Smuts was as interested in the creation of the League of Nations as he was 
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in changing the Empire into the Commonwealth. In April 1917 he formulated a first 
brief paragraph “in regard to a League of Nations” which was discussed and adopted 
after slight amendment by the Imperial War Cabinet on 26 April 1917.420 It is also 
worth requoting some of the lines from his speech of May 1917: 
You talk of an Imperial mission. I think the British Empire has only one mission, and 
that is a mission for liberty and a mission for greater self-development. You represent 
the only system in history in which a large number of nations has been living in unity. 
You talk about a league of nations. You are the only league of nations that has ever 
existed.421 
Remembering that the purpose of the speech was first and foremost to cement Smuts’ 
vision for the future of the British Empire-Commonwealth among senior British 
policy-makers, it is striking how clear his formulation of the British Empire as a 
proto-type League of Nations is: “You are the only league of nations that has ever 
existed”. Smuts indisputably set up the British Empire as a relevant existing model for 
any new international organisation like the League. 
However, there was more to Smuts’ support for the League idea. While his support 
for the League idea during the War certainly supports that he genuinely believed in 
the concept, his memorandum to the War Cabinet of 3 December 1918 sets out 
reasons to support it, in what may be considered term of pure Realpolitik. He argued 
that Britain would need an ally in the future to manage international affairs, and that 
the US was a better and more natural ally than the unpredictable French. Given that 
Wilson had declared that the US wanted nothing but peace in the world from the 
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conference, Smuts argued that helping Wilson get his League “—not merely as a 
formula, but a real substantive part of our future international system—” would be a 
political win that he could show off at home, and which would make him more 
amenable to support British interests on topics less close to his heart. To secure full 
benefits from this approach, Smuts recommended making clear to Wilson before the 
Conference that Britain would wholeheartedly support his League idea by presenting 
a draft proposal.422 Cecil responded by letter to Smuts the following day, giving the 
memorandum his full support.423 While these rather cynic considerations could be 
taken to imply that Smuts and Cecil saw the League more as a tool to manipulate 
Wilson, than as an important initiative in its own right, their work for creating the 
League, both during the War and the Peace Conference, makes it more likely that they 
were using Smuts’ arguments as a way to win over a sceptical War Cabinet, as they 
were always more interested in the League than Lloyd George.424  
In fact, Smuts presented his own draft Covenant to the War Cabinet and to President 
Wilson. The draft was well received, and from late December 1918 through February 
1919, Smuts frequently mentioned in private correspondence that his program formed 
the basis of American proposals that were being made in Wilson’s name.425 This 
opinion was shared by Cecil, who in his conference diary for January 19 wrote that 
Wilson’s proposal was “almost entirely Smuts and Philimore combined, with 
                                                             
422 Cecil of Chelwood Papers, Add MS 51076, ff. 79-81, quote f. 80. 
423 Cecil of Chelwood Papers, Add MS 51076, f. 82. Copy of letter from Cecil to Smuts, 4 December 
1918. 
424 As mentioned in the Introduction, Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace (2009), demonstrates Lloyd 
Goerge’s rather limited interest in the League. 
425 See Hancock and van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume IV. First the period of 
optimism and pride: Vol. 20, No. 258, Letter to M.C. Gillet, 27 December 1918, p. 34; Vol 98, no. 55, 
Letter to A. Clark, 15 January 1919, p. 43; Vol. 22, no. 202, Letter to M.C. Gillett, 29 January 1919, p. 
57; (“the draft of the League of Nations has seen the daylight. It is almost entirely my original 
conception and I am naturally pleased at the acceptance of my ideas. I have kept well in the 
background so that others may have the credit for the League as in that way their co-operation could 
best be secured”) in vol. 98, no. 64, Letter to A. Clark, 16 February 1919, p. 71.  
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practically no new ideas in it”,426  and in a draft letter to Lord Philimore from late 
February stated that the draft covenant discussed by the League of Nations 
Commission “in substance, though not in form, differs only slightly from the British 
draft”.427 However, the broader peace negotiations from the middle of February 
onwards left Smuts increasingly uneasy, while his private correspondence from May 
showed that he had become bitter and disillusioned at the turn of events.428 In the 
section dealing with the later mandates of the League of Nations, an area of intense 
interest to Smuts, given that South Africa hoped to take control of some of the former 
German colonies and preferably annex them, he presented the following formulation: 
That, as a successor to the Empires, the League of Nations will directly and without 
power of delegation watch over the relations … of the new independent States arising 
from the break-up of those Empires, and will regard as a very special task the duty of 
conciliating and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance 
of good order and general peace.429 
The key phrase in the quote has been underlined, ie “as a successor to the Empires, 
the League of Nations”. It should be noted that in the wider context it is clear that 
                                                             
426 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51131, f. 18. 
427 Draft letter, Cecil to Philimore, dated Feb. 1919, and with an added comment “superseeded by letter 
of March 4” added in pencil. FO 608/240, f. 83.  
The argument the Covenant was essentially the British plan favouring British interests was also used by 
American detractors of the League, for example Senator Borah (R) who on February 21 had argued in 
the Senate that “the Constitution of the League was greatest triumph for British diplomacy in 300 
years. It was practically British plan suggested by Smuts” according to a telegram sent from 
Washington to the Foreign Office. FO 698/243, ff.105-106.   
428 Hancock and van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers, Volume IV. Concern shown: Vol. 101, 
no. 73, Letter to D. Lloyd George, 26 March 1919, pp. 83-87; Vol. 20, no. 215, Letter to M.C: Gillett, 
27 March 1919, p. 88; Vol. 22, no. 217, Letter to M.C: Gillett, 31 March 1919, p. 95; and finally upset 
with the Peace treaty as a whole: Vol. 98, no 77, Letter to A. Clark, 2. May 1919, p. 141; Vol. 22, No. 
234, Letter to M.C: Gillett, 7 May 1919, p. 152; (“The Peace Treaty is becoming more and more an 
abomination to me”) in Vol. 22. No. 236, Letter to M.C. Gillett, 14 May 1919, p. 157. And many, 
many others. 
429 ‘Proposals made by General Smuts for a League of Nations’ in F. Wilson, Origins of the League 
Covenant (Hogarth Press, 1929), pp. 184-188. Quote p. 184. My underlining. 
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Smuts is referring to the collapsed Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman, and German 
Empires, but even so, naming the League of Nations as ‘successor to the Empires’ is a 
strong formulation, which seems to make a direct link between “imperialism” and the 
new League of Nations. Given Smuts’ speeches on the virtues of the British 
Empire/Commonwealth, his willingness to include this formulation may not be 
surprising, but it is striking that Wilson adopted his formulation in the first American 
draft presented to the League of Nations committee at the Paris Peace Conference, 
which read: 
As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered, directly and 
without right of delegation, to watch over the relations inter se of all new independent 
states arising or created out of the Empires, and shall assume and fulfil the duty of 
conciliating and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance 
of settled order and the general peace.430   
As can be seen, some changes have been made to the formulation, but the key phrase 
‘as successor to the Empires, the League of Nations’ remains. However, while Smuts 
and Wilson were both happy with that phrasing, someone else, possibly Cecil himself, 
was not. The copy of the American draft in Cecil’s archives has parts of the text 
crossed out in pink ink (presumably originally red), which is here represented by the 
strikethrough of the relevant words. While the corrections in the various drafts in 
Cecil’s archives have not been signed, they are most likely Cecil’s own, as use of that 
colour ink is consistent with Cecil’s signed comments in documents found in Foreign 
Office papers from the Conference, in which no two commentators have used the 
                                                             
430 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51116, ff. 1-5, quote f. 5. The draft in the archive is not 
specifically dated, but hand written note on cover states “President Wilson's Copy” other notes on copy 
are “1st Ed.” and “1” and “I”. Strikethrough represents the places where the text had been edited by 
hand and parts crossed out.  
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same colour.431 In the edited version of the first American draft, all references to the 
Empires thus fell out, and they do not return in the finished version of the Covenant. 
Given that the rejection of the phrase “As successor to the Empires” came from the 
British side, it is easy to suspect that a possible source of objection might be the 
implication that the League of Nations should replace all empires, that is not only of 
the defunct Ottoman, German, and Austro-Hungarian Empires, but also the British 
Empire, (an implication which would obviously be unacceptable to the British 
delegation).   
In spite of the British rejection of the part of Smuts’ formulation relating to the 
League as “successor to the Empires”, the general trend of the processes for making a 
British proposal for a League of Nations—in the official Phillimore Committee, in 
Smuts’ input, and in the published writings of the imperialist-internationalists—was 
clearly one of using historical examples of empires in general, and the British Empire 
in particular, as relevant models for enhancing international peace and cooperation. 
There was widespread support for the idea that the right—British—kind of 
imperialism as a precursor for internationalism.  
 
5.2 Using the British Empire as a model for the League of Nations 
While it was one thing theoretically to consider imperial models as precursors of 
internationalism and international organisations, that alone would not ensure that any 
empire, let alone the British Empire, was used as a practical model for creating the 
League of Nations. However, while the British delegation was not entirely successful 
                                                             
431 See for example comments 9 or 10 January 1919, FO 608/242 f. 470, comments 1 February 1919, 
FO 698/243, f.35, and comments 6 February 1919, FO 698/243, f.42, all of which displays signed 
corrections in three different colours, with Cecil consistently in faded red ink.   
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in its attempts to get British modes of operation written into the Covenant, it will be 
seen below that Cecil’s delegation did base some of its practical suggestions on intra-
imperial models of collaboration. This section also shows how Zimmern and Hall saw 
additional ways in which the League of Nations would benefit from copying the 
British Empire-Commonwealth.  
5.2.1 The Conference System 
A very specific point where the British delegation aimed—and failed—was in 
proposing that the League should imitate the imperial system of cooperation 
symbolised by the Imperial Conferences. The system of Imperial Conferences had 
developed since the late nineteenth century as a means of securing regular 
consultation between the government at Westminster and the governments of the self-
governing colonies (later known as Dominions). While the conferences were 
originally mainly designed to inform the “local” governments of Imperial policy, they 
had increasingly become a forum for intra-imperial communication, where 
Westminster remained in the lead but Dominion representatives were vocal about 
their ideas on Imperial policy. Originally meeting at fairly irregular intervals, it had 
become established custom that the Imperial Conference should meet every four years 
at least, though not much more frequently given the significant travel-time from the 
furthest Dominions (all participants were expected to send their Prime Minister to 
assure that the Conferences could both hold discussions and make decisions). The 
value of face to face meetings by the relevant leaders was considered a key part of the 
success of the Conference system. In a set of “observations” for the consideration of 
the War Cabinet, Maurice Hankey, the highly influential cabinet secretary, noted that 
the regular meetings and social gatherings of ministers and officials during the War 
had meant that “the atmosphere of these Conferences have gradually improved, and 
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that business is easier to transact than formerly. […] The result is a much greater 
mutual understanding. So it will be with the League of Nations.”432 The general faith 
in the value of Conferences was such that it was suggested that “Had we had a 
Council-meeting in 1914 -i.e. if Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference had been 
taken– there [would] have been a good chance of averting war.”433 The idea of 
copying the Conference system was essential to the British model. 
Several documents on drafting the League of Nations Covenant from the Cecil Papers 
show the British attempt to copy this system into the formation of the League of 
Nations. An early draft, of very uncertain dating, introduces the conference system for 
the League as follows: 
Organisation of the League of Nations […] Art.5. Within six months from the date of 
the present Convention, and thereafter in every fourth year from the date of the present 
Convention there shall be held a general Conference of the League, composed of 
responsible representatives of the States members of the League. Whereever possible, 
these responsible representatives shall be the Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers of 
the States. This quadrennial conference is hereafter referred to as the “Conference of 
the League”.434  
As mentioned, the dating is very uncertain. On the first page of the manuscript, in 
pen, it reads “Sept. 1916 or May 1917” but added in pencil it states “[aft 17 Dec. 
1918?]”,435 suggesting a two-year span in which it could have been created. Certainly 
the Conference idea was already being discussed around May 1917, as Smuts noted in 
one of his speeches that month that he considered “a periodic conference or other 
                                                             
432 CAB/24/39, ‘War Cabinet. League of Nations. Observations by the Secretary’ (16 Jan. 1919), p. 4. 
433 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51102, f. 85. Comment added on the back of the folio in blue 
ink, date of document unsure, further explanation in the following paragraph. 
434 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51102, f. 72. 
435 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51102, f. 72. 
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institution” capable of giving a future League of Nations flexibility to follow the 
developments “essential”.436 Irrespective of the actual dating, it does appear to be one 
of the early specific drafts of the Covenant, at this stage called “Convention”, and as 
seen it clearly reflects the conference system of the Empire, with the basic model of a 
fixed conference every four years with “responsible representatives”. 
On 17 December 1918, the latest possible dating of the previous document, Cecil 
presented a memorandum to the War Cabinet known as the “Cecil Draft”, which was 
prepared in the Foreign Office after the Phillimore Report with Alfred Zimmern as 
one of its main authors. Zimmern stated specifically in both a 1923 and a 1924 paper, 
that the main influence for the Cecil Draft was the Conference system.437 A brief 
chapter on its conception, as well as the full text of the memorandum can be found in 
Zimmern’s, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law.438 Zimmern noted that the 
idea of a conference system for the League of Nations was inspired both by the War 
Council and the Imperial Conferences: 
This system of regular meetings between governments, established long before the 
war, had not only stood the strain of war conditions but had emerged greatly 
strengthened, with a fine record of work to its credit. Diplomacy by Conference had 
proved its value during the war.439    
That inspiration could be seen directly in the Cecil Draft in section “II. Arrangements 
for Regular Conference”, which clearly set out that the “fundamental principle of the 
                                                             
436 Smuts’ speech at a meeting held at the Central Hall, Westminster, May 14, 1917 (the day before his 
‘Bonds of Empire’ speech extensively quoted in chapter 4) in J. Smuts et al, ’General Smuts and a 
League of Nations’, League of Nations Society Publications, No. 11 (League of Nations Society, 1st ed. 
May 1917), pp. 10-11. 
437 Zimmern, ‘International Organisation. Its Prospects and Limitations’ and ‘The League and the Old 
Diplomacey’ both in Zimmern, The Prospects of Democracy, p. 226 and pp. 200-201. 
438 Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, pp. 190-209. 
439 Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, p. 191. 
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League would be that it is a meeting of Governments with Governments”, which 
would best be achieved by the foreign secretaries of the great powers meeting 
annually, while the foreign secretaries of all the League members should meet less 
regularly, “possibly every four or five years”.440 
 
On new year’s day 1919, at a Foreign Office meeting including leading 
representatives of the Dominions and India, the model was presented quite simply as 
the “Quadrennial Meeting of representatives of all States included in the League”,441 
specifying that “the Dominions and India should have the right to their own 
representatives at the Quadrennial Meeting of all States included in the League.”442 
An additional higher tier of annual meetings by the Great Powers was added, in 
recognition that quadrennial meetings might not be enough at the highest level, and it 
was again reiterated that representatives at the meetings should be Prime Ministers or 
Foreign Ministers. These proposals were in all essentials the same as the Cecil Draft. 
By the time of the actual negotiations of the Covenant, the British “Draft 
Convention”, dated 20 January 1919, suggested a wording almost identical to the first 
draft: 
4. A General Conference of the League shall be held within six months of the date 
when the present Convention comes into force, and similar conferences shall be held 
from time to time as occasion may require, and in any case at intervals of not more 
than four years. A general Conference shall be composed of responsible 
representatives of the States members of the League443 
                                                             
440 Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, all quotes from “II. Arrangements for 
Regular Conference” point 1., p. 204. 
441 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51105, f. 185. 
442 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51105, f. 186. 
443 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51116, f. 6. 
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The biggest difference, compared to the first draft discussed above, was the proposal 
that the Conference, now called General Conference of the League, should be 
composed of “responsible representatives” without it being specified that they should 
be Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers (though it was still intended that these 
representatives should have full bargaining powers). 
The attempt by the British to encourage the League to follow the Imperial Conference 
system in many respects failed. The fourth American draft of the Covenant, dated 3 
February 1919, made no mention of any conference of heads of state or similar 
dignitaries but instead called for: 
Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held from time to time [pencil note: “at 
stated intervals”] as occasion may require for the purpose of dealing with matters 
within the sphere of action of the League. Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be 
held at the capital of the League or at such other place as may be found convenient and 
shall consist of not more than two representatives of each of the H.C.P. An 
ambassadors or ministers of one of the H.C.P. [High Contracting Parties] shall be 
competent to act as its representative.444 
So, instead of a General Conference of the League attended by Prime Ministers, it 
became a meeting of a “Body of Delegates” which, rather than meeting at least every 
four years on a fixed basis, would meet “from time to time”. It does appear that the 
British negotiators were successful in retaining a commitment to some degree of 
regularity of meetings, with the added words “at stated intervals”, but not in 
preventing the downgrading of representatives to “ambassadors or ministers” who 
                                                             
444 Cecil of Chelwood Papers. Add MS 51116, f. 47. The text was edited, probably by Cecil, in red/pink 
ink. “not more than two representatives of each of the H.C.P.” and “shall be competent to act as its 
representative” were crossed out, and the plural s for ambassador and minister were written in. 
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were unlikely to be able to negotiate on behalf of their governments beyond the remit 
they had been given.  
Ultimately, as is well known, the League ended up with the General Assembly, which 
had little resemblance to the Conference of the League suggested by the British, 
though not for want of trying from the British side. However, Hall and Zimmern still 
considered the Conference system a model for another part of the structure of the 
League, namely the League Council, which to a degree matched the idea of a ‘higher 
tier’ of Conference of the Great Powers mentioned in the Cecil Draft and the Foreign 
Office meeting with the Dominions on 1 January 1919.445   
5.2.2 Other specific functions 
While the Conference system was intended to be copied as general ‘machinery of co-
operation’ for the League of Nations, the Empire was also seen as a model for the 
League in terms of the functions it was to fulfil. Zimmern and Hall specifically 
explained how they saw the British Empire as an actual international organisation that 
had hitherto been responsible for a range of worldwide issues that could now be 
passed on to the League of Nations. Delving into some of these areas, it is very clear 
that their thoughts are from a different time and mind frame, as proposals they 
considered liberal and forward thinking now seem deeply reactionary (and, in some 
cases, frankly offensive). In the Third British Empire lectures, Zimmern set forth a list 
of areas apart from the Conference system where the Empire was a model for the 
League, “When I say that we anticipated the League of Nations I am speaking 
                                                             
445 Zimmern compares the Council with the Conference system, outlining the main differences in 
Zimmern, ‘The League and the Old Diplomacy’ in Zimmern, The Prospects of Democracy, p. 201-203.  
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precisely. We did so in three special directions.”446 The three directions were outlined 
as trusteeship, international policing, and the peaceful settlement of international.447 
Trusteeship is probably the most controversial of the topics seen through modern 
eyes, but in the view of Zimmern, who had no direct experience of colonial 
government, it was the difference between ruling the colonies for the sake of 
exploiting them to the benefit of the imperial hegemon, and ruling them for the sake 
of their native inhabitants, with a view to developing political and cultural maturity 
for future self-government. He argued that the choice that had faced those who built 
the Empire was between “unregulated commercial exploitation and paternal 
government”, and by choosing paternal government the Empire “anticipated the 
League of Nations. We established a system of trusteeship, but without any authority 
to whom we were responsible.”448 While he acknowledged that this unregulated 
trusteeship was not without failures and blemishes, he felt that “if you take our 
colonial record as a whole, I believe that history will justify it”,449 and suggested that 
“the criticism we invite is that we are so public-spirited, so ready to do crusading, that 
we sometimes feel impelled to interfere to clean up abuses which the victims 
themselves would have preferred to leave untouched.”450 In other words, in 
Zimmern’s view Britain had generally been effective and beneficial in governing the 
colonies, and had shown that the principle of trusteeship was a worthwhile endeavour, 
                                                             
446 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p. 77. 
447 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p. 60, and pp. 77-80. 
448 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, both quotes p. 77. 
449 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, both acknowledgment of failures and quote from p. 79. 
450 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, pp. 79-80. One example that Zimmern might have had in mind 
is the Indian tradition of Suttee/Sati, the burning of the widow on the pyre of her husband, which was 
banned by the British against Indian protests. One good modern examination of the issue of Suttee is L. 
Mani, Contentious Traditions: The Banning of Sati in Colonial India (University of California Press, 
1998). 
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which could be developed worldwide with international supervision through the 
League. 
Already in the Cecil Draft of December 1918, the idea of trusteeships was listed under 
‘Treaty Provisions’ VII, which stated that “The treaty should give precision to the 
idea of the responsibility of the civilised States to the more backward peoples”,451 and 
went on to explain how specific mandates should be set up under League supervision 
and authority.452 Smuts’ proposal for the League from the same month also explored 
trusteeship as seen above, and had the issue of mandates among its first points made 
(section A, 2.-9.). However, given Smuts’ strong preference for the outright 
annexation of some former German colonies by South Africa, he made no mention of 
civilised responsibility, though his suggestion, like the Cecil Draft, left it to the 
League to draw up the conditions of the mandatory power. His proposals let the 
League “reserve to it the complete power of ultimate control and supervision as well 
as the right to appeal to it from the territory or people affected against any gross 
breach or the mandate by the mandatory power”453 —words which suggest that Smuts 
too supported the idea of international supervision against some set standards.454 
The Covenant of the League itself details the principles of mandates in Article 22, 
over nine points that have more in common with the idealism of Zimmern and the 
Cecil Draft than with the more restricted formulations of Smuts. According to Article 
                                                             
451 Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, p. 203. 
452 Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, pp. 203-204. 
453 ‘Proposals made by General Smuts for a League of Nations’ in Wilson, Origins of the League 
Covenant, pp. 184-185, quote p. 185. 
454 The particularly brutal rule of the Congo Free State by Leopold II of Belgium, who held the colony 
as a virtual private property from 1885 to 1908 had been the cause of international outrage and an 
international parliamentary commission, which lead to such public and diplomatic pressure, that the 
Congo was annexed as a Belgian colony. Memories of the outrage, was certainly a main reason for 
setting up international mandates. Reference to the case can be found in Zimmern, ‘Some Principles 
and Problems of the Peace Conference’ in Zimmern, The Prospects of Democracy, p. 176 (the article 
was originally published in the Round Table, November 1918).  
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22, the governance of people “not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world” should be applied on “the principle that the well-
being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation”.455 With 
this combination of White Man’s Burden and the liberal ideology of developing the 
peoples of the mandates towards self-government, the Covenant fulfilled Zimmern’s 
ideas of the League as a successor to the Empire in terms of trusteeship and 
paternalistic government.  
Hall, also hailed the Empire as a model for trusteeship: 
The most striking of all the ways in which the British Empire has served as a model for 
the League of Nations is to be seen in the clauses for the Covenant which embody the 
mandatory principle. These clauses adopt the best features of the best English practice 
with regard to tropical dependencies, notably the principle of the open door, or equal 
economic opportunities for all nations, and the principle of non-militarisation of the 
native inhabitants.456 
However, Hall also took a more critical approach, and argued that the British Empire, 
had the potential to be: 
for good or for evil a decisive influence on the development of the mandatory 
principle. If the peoples of the British Commonwealth are content to remain passive 
and ignorant with regard to native races, they will be responsible for making the 
mandatory principle a mere cloak for capitalist imperialism. If, on the other hand, they 
insist on a generous fulfilment on the principle of trusteeship –which means nothing 
less than the preparation of dependencies for ultimate self-government […] then the 
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quotes p. 522. 
456 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 336. 
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British Peoples may cause the adoption of the mandatory principle to be regarded as 
one of the most beneficent advances ever made in human history.457   
As discussed in further detail later in this chapter, Hall thought the British Empire was 
a model for the League not only in terms of government but also in terms of the 
voluntary societies, which in his estimate were largely responsible for the degree to 
which the Empire had applied the principles of trusteeship in its colonies so far.458  
Zimmern noted in The Third British Empire that “the British Empire anticipated the 
League of Nations by developing an international police force”. He argued that the 
Royal Navy had served a policing function in many instances during the nineteenth 
century, not least in its work to end the trade with slaves: “In this matter, the British 
Navy was the champion of common human rights”.459. In reality, the League was not 
actually given any specific mandate for international policing, but rather a role of 
general supervision on such issues as the prohibition of the slave trade, trafficking of 
women and children, and trade in narcotics—though without any clear specifications 
on how this supervision would take place.460 
The final specific area in which the Empire was a model for the League, according to 
Zimmern, was that of the peaceful settlement of disputes, “We anticipated the dispute 
clauses of the Covenant of the League of Nations. We established an obligatory 
system for the peaceful settlement of disputes within the British Empire.”461 It is 
interesting to notice that Zimmern did not suggest that the imperial dispute system 
was ideal or always reached the right decisions. Giving the example of the dispute 
                                                             
457 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 363. 
458 Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, pp. 363-364. 
459 Zimmern, The Third British Empire, p. 79. 
460 ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’ in Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 
pp. 523-524. 
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between South Africa and India over the treatment of Indians in South Africa, 
Zimmern argued that if they had been independent countries outside the system of the 
British Empire, the dispute could easily have led to a breakdown of diplomatic 
relations and potentially to hostile actions between the two countries. However, inside 
the Empire, “the British system narrowed the dispute, dangerous and inflammatory as 
it was, to a discussion between the India Office and the Colonial Office”,462 thus 
containing it by clearly delegating the power of reaching a resolution. Zimmern 
acknowledged that the settlement had not been particularly good, but “in the modern 
world almost any settlement is more satisfactory than war. The Pax Britannica is an 
imposed peace, and has the advantages and disadvantages of any system of imposed 
peace.”463 In a similar way, disputes between members of the League of Nations 
would be referred to arbitration or settlement to the Council of the League, where the 
issue could be narrowed down and settled without the need for armed conflict. 
Zimmern left it open to the reader to conclude that dispute settlements by the League 
might often result in equally unsatisfactory outcomes and yet be preferable to war. 
It is therefore clear that while the imperialist-internationalists believed that the 
Conference system provided an appropriate model which the British Empire could 
offer to the League of Nations, and that the Empire had already led the way in the 
nineteenth century on issues of global governance and respect for human dignity, they 
believed that it was now time to hand over responsibility for these tasks from imperial 
to universal responsibility.   
5.2.3 The wider model of Cooperation 
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Beyond Imperial Conferences, trusteeship, international policing, and dispute 
settlement there were far wider areas in which the imperialist-internationalists aimed 
to model the League on the British Empire. Hall’s The British Commonwealth of 
Nations dedicated the final chapter to “The British Group and the League of Nations”, 
the first section of which was on ‘The British Commonwealth as the Model of the 
League’.464 In this part, Hall gave praise to the British system and changed the focus 
on how to secure peace: 
The experience of the British Commonwealth has gone far to prove that peace is a by-
product of normal and healthy international co-operation, and that the way to discover 
peace is not to be obsessed with the idea of avoiding war—because those who are 
obsessed with the idea of avoiding a thing are most likely to collide with it—but to be 
filled with the desire to co-operate with a view to enable each people to live, in the 
fullest measure, the good life. The new principle of international relations which shines 
out from the lengthy and somewhat dreary debates of the Imperial Conference on such 
questions as emigration, commercial relations and communications, is the principle of 
mutual service between nations in matters of living everyday interest.465 
In other words, if the League of Nations focussed on international cooperation, peace 
would come as a natural side-effect, while straining too hard to make the League a 
forum narrowly focussed on securing peace would be more likely to promote war than 
to hinder it.466 
The Cecil Draft suggested a range of international bodies that could be seen as 
comparable to some of the joint bodies of the Empire, in one case making a direct 
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comparison to an existing Imperial board.467 In the beginning and end of the section 
on ‘International Bodies for Study and Enquiry’, the Cecil Draft expressed strong 
sentiments on the importance of international cooperation in a wide array of areas: 
The chief dangers to the world’s peace in the future arise in connexion with problems 
which are not at present, and will perhaps never be, ripe for judicial determination. The 
League of Nations will be incomplete unless it sets on foot arrangements by which 
such problems can be discussed from different points of view in an atmosphere of 
study and detachment.468 
The association in this work of some of the best brains from a number of different 
countries should promote a process of political invention which may be of very great 
service to civilisation. Experience shows that internationalism, which may be defined 
as the habit of looking at problems from the point of view of the world as a whole, can 
best be developed in an atmosphere of this kind.469   
The bodies tentatively suggested were to be on topics of such universal interests as 
justice, health, industrial conditions, finance and currency, transit (land, sea, and air), 
conservation of resources, equality of trade conditions, race relations, and “the 
problems of the Tropics”.470 
While only one of the bodies suggested in the Cecil Draft was directly compared to a 
matching Imperial body, Hall discussed the “Machinery of Co-operation” of the 
British Empire/Commonwealth with a stress on the various joint bodies such as 
Committee of Imperial Defence, the Pacific Cable Board, and the Imperial Bureau of 
Mycology, which were he considered: 
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The beginnings of a complex organisation which will be of the utmost value, not only 
to the British Empire, but also to the League of Nations. It is obvious that they are the 
forerunners of a vast network of similar bodies, which will make possible inter-
Imperial co-operation on a gigantic scale for the development of the political, social 
and economic life of the peoples of the British Empire. Their significance for the 
League of Nations lies in the fact that the British Empire is already becoming a pioneer 
of internationalism –a vast laboratory of international government.471   
It is reasonable to compare Hall’s ‘joint bodies’ with the ‘international bodies’ 
suggested by the Cecil Draft as essential to the operation of the League of Nations. 
The benefits of these bodies were self-evident for the people who were part of them, 
as cooperation across the Empire secured the faster spread of new knowledge and 
inventions, and more efficient work on issues of common interests. The benefit of 
international scale was expected to be the same, only greater, with the League, 
promoting co-operation and educating people in the advantages of cooperation over 
hostile competition. As Hall concluded, when revisiting the issue of joint bodies in his 
section on the Empire as a model for the League: 
If this opportunity is seized the League will become the director and supervisor of a 
vast network of international councils and bureaux, including all the international 
bodies, such as the Universal Postal Union, already in existence, and the large number 
of new international bodies which have been found necessary during the war, and will 
be equally necessary in some form or other to satisfy their requirements in time of 
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peace. As we have seen, the working out of the same principle of mutual service is 
leading to a somewhat similar result in the British Group of States […]472 
The actual negotiations of the Covenant of the League of Nations showed that, at least 
to some extent, an effort was made to secure a range of joint bodies. On 22-23 March 
1919, the League of Nations commission met with representatives of the lesser 
powers, who had been given a draft Covenant published 14 February 1919 to read and 
comment on. During the debates, Robert Cecil pointed out that “The Commission had 
been anxious to give the League a sphere of continuous international activity in 
addition to its primary duty, which was that of keeping the world's peace.”473 In the 
final League Covenant, Articles 23, 24, and 25 relate to issues of joint bodies or topics 
that could be put under the control of joint bodies,474 and by 1925 Zimmern confirmed 
the importance of these bodies in the second of his American lectures, stating that,  
Most important of all, the League is a standing agency of co-operation in matters of 
common concern to all civilized peoples. Its action in this sphere has passed unnoticed 
by the general public because most of the matters with which it deals involve no 
important elements of controversy and conflicting interest. Health, communication, 
intellectual co-operation are not subjects which occupy headlines or fall within the 
sphere of high policy. Nevertheless, they are vital to the maintenance of civilization, 
and it is in this region that the co-operative method has achieved its most important 
results.475 
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Thus, the imperialist-internationalists propagated the notion that international 
cooperation at an organised level should cover a wide array of issues common to 
humanity. They believed that this approach was an essential part of securing 
international peace and that this was a lesson that could be learnt from the experience 
of the British Empire.   
Another aspect of cooperation that Hall considered vital, and which could clearly be 
upscaled to international level, was the voluntary intra-imperial organizations which 
he considered a key part of giving the Empire any meaning at all: 
These [voluntary] associations are, indeed, the fine flower of the group life, a sign of 
what the fellowship means in human terms. They, and not the major governmental 
organs, are the measure of the strength of feeling and the community of interests which 
bind the peoples of the Group together. They are also the greatest assurance of the 
permanence of the Group as they are one of the most important factors in human life, 
because they are the creation, and partly the creators, of the strongest bond of Empire –
the human tie.476  
A very similar sentiment was later echoed by Zimmern in The League of Nations and 
the Rule of Law, in which he compared voluntary organisation in the Commonwealth 
and the League, writing that: 
Voluntary and unofficial action in the international field is, for the most part, beyond 
our scope. Nevertheless it is one of the principle elements in the whole international 
problem and its existence must be kept in mind by every student of the subject. 
Without the co-operation of voluntary agencies intergovernmental organisation can 
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never proceed very far. It is not governments but peoples that give international 
relations both their substance and their particular tone.477 
Zimmern believed that if the voluntary associations had helped to create within the 
British Empire a kind of ‘group feeling’, almost a Hegelian spirit, then a greater sense 
of universalism and common public opinion could be fostered by the League if it 
could develop in a similar way. The weight of importance Hall attached to these joint 
bodies and voluntary associations can be seen in two appendices he carefully prepared 
on the machinery of cooperation and a list of the voluntary associations.478 
To conclude, then, while the joint bodies and voluntary organisations of the Empire 
were, in most cases, not directly engaged with peace work, Hall and Zimmern 
considered their day to day work essential for creating the habit of peaceful 
cooperation for the common good. They therefore welcomed the fact that both the 
Cecil Draft and the Covenant of the League of Nations ensured that the principle of 
ongoing cooperation was incorporated into the foundations of the League. 
5.2.4 Detractors of the League on the Empire as a model 
It may appear unsurprising that the people actively involved in both the process of 
creating the League of Nations, and the development of Empire in to Commonwealth, 
would see a connection between these two phenomena. However, various writings by 
Leo Amery, a confirmed detractor of the whole idea of the League of Nations, shows 
that even though he disagreed with the idea of the League he still thought that the 
British side based their proposals for the League on experience from the Empire. 
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As an ardent imperialist and proponent of imperial preference in trade, Amery’s open 
allegiance was always to the Empire rather than to world peace, reflecting a 
“Hobbesian view on international politics” according to Wm. Roger Louis.,479In his 
memoirs, My Political Life, Amery recalled how he had circulated in the War Cabinet 
“a detailed criticism of the, to my mind, dangerously misleading conception of a 
League of Nations”,480 and quoted a letter he had written to Lord Reading in October 
1919 where he concluded that “some sham structure of a League of Nations which, 
like the Holy Alliance, will break down and become a laughing-stock within a few 
years”.481 He himself favoured a new system of balance of power between various 
blocks of power, such as The British Empire, the United States, and some continental 
European block.482 Amery’s published diaries consistently refer to the League in a 
negative light.483 As early as December 1916 he dismissively stated that the idea of 
“leagues of peace […] are all fudge” in a letter to Robert Cecil,484 and on 30 January 
1919 he noted in his diary that there was no point fussing about what was meant by 
“mandatory occupation” by “a League of Nations which isn’t going to exist and won’t 
affect anybody”.485 In March 1919 he told Smuts that “there is no need for anyone to 
worry about the League of Nations, […] it isn’t going to make any difference to 
anybody”486.  
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Yet although Amery was dismissive of the League of Nations, in his correspondence 
with Smuts, with whom he was on good terms, he had from the start supported the 
idea that if the League of Nations was to be created then it should be based on the 
British Empire. In December 1918, Amery was among those who received a draft of 
Smuts’ proposal for the League, replying that “I am in entire agreement […] that the 
experience of the working of the existing League of Free Nations, viz., the British 
Commonwealth, affords the best guide to the constitution of the League of 
Nations”.487 In his memoirs, he supported that notion, when he wrote in his criticism 
of the League that in the middle of the mess of idealistic and unrealistic ideas Smuts 
“set himself to converting Wilson’s vague phrases into a world-wide enlargement of 
the Imperial War Cabinet, with a more democratic Imperial Conference in form of an 
Assembly attached to it.”488 However, while Amery reluctantly accepted that Smuts’ 
original version might not be entirely disastrous, he thought that Cecil had 
strengthened the most dubious parts of Smuts’ model, while ignoring “his sager 
qualifications”.489 In the third volume of his memoirs, Amery reviewed the competing 
conceptions of the League, noting that Smuts like many others in Britain had a: 
 
more realist outlook of those who saw in the League a valuable instrument for 
promoting international understanding and co-operation, providing standing machinery 
for conciliation available to all who were willing to be conciliated, the centre of an 
ever-increasing number of beneficent international activities, a forum of world 
opinion, growing in authority as it succeeded in its tasks, but relying throughout on its 
moral influence and not on coercion. […] What is more, they felt instinctively that 
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coercion was contrary to the whole spirit of free co-operation which alone could give 
real life to the new system. It was an illogical but characteristically British outlook, 
influenced by our experience of the working of our own Commonwealth 
Conference.490 
The description here of a “realist outlook” or “British outlook” is very close to the 
position of men like Hall and Zimmern.491 Although Amery himself emphatically 
opposed any form of a League of Nations, he believed that such an organisation 
would be most likely to have success if it was designed by those who, like Smuts, 
wanted it to incorporate the pattern of cooperation that supposedly characterised 
relations between Great Britain and the dominions. 
-An English League- 
A final aspect worth investigating in the context of the Empire/Commonwealth being 
used as a model for the League of Nations is the issue of the essential value of 
Englishness or Britishness (a subject also discussed in Chapter 4 when looking at the 
cultural foundations of Commonwealth). 
As noted in Chapter 4, Smuts and Murray seemed directly to distinguish the British 
values of open fairmindedness from the tendency of other nations to be more 
smallminded and egoistically focussed on their own interests. Hall, in many ways like 
Smuts, considered the English speaking people, whether from Britain, the Dominions, 
or the United States, particularly good at developing and spreading—within the 
English speaking world—new new ideas and technology. Zimmern by contrast took a 
strong stance on the importance of the Empire not being an English Empire, though 
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he too emphasised how ‘Britishness’ could assume an almost international identity, 
which ultimately came very close to the very values celebrated by Smuts and Murray. 
In the words of Amery, recently quoted above, among the partisans of the League the 
“more realist outlook” was a “British outlook”,492 so it should be little surprise that 
the imperialist-internationalists saw the spread of a British or English approach to 
international affairs as essential to the success of the League. 
Hall spoke directly about the “greater capacity of the British Peoples for internat ional 
co-operation,”493 based on their understanding of the benefits and necessity of such 
cooperation, and he assumed that, for the time being, it would be hard to foster 
international cooperation on world scale. His dearest hopes were for closer 
cooperation between the British Commonwealth and the United States, “based on the 
strongest of all reasons – the fundamental identity of the English speaking peoples in 
language, institutions, laws, ideas, and traditions”494, things which in his opinion 
would “build the strongest of all guarantees of the success of the League of Nations 
and of the beginning of a reign of peace upon the earth”495. In short, the English 
character was a defining element in creating a viable internationalism. 
Zimmern, for all his focus on internationalism, defined the English concept of 
character as that of the English gentleman, whom he thought,  
represents a specific and clearly marked type of civilized humanity. […] He has 
evolved his own special technique of government, the result of a long development and 
much stored up experience. […] For courage, for honour and loyalty, for tolerance, for 
wisdom and calm judgement, for self-control in emergencies, I doubt the world has 
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ever seen his equal. […] The English gentleman has been, in fact, an unrivalled teacher 
of peoples.496 
In other words, Zimmern offered an uncritical celebration of the glory of the English 
character—very similar to the view of Smuts and Murray—emphasising how it could 
be a role model for the rest of the world. He had presented a similar view in an article 
published in the Round Table in November 1918, where he supported the notion, 
attributed to Churchill, that  
the general adoption by other Governments of an attitude of frankness and openness, 
such as has been customary in this country, as to expenditure on armaments will by 
itself exercise a powerful and beneficial effect on the international atmosphere.497  
Clearly, in Zimmern’s view, Britain was the teacher of the world, and ultimately the 
Empire was suitable as a model for the League of Nations both in terms of its culture 
as well as its mode of operation. All in all, it is fair to conclude that, to the imperialist-
internationalists, it was not simply the machinery and functions of the British Empire 
that made it a model for the League of Nations. It was also what they perceived as the 
distinctive combination of goodwill and hard-headedness displayed by the English-
speaking people—or perhaps more specifically the British—on questions of 
international cooperation. 
5.3 Conclusions 
Published materials dating from both before and after the creation of the League of 
Nations show that the imperialist-internationalists were committed both to the general 
idea that imperial experience could provide lessons to promote internationalism and 
more specifically that the British Empire could offer a specific model for the League 
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of Nations. They focussed on cultural aspects, such as the British or English capacity 
for international cooperation and fairness, as well as on more specific institutional 
features of the British Empire (in particular the Conference System and the wide 
selection of joint bodies and voluntary organisations). When it came to the idea of the 
Empire as a more general predecessor, it was argued to be a model for the principle of 
trusteeship, for international policing of human rights, and of the peaceful settlement 
of disputes.  
Smuts, Zimmern, and Cecil—who were all involved in creating the Covenant of the 
League—were active in promoting the Empire/Commonwealth as a relevant model. 
They did so both in public speeches and in government proposals for the Covenant. 
Detractors of the League, such as Amery, also recognised their attempt to use the 
Empire as a model. “The Covenant, as it emerged from the Paris Conference, was 
what the textual critics call a conflation, but its main source was British, and it is not 
claiming too much to say that its “archetype” was the “Cecil Draft”.”498 Thus Alfred 
Zimmern summed up the Covenant, and indirectly his own importance, in an article 
published February 1924. While not all British proposals were incorporated into the 
Covenant, Hall and Zimmern both continued to argue throughout the 1920s and 1930s 
that the ideas and experiences of those familiar with the British Empire had played a 
significant part in helping to shape the creation of the League. 
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6: ‘A league within the League’: The British Commonwealth of 
Nations 1926  
The previous chapters have shown a line of continuity from ideas about empires as 
centres of international organisation and peace, through the education of the 
imperialist-internationalists, who connected that tradition to their ideas on the 
development of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth, and on to their 
use of the British Empire as a model for the creation of the League of Nations. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show the way in which, from the creation of the League 
down to the late 1920s, the imperialist-internationalists saw the Commonwealth and 
the League as complementary to each other (i.e.  rather than as two competing 
international organisations). It will be demonstrated that Zimmern, in particular, saw 
the League of Nations as an institution whose very existence would help secure the 
future of the British Commonwealth, which he feared was in danger of breaking apart 
without the superstructure of the League to support it. Just as the imperialist-
internationalists had seen the Empire as a model for the League, so they saw the 
Commonwealth as a model for the ongoing development of the League, thus ensuring, 
in their minds, that the future relationship between Commonwealth and League would 
be one of mutually beneficial interchange of experience and example.  
In order to allow the reader to make sense of the arguments of the imperialist-
internationalists, this chapter presents a somewhat fuller historical introduction to the 
constitutional development of the Empire/Commonwealth in the 1920s as well as 
examining some of the main issues of debate in regards to intra-imperial relations and 
the role of the Commonwealth in the League of Nations. 
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6.1 The Development of the British Commonwealth in the 1920s 
The decision of the imperialist-internationalists to begin using the term Empire rather 
than Commonwealth was explored in Chapter 4, but that development was only the 
beginning of a complex story.  It is a story that in a way continues to this very day, 
given the continued existence of the Commonwealth of Nations, long after the 
colonies became independent and the former Dominions stopped using that name. It is 
not within the scope of this thesis to track the development of the Commonwealth 
story up to the present, but to understand the first major developments it is necessary 
to look at the Imperial Conferences in the 1920s. 
It will be remembered that Duncan Hall’s 1920 book British Commonwealth of 
Nations looked forward to the next planned Imperial Conference as a time to define 
the relationship between Britain and the Dominions, given that the Dominions had 
matured to the point of signing the Peace Treaty individually and obtaining their own 
seats in the League of Nations. These developments represented a major turning point 
in the international recognition of their independence. For the same reason, it was also 
a massive conundrum: How could the Dominions remain part of the British Empire or 
Commonwealth and simultaneously be independent even in matters of war and peace? 
Among imperialists of all shades, there was a strong and determined wish to avoid a 
repetition of the events that led up to the Declaration of American Independence. 
This, as previously examined, was a main reason prompting London to allow the 
Dominions gradually increasing control over their own affairs.  Yet it was becoming 
clear by the early 1920s that even if this approach prevented a new war of 
independence, it might simply turn out to dissolve the Empire in a more peaceful way, 
which, while vastly preferable to a war, was certainly not what any of the imperialists 
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desired. Thus, an overriding question loomed for the Imperial Conferences which 
took place in 1921, 1923, and 1926: what was the Commonwealth if its constituent 
members were fully self-governing? 
To answer that question from the perspective of the time, three main sources are used 
here. The leading constitutional authority during this period was Arthur Berriedale 
Keith, born (like Zimmern) in 1879, who was a notable scholar of law and Sanskrit.  
He had obtained a first-class degree at Oxford in Classics, and subsequently set a new 
record of excellence when he took the Indian Civil Service examinations. Keith had a 
curious dual career, entering the Colonial Office in 1901, first working with colonial 
affairs, and then from 1907 to 1914 with affairs relating to the Dominions. During that 
period, Keith assisted at the Imperial Conferences. In 1914 he took up a professorship 
of Sanskrit at Edinburgh University, which he held for life, but he continued his 
interest in imperial affairs, in 1927 adding the post of lecturer in the constitution of 
the British Empire to his portfolio.499 His numerous publications on the British 
constitution were generally considered authoritative in Britain at the time, though the 
private correspondence of some Dominion administrators shows a certain irritation at 
Professor Keith pontificating from Edinburgh about imperial issues without ever 
actually visiting the Dominions and experiencing the realities facing the 
administrations.      
A much younger commentator was Kenneth Wheare, a specialist on the development 
of the British constitution, who was born in Australia before being educated at Oxford 
where he later taught.  Wheare wrote a number of key works on the development of 
the relationship between Britain and the Dominions from the 1926 Imperial 
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Conference onwards. In the 1930s, his main works were The Statute of Westminster 
and The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, which investigated the 
implications of the recent developments.500 
And, finally, the third of the authorities used here is Duncan Hall himself, who wrote 
several follow up works to his 1920 book. An article also named ‘The British 
Commonwealth of Nations’ was published in 1927 in collaboration with Lawrence 
Lowell of Harvard University, and discussed the recent Balfour Report and the 
previous Imperial Conferences. Another work was his 1000 pages final opus magnum, 
published fifty one years after The Commonwealth of Nations, and simply called 
Commonwealth.501 When using Commonwealth as a source, it should be remembered 
that, unlike Hall’s early works, which were written at the same time as the 
developments discussed in this thesis, Commonwealth represented a kind of swansong 
published at the end of a long career during which the Empire had largely 
disappeared, to be replaced by a version of the Commonwealth distinctly unlike 
Hall’s own idealistic writings of 1920. Commonwealth, unlike Hall’s earlier works, 
was thus not so much a primary source for his ideas of the 1920s but rather the 
reflections of an old man evaluating the project that had been his focus of interest for 
his entire professional life. 
-The Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923 and Dominion participation 
negotiations- 
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According to Hall’s article from 1927, the principal work of the Imperial Conference 
of 1921 was a thorough overhaul of whether “the foreign policy of the British Empire 
was to be a unitary foreign policy.” The answer to this question depended on a set of 
practical questions: should all policies be announced through the Foreign Office in 
London?; could the Dominions negotiate their own treaties?; and finally and not least, 
“what was the effect of membership of the League of Nations upon the relationship 
inter se of the parts of the British Commonwealth?”502 These were big questions, but 
as Hall, Keith and Wheare all made clear, the 1921 Conference was not yet ready to 
formulate a real answer to them. The official statement of the Conference essentially 
declared that as things were working well on the basis of good communication 
between Britain and the Dominions they should continue that way.503 While Smuts 
had come to the Conference hoping for a definite constitutional declaration of the 
relationship between Britain and the Dominions, Billy Hughes from Australia was 
more interested in making Imperial unity in international affairs clear to the world. At 
the 1921 Conference, Hughes had the stronger hand. According to Lloyd George, in a 
speech given later that year, the British Foreign Office was “the instrument of the 
foreign policy of the Empire […] That has been accepted by all the Dominions as 
inevitable. But they claim a voice in determining the lines of our policy.”504 These 
rather vague concessions of the right of the Dominions to be involved in deciding 
Imperial foreign policy fell well short of granting them any real political 
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independence in foreign affairs. It was in any case only likely to be accepted for a 
short time given the ambitions of Canada and South Africa. 
The early 1920s saw many challenges to this general agreement. Later in 1921 Lloyd 
George accepted an invitation to the Washington Conference on Limitation of 
Armaments that made no reference to the Dominions. Lloyd George argued that it had 
been agreed that “His Majesty’s Government should represent the whole Empire at 
Washington” and only asked for some members of the delegation with “special 
knowledge of Dominion and Indian points of view”. Smuts, however, protested that 
the precedent from the Paris Peace Conference should be followed (which Lloyd 
George conceded).505 Canada, meanwhile, increasingly wanted its own independent 
representation and negotiating power in regards to its southern neighbour (ie the 
United States). One of the early tests of this came in the negotiations of the Halibut 
Treaty of 1923 about the distribution of fishing rights between the United States and 
Canada. In what became a landmark precedent, Canada insisted that the treaty should, 
on the side of the Empire, be signed by a Canadian representative only on behalf of 
the Canadian Government – though fully accredited by the King –  rather than being 
co-signed by a representative of the Imperial Government. By insisting on the right of 
the Dominions to sign international treaties in their own right, as long as they 
pertained only to them, Canada moved the principles of Dominion independence a 
step further.506 According to Hall, the consequence was that, 
Treaties, either political or commercial, may be negotiated, signed and ratified 
separately by the different Governments of the British Commonwealth. In view of this 
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resolution and the event leading up to it, the theory current in 1921 of a unitary 
“foreign policy of the British Empire” was no longer tenable.507     
In spite of these developments, though, there is no doubt that the Foreign Office 
continued to aim at British control over foreign relations, including relations between 
Canada and the United States. Hall’s archives contain the copy of a note dated 11 July 
1927 by Sir William Tyrrell, then Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
addressed to the Secretary of State (Austen Chamberlain), in which he argued that 
“we [the Foreign Office] must endeavour to retain as much control as we can get over 
American-Canadian relations in view of the possible repercussions on our relations 
with the United States.”508 
The issue of authority in international negotiations continued to raise its head as 
supplementary treaties were made to the Treaty of Versaille. The Lausanne 
Conference to settle peace with Turkey saw the British government agree to the 
British Empire being represented by a single delegation of two delegates, and no 
separate representation of the Dominions, without consulting the Dominions first. 
This caused offence in Canada, as it broke with the precedence of the Paris Peace 
Conference, and it required significant debate back and forth across the Atlantic to 
reach an agreement on how Canada would approach the result of the Conference.509 
According to Keith, the ultimate result of the Lausanne Conference, from a 
constitutional point of view, was to set the precedence that “the power of the British 
Government to bind the Dominions was thus recognised contemporaneously with its 
duty not to impose on the any obligations, save with their consent”510, a conclusion 
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that clearly described an uncomfortable starting point for international negotiations. 
The natural conclusion to this understanding came with the Locarno Pact, when Great 
Britain signed on behalf of the Empire, but with a special clause, that “The present 
treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, 
unless the Government of each Dominion, or of India signifies its acceptance 
thereof.”511 
In the between the Lausanne and the Locarno Conferences came a second Imperial 
Conference in 1923, dubbed “the Unknown Imperial Conference” by Hall in 1971,512 
at which, once again with only moderate success, there was an effort to define which 
powers of negotiation the different members of the Empire had. The conclusion of the 
conference was that on issues that were only relevant to a single Dominion or Great 
Britain alone, then that Dominion or Britain could sign and ratify a treaty on their 
own, as long as they consulted their colleagues beforehand to ensure that they were 
really the only part of the Empire affected.513  It should be noted that Hall was 
consistent in arguing that the developments in the early 1920s formed part of a steady 
progression towards new rights in treaty negotiations for the Dominions, while Keith 
tended to argue that each of these steps was in more or less perfect accordance to 
established precedent, and therefore did not reflect any revolutionary changes in the 
character of the British Constitution. 
In summary, the first half of the 1920s saw the Empire/Commonwealth faced with a 
string of challenges to define which powers of foreign policy belonged where, and the 
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two Imperial Conferences held in the period managed only partially to give an answer 
to the problem. The 1921 Conference seemed to have overestimated the unity of the 
foreign policy of the different parts of the Commonwealth, while the 1923 Conference 
acknowledged the right of the Dominions to independent negotiations, without 
making very clear what then held together the Commonwealth. That the international 
community was confused about the relationships within the British Empire was hardly 
unreasonable, considering that the members of the Empire/Commonwealth had no 
clear agreement between themselves. Thus the grounds were laid for yet another 
Imperial Conference in 1926, to try once and for all to clearly formulate the status of 
the Dominions. 
-The Imperial Conference of 1926, the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of 
Westminster- 
The Imperial Conference of 1926 was charged with sorting out the confusion, as far 
as possible, and defining what the relationship between Britain and the Dominions 
really was. In all the fluid developments of rights of representation and treaty making, 
no step in constitutional law had yet been taken to make clear that the Dominions 
were anything other than colonies with a fancy name, with the result that the 
temporary permission given to Dominion governments to play an international role 
could in theory be revoked without any changes in legislation. The Dominions might 
have been allowed to act independently, but, constitutionally, there was nothing to 
guarantee it as a right. 
The more British settler-Dominions of Australia and New Zealand were largely 
satisfied with that status quo and, in the words of Zimmern, when faced with 
questions of constitutional practice tended not to ask “Why?” but “Why not?”, on the 
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premise that practice worked.514 The South African government, on the other hand, 
sought a clearer statement of the country’s status as an essentially independent part of 
the British Commonwealth. As long as Smuts had been in power, the South African 
government was reluctantly willing to concede to the vaguer formulations produced 
by the previous Imperial Conferences. After Smuts was ousted from power in 1924, 
the 1926 Conference had to work with the Boer nationalist Hertzog, who was not 
willing to accept general statements of intent. He came to the Conference to get the 
“constitutional declaration” that Smuts had failed to achieve, while Canada’s 
Mackenzie King similarly wanted the independence of Canada clarified to the 
world.515  
Hertzog’s call followed upon that of his South African competitor, Smuts, who had 
submitted a document to the 1921 Conference on “Constitutional Relations in the 
Empire” with two different variations (A and B). Both versions started with the same 
formulation of point 1: 
The British Empire rests on a basis of equal partnership between the United Kingdom 
and the Dominions, including India. Their Governments are all equal and co-ordinate 
governments of H.M. the King, united by a common bond of allegiance to this Throne, 
and by common ideals of freedom, equality and justice. They are agreed that all 
surviving forms of inequality and subordination shall disappear, and that the necessary 
legislative and administrative alterations to that end shall be effected. 
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While their Parliaments have full and exclusive authority over their internal affairs and 
have full international status, the principles of their common foreign policy are settled 
by mutual consultation and conference.516   
Yet by the first line of point 2 there were variations between versions A and B, after 
which differences in formulations were common, suggesting that Smuts was 
particularly keen on the specific wording of point 1 quoted above. This document, 
along with a longer memorandum entitled “The Constitution of the British 
Commonwealth”, was circulated by the British Prime Minister Baldwin to the Foreign 
Secretary Austen Chamberlain and Lord Balfour (former Prime Minister and titular 
head of the Conference).517 Smuts’ memorandum was thirteen pages long, and 
contained a fairly detailed analysis of his considerations on “1. The status of the 
Dominions, 2. The relations of the King, as the common bond of unity, to the 
component parts of the Commonwealth, 3. The methods of conference and 
consultation between those parts in all matters of common Imperial concern, and 4. 
Several other subsidiary but still important matters.”518 
Baldwin, in his accompanying letter to Chamberlain, pointed out that most of the 
memorandum had not been used at the Imperial Conference in 1921, though Smuts 
had used its preliminary comments in his own speech, while part of section B of 
Smuts’ “Constitutional Relations” draft had been “embodied in the published record 
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of the 1921 proceedings”. His comments seem to suggest that the Prime Minister still 
found the old documents of value, and he pointed out that he remained committed to 
“the indissoluble unity of all parts of the Empire under King and Crown, and the 
reference to the Crown as an integral part in the constitutional framework of each 
political entity.”519 It is worth noting that in regards to the topic of executive 
sovereignty Smuts, in the longer memorandum, referred to Duncan Hall’s 1920 
British Commonwealth of Nations and its suggestion of a declaration of constitutional 
rights, stating that “I heartily endorse Hall’s suggestion which seems to me the easiest 
constitutional means of settling the international status of the Dominions without 
changing the unwritten flexible character of the Constitution of the British 
Commonwealth”.520 
The result of the Conference was the so-called Balfour Report. The complete report 
covered the issues of “The Status of Great Britain and the Dominions”, “The Special 
Position of India”,  and “The Relations between the various parts of the British 
Empire”, which included the title of the King, the position of the Governors-General, 
the operation of Dominion legislation, and appeal to the Privy Council.521 A general 
overlap of topics and considerations with Smuts’ memorandum is noticeable, and the 
best known part, the oft-quoted attempt at a short formulation on Dominion status and 
relation with Britain, bears distinct similarities to Smuts’ 1921 draft: 
They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no 
way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, 
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though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations.522 
A striking difference to Smuts’ “Declaration” is that there is no mention, either in this 
central part, or later in the report, of the Dominions having “full international status”, 
as Smuts had written. Arguably, as the questions of Dominion representation at the 
various conferences had shown, the acceptance of their “full international status” was 
something Britain could not grant on its own, but which had to be accepted and 
acknowledged by the wider international community. 
Besides, while those lines made clear that Britain and the Dominions were equal and 
that Britain had no right of overruling the Dominions in domestic or foreign affairs, it 
still didn’t answer what the Commonwealth really was, whether it was called the 
British Empire or the British Commonwealth of Nations.  Nor did it change the 
legislation that required the British Parliament to ratify changes in the constitutions of 
the Dominions. As Sir William Tyrrell’s note from 1927 showed, the Foreign Office 
was still doing its best to keep central control. Actual legal changes were to require 
another Imperial Conference in 1930, and the subsequent 1931 Statute of 
Westminster, which finally removed the right of the British Parliament to interfere in 
Dominion legislation.523 Even that, though, hardly changed the mind-set of the 
Foreign Office. In 1942, E.H. Carr, who had of course served in the Foreign Office 
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from 1916-1936, wrote that “almost everywhere a strong British lead will be 
welcomed, not resented, by the other English-speaking countries”.524 
-The Status of the Dominions and the “league within the League”- 
A significant reason why it was so important to clarify the status of the Dominions 
was its impact on their place in the international community. Were the Dominions 
independent sovereign states? Were they glorified colonies? Or were they something 
akin to the federal states of America? The answer was as seen above clearly crucial to 
negotiations of international treaties. 
A serious issue was the uncertainty about what a “British Empire” signature on a 
treaty actually meant. Did the signature commit the entire British Empire to support 
the treaty or only Britain and its colonies?—Cecil considered this specific conundrum 
in some comments to a draft League of Nations Convention dated 31 January 1919, 
concluding that “it seems altogether impracticable [!] that the Dominions should seek 
not to be bound by international action of Imperial Govt.” 525 Though, of course, that 
was exactly what happened. And what was the standing of a treaty signed by a 
Dominion alone? Would it be valid if challenged by the British government at a later 
stage? The other side of the issue was the impact of separate Dominion representation 
on international agreements. The United States had used the multiple representation of 
the British Empire in the League of Nations as a reason not to join unless the United 
States was granted one delegation per state. France objected to Dominion 
representation at the Lausanne Conference, unless their own colonies of Algeria, West 
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Africa, and Tunisia were similarly granted representation, even though the French 
colonies had no comparable level of independence to the Dominions.526 These 
examples demonstrate the unwillingness of the international community to give the 
British Empire an unfair advantage within the League by effectively ‘stuffing the 
ballot’ with the extra votes of the Dominion delegations, not least since France and 
the United States did not yet see the Dominions as independent states with “full 
international status”. 
It can certainly be argued that the British Empire wanted to have its cake and eat it in 
international affairs. In 1920, with the Peace negotiations fresh in mind, the Foreign 
Office was concerned about the status of the Empire and its reception internationally 
in connection with preparing credentials for the Dominion Delegates to the League of 
Nations: “It raises the everlasting question of the anomalous position of the British 
Empire in the League of Nations. Are they separate Members? Are they part of the 
British Empire? Is the British Empire one? Is the British Empire six?”527 However, as 
the Dominions became a fixed part of the League there was a clear expectation in 
London that the international community should accept the Dominions as independent 
sovereign states, while at the same time seeking to ensure that members of the 
Commonwealth should agree on a unitary foreign policy on all issues of common 
interest, to be advanced at the League and in other settings by acting as a block of 
collaborating countries rather than as a centrally controlled Empire. According to 
Gilbert Murray, writing in 1929, the one reasonable exception to jurisdiction from 
international settlement that the Empire should insist on was disputes between 
members of the Empire since 
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Great Britain regards disputes between different parts of the Empire as domestic and 
not international. This exclusion is justified both in theory and in practice. A dispute 
between, say, England and Australia, is clearly domestic to the British Commonwealth 
and ought to be decided in accordance with British ideas and British customs. To hand 
it over to the International Court, to be decided according to the Court’s view of 
international law, would be to give a semi-foreign tribunal the right of determining the 
constitution of the British Empire.528 
But if disputes in the Empire were domestic matters then how could its members be 
seen as independent by the international community? 
The idea that members of the British Commonwealth could be simultaneously 
independent while fully collaborating was often formulated as the idea of the 
Commonwealth being “a league within the League” – that is a group of independent 
but closely aligned nations, that was essentially no different from any other group of 
similar minded countries agreeing to coordinate their vote in the League of Nations to 
secure the outcomes they wanted. The idea was internationally controversial, as 
opinions were divided on whether any “leagues within the League” were acceptable at 
all. On the one hand it was argued that block-voting would destroy the entire purpose 
of the League by diminishing its capability of functioning as a forum for open 
communication and reconciliation of differences, since the kind of intrigue and 
bargaining that would take place within mini-leagues would not adhere to the 
principles of openness and transparency that was part of the ideology behind the 
League. On the other hand, proponents of “leagues within the League” argued that it 
would be hard to secure real and significant agreements on matters of global 
importance without an opportunity to secure the kind of private agreement between 
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governments needed to stop a descent into endless quarrelling voices. People like 
Amery suggested actively encouraging the smaller countries to band together in mini-
leagues of similar minded countries, so they would be able to present a united front 
with the weight of their collected populations and economies behind them, effectively 
leading to a smaller number of groups of nations whose representatives could meet in 
a manageable forum that was more likely to reach a large scale agreement.529 In this 
context, the Dominions were often compared to small European countries such as 
Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands – countries that had an international presence 
but were individually too small to be powerful.530 
The following pages will show how the debate about the role of the 
Empire/Commonwealth in the League of Nations, and whether it should function 
(officially or de facto) as a “league within the League”, was a major aspect of the 
thoughts of the imperialist-internationalists about the ongoing development of Empire 
and League in the 1920s. In many ways, the concept of a “league within the League” 
appears to be an attempt of merging aspects of Old and New Diplomacy. For the 
British Empire and Commonwealth to act like a “league within the League” would 
allow it to continue as a significant player in the game of the great powers, while 
Dominion membership of the League allowed all self-governing parts of the 
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6.2 The League and the Commonwealth  
- Representation of South Africa in the League Assembly 1920-1923- 
Some of the principle issues connected to Dominion representation in the League 
have already been raised, but the issues of the practice of Dominion representation 
quickly came to the fore when the representatives for the first Assembly were chosen. 
Smuts and Cecil had been in close cooperation as the two leading voices of the British 
Empire in writing of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and when it was time to 
choose the representatives of South Africa for the first League Assembly, Smuts 
considered Cecil’ presence at the Assembly essential. From the perspective that the 
Empire was all one big happy family, the appointment of Cecil might seem no more 
controversial than Smuts’ own appointment to the War Cabinet, but coming on the 
heels of a major struggle to make international society accept that the Dominions 
were independent entities, entitled to independent representation, the concept was 
rather more controversial. 
That Smuts himself was influential in the League was clear. In December 1919 he 
managed, on request, to get copies of the drafts agendas for the Council and Assembly 
before they had been circulated even to all appointed members of the Council—of 
which Smuts himself would not be a member—and the cover letter pointed out that 
“General Smuts is the only person to whom they have been sent outside the 
Secretariat” and stressed the importance of them being treated as highly 
confidential.531 Smuts as therefore well prepared, and wanted to secure the strongest 
possible support for his vision for the League. 
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Choosing Cecil as the second representative of South Africa at the first Assembly of 
the League of Nations was a calculated choice, as Smuts argued that “I am very 
anxious that the League should have the benefit of Cecil's advice from a larger point 
of view”,532 but one that turned out to be highly controversial compared to the foreign 
policies of the Empire. Foreign Office documents from 27 October shows the concern 
of Balfour and others that the appointment of Cecil would strengthen American 
prejudice against Dominion representation in the League and the accusation of 
multiple representation for the British Empire. Notes to the telegram, dated 28 
October 1920, argues that, “the whole theory of independent Dominion representation 
in the League of Nations rests on the ground that the problems coming up the League 
require to be voiced by the Dominions from the angle of their own special interests 
insofar as they may not be identical with those of the British home government”, and 
concludes that representation of a Dominion by a British statesman with no 
connection to the Dominion renders the argument for Dominion representation 
obsolete.533 Since Cecil was chosen for being Cecil, rather than for any deeper 
understanding of South African issues, the concern was understandable, and in Cecil’s 
diary from the Assembly, an entry from 13 November—two days before the opening 
of the Assembly and after he had arrived in Geneva—shows that a dinner with Sir 
Eric Drummond, the Secretary General of the League, revealed that Drummond was 
still not convinced of Cecil’s right to represent South Africa, though Cecil thought the 
antagonism was all caused by Frenchmen wanting to avoid the presence of anybody 
who supported the entry of Germany into the League. In what is probably understated 
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language Cecil admitted that “we very nearly quarrelled”.534 It is clear that Cecil did 
not recognise, or at least accept, the fundamental objection to his work as a 
representative of South Africa. 
In spite of the concerns of the Foreign Office, the British legate to Switzerland, Theo 
Russell, reported favourably back on Cecil’s participation. In a letter to Lord Curzon 
dated 23 November 1920, Russel gave his personal impressions of the Assembly 
stating that the press (“these birds of evil omen”) had expected the Assembly to last 
no more than two days, but that Cecil had turned the fortunes of the Assembly around: 
I have no hesitation in saying that by far the greatest share in the process of 
galvanating the League into a living, palpitating body has been borne by the second 
delegate for South Africa, Lord Robert Cecil. Not only his speeches from the tribune, 
but his personality, his earnestness and his persuasive intercourse with other delegates, 
have contributed more than anything else to dissipate a spirit of scoffing and to create 
an atmosphere of determination on the part of the League.535 
 Nevertheless, the concerns about the American reaction was hardly unfounded. In a 
letter dated 13 December from Coronel House, with whom Cecil had collaborated 
closely in Paris, House congratulated Cecil on his participation in the Assembly but 
urged him not to come to the USA to speak about the League in spite of invitations to 
do so, as “much has been said about the League being of British origin and your visit 
would lend color to this statement.”536 While Cecil’s part in writing the Covenant was 
presumably a main reason for the hesitation, his recent role as a representative of one 
of the Dominions undoubtfully strengthened the reservations. 
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Regardless of the British concerns, the choice of Cecil had been success as far as 
Smuts was concerned. Friendly correspondence between Cecil and Smuts from 
December 1920 to July 1922 confirms Smuts’ satisfaction in Cecil’s participation and 
he re-nominated Cecil as representative of South Africa in 1921 and 1922, in spite the 
occasional acknowledgement that his position might not be popular with the British 
government.537 By 1923 Cecil had joined the Cabinet and went to Geneva on behalf 
of the British Empire,538 but in line with his wish to strengthen the League more than 
South Africa itself, Smuts appointed Gilbert Murray—the close collaborator of Cecil 
in the League of Nations Union—as the new representative of South Africa.  
- Zimmern on the League as a Deus ex Machina- 
For Zimmern, the challenges to cohesion of the Commonwealth raised by the 
development of Dominion status were real and difficult to resolve. In various forms, it 
was an issue he repeatedly addressed in the 1920s via a string of speeches and articles, 
many of which were published together in The Prospects of Democracy in 1929.539 
The Balfour Report had declared the independence, more or less, of the governments 
of the Dominions, but having removed the central government from the core of the 
organisation, what had been left to tie together the members of the Commonwealth 
was defined as “a common allegiance to the Crown”. 
For Keith, when writing his 1928 book Sovereignty of the British Dominions, the 
formulation was a cause of great tribulation, because if taken at face value it implied 
the dissolution of the Empire into a personal union, in which the King was King of 
Australia as a separate function from being King of Canada, which was in turn in a 
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separate function from being King of New Zealand, and so on. The result was that no 
treaty signed by the King simply on the authority of the government of Great Britain 
would have any relevance to any of his other Kingdoms. However, Keith argued that 
the dissolution of the Crown had not been supported by any legislation, nor had it 
been discussed in those terms by Britain and the Dominions, which implied that the 
dissolution of the Crown had not in fact taken place and that the Balfour Report had 
been mis-formulated. The Crown remained one and indivisible, and gave shape and 
form to the Empire, which was the basis for the status of its representatives in 
international negotiations whether they came from Britain or the Dominions.540 
Zimmern, up to a point, agreed with Keith. In The Third British Empire, he argued 
that “it is evident, that the Crown which acts on the advice of a South African minister 
is only in name the same Crown as that which acts on the advice of a British, Irish, or 
Canadian minister” —which is exactly the point Keith made against the Balfour 
Declaration. But where Keith concluded that the Declarations was mistaken, Zimmern 
continued the argument by stating that, “the Crown, in fact, under the post-war 
constitution, can receive discordant advice from six separate Prime Ministers. It could 
even receive the advice to go to war with itself.” In short, the Crown “has no binding 
force at all, it is merely a façade”, and “behind the comfortable theory of the Crown as 
a constitutional link is an unresolved constitutional deadlock.”541 Where Keith saw the 
consequences of the Declaration and therefore rejected it, Zimmern saw the same 
consequences and looked for a new solution, readily accepting: 
The old constitution, as far as it is still in working order, is powerless to arrest the 
process of transformation which we have already observed. The Empire is, in fact, 
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constitutionally speaking, in rapid disintegration. It is drifting steadily towards a 
condition, if it has not already reached it, in which it is no longer a single state but an 
entente of states.542 
Based on this reality, the task for the Commonwealth was to remain an organisation 
of collaboration in areas of common interests, and to that end Zimmern considered the 
League of Nations would support rather than hamper the Commonwealth. 
A key issue for Zimmern was the need of the British Empire for universal peace: 
The British Empire needs peace everywhere and all the time. It needs a general 
guarantee of peace as such, irrespective of the geographical and other conditions. It is 
of small value to those who wish to keep the people of Canada and Australia thinking 
along the same lines of general policy as the people of Great Britain, to build up an 
ingenious system of local pacts by which one part of the Empire is defended in this 
way and another in that way. The British Empire lives by the ocean. The ocean is one 
and indivisible. The arrangements for the safeguarding of peace should be equally one 
and indivisible. Thus it may be regarded as certain, despite the rejection of the Geneva 
Protocol in March 1925, that British public opinion will eventually adopt a universal, 
rather than a regional, plan for the maintenance of peace. Such a plan is, of course, a 
world interest but it is also pre-eminently a British interest.543  
Without universal peace, pretty much any conflict was bound to affect some part of 
the Empire, and thus a universal institution such as the League of Nations, designed to 
secure peace, was in the interest of the Empire. Along similar lines, Murray argued in 
1929 that “if war should break out anywhere from one of these causes [racial, 
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religious], it is the British Empire that would be struck first.”544 Furthermore, Murray 
thought that “another war would probably be the end of the Empire”,545 making the 
need for universal peace absolute. 
Hall, too, had pointed to the motive of self-interest at a 1927 round table debate at the 
University of Chicago, where he stated that, 
there is a very strong movement throughout the British Commonwealth in support of 
the League of Nations. […] Just why we support the League of Nations, when you 
come down to the real explanation, is hard to say. It is a mixture of motives. We are 
more interested than any country in the world in the preservation of the status quo, as 
we have got everything to lose by a disturbance of peace.546 
However, as Zimmern had pointed out in a 1924 article, if the League eventually 
managed to secure universal peace, it could also mean the end of the Empire since “an 
Empire held together by fear of attack is an Empire which will fall to pieces when the 
League of Nations can effectively relieve it from this fear”.547 His words offered a 
clear warning that the Empire needed to offer its members more than the security of 
Pax Britannica if it wanted to survive as a significant actor in a world of greater 
international cooperation. 
In commerce, Zimmern’s conclusion was the same: 
Great Britain is not interested in the breaking down of economic barriers in this or that 
region. She is interested in the breaking down of economic barriers in every part of the 
world. Living as she does by foreign trade and dependent upon the ocean paths for her 
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food and raw material, she is more dependent than any other state upon international 
economic co-operation. And such co-operation, as is now becoming very clear, can 
best be developed through the activities of the League of Nations.548 
While politicians such as Amery were trying to promote Imperial Preference through 
the Empire Marketing Board, Zimmern supported a worldwide solution which 
required international cooperation, reflecting his preference for a League that had a 
large portfolio of interests beyond simply matters of war and peace.  
Even in matters of race-relations, where Zimmern so often hailed the British Empire 
as offering a model of political equality, he still thought the League was essential to 
the future development of the Empire/Commonwealth. He feared that the clamour for 
national independence in the colonies would all too easily break into war, as the 
British and French Empires sought to move from ”race-ascendency into a 
partnership”, a task he believed had to happen whether they wanted it or not—and 
which he deemed impossible without the umbrella of international security offered by 
the League.549  
But such claims about how much the British Empire needed the League could 
obviously suggest that the Empire itself might no longer be relevant. If the British 
Empire had helped to inspire the creation of the League of Nations in its image, but 
with a worldwide reach that allowed it to solve even those issues that were outside the 
reach of the Empire, had it not effectively set up its own superior successor and 
helped to make itself redundant? Zimmern acknowledged the issue, “If the Empire 
can only survive in and through the League, is not the League taking the place of the 
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Empire, as the Council and the Assembly and the League’s technical Committees are 
taking the place of the Imperial Conference?”550  
According to Hall: 
The general tendency in the world is toward international cooperation, and the general 
tendency of the members of the British Commonwealth will be even more toward 
increasing cooperation with each other. We are being drawn together day by day by 
the tightening bond of communication: the common factors of blood, language, and 
basic ideals may tend in the future to count for far more than in the past because of 
these developments in communication.551 
In other words, cooperating in the League ought only to strengthen the 
Commonwealth where there were more common bonds to start with. Zimmern 
likewise argued that the League served a function that helped keep the unity of the 
Commonwealth when mere statements about the bonds of the Crown might fail. 
While the interests of the Empire were better served through the League of Nations, it 
did not follow that the needs of the individual members of the Commonwealth would 
be better served by the League should the Commonwealth not exist. At the most basic 
level, the League helped promote the bonds of the Commonwealth by reminding the 
members of the Commonwealth of all they had in common: 
It does not take a very profound knowledge of psychology to realise that the British 
members of the League of Nations feel more British in Geneva than they do in 
London. The psychological effect of an Imperial Conference, where British 
delegations from five continents are, for the most part, discussing matters on which 
their local interests are divided, is necessarily quite different from that of Geneva, 
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where the British delegates are drawn naturally together in the face of foreign interests 
and, what is even more important, foreign habits of mind.552  
Zimmern thought that this reminder of the cultural bonds of the British 
Commonwealth would help its members together and increase the awareness of the 
desirability of a united front in international affairs. It was seen in Chapter 4 that in 
Zimmern’s chapter on Britain and the League of Nations in The Third British Empire, 
he spoke about the British Commonwealth as the British Entente, one among other 
regional ententes in the League 553 He made it clear that what he meant was that for 
the Commonwealth “to survive, [it] must survive as a league within the larger 
League”.554 
But not only did the League have a psychological effect, it also had the very practical 
effect of keeping the members of the Commonwealth in closer communication. 
Zimmern pointed out the value of proximity it offered, as the League Assembly met 
annually, unlike the Imperial Conferences that only met every four years, fostering 
more frequent personal contact.555 Moreover, by elevating a lot of issues up on the 
international level, where British common interests became more noticeable to the 
representatives of the Commonwealth countries, Zimmern concluded that “it must be 
said that the League helps the Empire by specialising its problems of detail and thus 
aiding towards their solution on more technical and non-controversial lines and by 
making its peoples more conscious of the larger problems on which they think and 
feel alike.”556  
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The result, according to Zimmern, was that “the League of Nations is the deus ex 
machina of the British Commonwealth”,557 as it had “been found to be a more useful 
agency, even for imperial co-operation, than [the British Empire]. The Geneva League 
of Nations has, in fact, become and indispensable part of the system of the British 
Empire”, without which the very cohesion of the Empire would be in grave trouble.558 
In 1926 he had asked, “Is this the end of the British Empire? Must we acquiesce in 
this euthanasia?” stemming from the independence of the Dominions.559 In 1928, he 
brought it up again and his answer was, “The League, in fact, presents for the Empire 
not a Euthanasia but a Koinonia”,560 using the Greek word for community. 
- Symbiosis between League and Commonwealth- 
It would be easy to conclude that Zimmern’s view of the League as an essential 
element for the survival of the Commonwealth suggested that the Commonwealth was 
no longer relevant to the League itself. Even if, as Zimmern argued, the interests of 
the members of the Commonwealth were better defended by their continued 
collaboration in the League, that would not seem to be of intrinsic value to the 
organisation of the League of Nations, raising the question of whether the 
Commonwealth was a parasite kept alive by an unwitting host. 
However, while Zimmern emphasised the dependence of the Commonwealth on the 
League of Nations, he agreed with Hall that the Commonwealth had much to offer the 
League, allowing the two organisations to develop in symbiosis, mutually supporting 
each other and serving as both accelerator and guarantor of human development and 
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civilisation. At the most basic level, the imperialist-internationalists tended to see the 
Commonwealth as the linchpin of civilization. In the words of Murray, 
European Civilization perhaps is the whole fleet that must be saved; but the British 
Commonwealth is at least one of its greatest vessels […]. If European civilization 
goes, Great Britain goes; and if on the other hand Great Britain goes, it will be very 
difficult for European civilization to survive.561  
The League of Nations therefore needed the Commonwealth to secure the continued 
existence of the basic values that supported its own creation. All the reasons that 
made the British Empire a relevant model for the creation of the League of Nations 
continued to apply. For Zimmern, the British Commonwealth was more than a 
historical model for the League; it was also a living example to the League of how to 
organise cooperation between states, as well as the basic political conditions that were 
necessary to do so, in particular the presence and promotion of political democracy: 
My only concern with it here is to bring out the vital connection between political 
democracy and the effective organization of peace. The British Commonwealth has 
made war inconceivable between its independent members without prejudice to their 
perfect freedom in every other respect. The moral and political development of the 
League of Nations can only be ensured on the same lines.562  
By demonstrating in its daily running the benefits of cooperation and peace to the 
world, and the importance of encouraging the growth of democratic independence in 
former colonies, the Commonwealth was continuing to set a model for the world. 
While acknowledging, as he had, that the Empire needed the security of universal 
peace that the League would provide, Zimmern argued that it was still the case that in 
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the case of race relations “the League for its part needs the example and the moral 
authority afforded by the Pax Britannica”, citing, as in other articles, the case of the 
negotiation of a solution to the disagreement between South Africa and India on intra-
imperial migration.563 But Zimmern’s argument went further than just race relations. 
It was, to a large degree, based on his sense of British exceptionalism as an essentially 
internationalist people. If the League was to succeed, it needed the Commonwealth: 
And the lamp-bearers, the transmitters, the human agents through whom alone these 
new institutions of  co-operation can function, where are we to look for them, or at 
least for their best exemplars, except in the country which has devised, in Dominion 
status, the world’s finest model on international co-operative institutions?564  
The British Commonwealth was a beacon in a world where it was likely that 
“economic forces compelled the world to choose between international government 
and private tyranny and no alternative system was available”. In such circumstances: 
A minority of responsible peoples, acting together in association, must preserve the 
inherited traditions of government and pass them on to the less experienced. That is the 
task of the League of Nations in the first period of its life; and that is the especial task 
of the peoples of the British Commonwealth, who bring to it their own unique 
experience of constitutional government and international co-operation.565  
It was the practical experience of making democracy work and spreading it abroad (as 
Zimmern saw it—the real history of British colonial rule is hardly as simple or rosy as 
that), which gave the British a unique perspective and experience—things that the 
League needed in order to grow from an idea into a working international body. This 
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experience and building up of best practices was in Zimmern’s view expressed not 
only in the Covenant, but also in the way that “the authorities of the League, working 
no doubt quite independently of any preconceived scheme, have developed an 
organisation corresponding very closely, mutatis mutandis, to that then recommended 
for Great Britain.”566 
The ongoing example of Britain was of value, according to Murray writing in 1929, 
not only at the level of Commonwealth (i.e. Britain and the Dominions) but also at the 
level of Empire (i.e. Britain and the Colonies), where the largest remaining Empire on 
earth held great responsibilities in terms of leading by example the way forward: 
The principle of Empire—that is, the government of alien territories or nations by a 
superior or stronger nation—fits with some difficulty into the scheme of the Covenant. 
The Mandate system imposes on Imperial Powers exactly the right degree and kind of 
control, but unfortunately it covers only a small part of the subject territories of the 
world. It shows, however, the right road, and a large part of the greatest problem of 
Great Britain’s future will be on the way to solution as soon as some British 
Government takes the bold but eminently wise step of sending the annual reports of all 
its Crown Colonies and Protectorates to the League Mandates Commission, and 
thereby establishing the Mandate principle as the only true and accepted method for 
the government of the uncivilized peoples by the civilized.567 
Murray was discussing here both his discomfort with imperialism in the sense of the 
rule of a dominant nation over another, which a page earlier he called “a shaken and 
unpopular principle”,568 as well as the potential of the British Empire to lead the way 
in strengthening the authority of the League as the natural guarantor of the 
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management of ruled peoples everywhere. At a time when he still considered the 
populations of the colonies too immature to obtain full self-government, abolishing 
the Empire in favour of benevolent international supervision seemed to Murray a 
reasonable way forward. Since the Covenant did not for obvious reasons include 
clauses forcing its founding members to convert their colonies into mandates, a 
voluntary submission to international supervision seemed a logical solution. As 
Morefield shows in Covenants without Swords, Murray and Zimmern both placed 
faith in the value of public opinion, and believed that if Britain voluntarily submitted 
to the mandate system, then the rest of the colonial powers would gradually be pushed 
by the public to follow the same course of action. 
Combining these lines of thought together, it is clear that Murray believed that the 
Commonwealth would in future continue to develop as a kind of torchbearer for the 
League, showing by its own internal dynamics the way forward for further 
international cooperation. Britain, by handing over control of the Empire to the 
League, would give up imperialism in favour of internationalism. The British Empire 
would essentially, and to Murray rightfully, be gone, and British Commonwealth and 
the League of Nations rise in its place as a more democratic and more moral way to 
secure international cooperation. 
6.3 Conclusions 
Neither the League of Nations nor the organisation of the new British Commonwealth 
was a finished deal after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1919 and the 
subsequent creation of the League of Nations. The following decade presented both 
organisations with the challenges of new claims and adjustments. The League and the 
Commonwealth in the eyes of the imperialist-internationalists existed in a kind of 
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symbiosis. The League could not survive without the support of the British Empire 
and Commonwealth, while they in turn were equally dependent on the League of 
Nations for securing the international stability needed to facilitate the continued 
development of the Commonwealth out of Empire. Without world peace, Zimmern, 
Murray, and Hall all agreed, the Empire would sooner or later face a war that would 
break the bonds of unity, whether based on interests of geography, race, or religion. 
Furthermore, meeting on a regular basis in Geneva to debate topics of international 
importance served to remind the delegations from different parts of the 
Commonwealth of how much they had in common compared with the rest of the 
world. Without the League, they believed, the Empire and Commonwealth would 
soon disintegrate through the forces of distance and self-interest. 
All the same, Zimmern, Murray, and Hall also agreed that the League of Nations 
needed not only the support of the British Empire and Commonwealth, but also the 
moral compass of ‘British’ ideas that continued to be developed within the framework 
of the Commonwealth. Seeing the Commonwealth as a “league within the League” 
fostered the idea of the Commonwealth as an ongoing experiment in international 
collaboration and governance that would continue to offer new results and best 
practices that could be shared with the greater League to the benefit of all. In 
Zimmern and Murray’s hope of careful tutelage of the colonies into independent 
members of the League of Nations, and Murray’s idea of the Empire voluntarily 
handing over the right of supervision of the colonies, they all saw a future in which 
the League had superseded the Empire while the Commonwealth remained as its fully 
democratic heir.  
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7: From Empire/Commonwealth to League of Nations, and so what? 
This thesis has argued there was in the interwar period a loosely defined group of 
political thinkers, here named the imperialist-internationalists, who were not linked by 
a formal organization, but who knew each other and worked towards the change from 
Empire to Commonwealth and the creation of the League of Nations. The question 
perhaps remains whether these debates and ideas are purely of historical interest or 
also have a more contemporary resonance.  
I believe there are three main conclusions that can be drawn about the significance of 
the imperialist-internationalists, some of which hint at the potential value of their 
ideas for a contemporary age.  In the first place, this thesis argues that E.H. Carr’s 
rejection of the interwar thinkers, whom he dismissed as “utopians”, showed a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the approach they were trying to take; rather than 
utopians, the imperialist-internationalists were idealists who sought to base their 
proposals on the realities and power structures they saw in the world around them. 
They believed in what Karl Popper in his famous 1945 book The Open Society and its 
Enemies called “piecemeal social engineering” instead of holistic solve-all-problems 
schemes. Their plans for securing peace and collaboration through the League of 
Nations were not a blueprint for a flawless and well-oiled sort of international 
organization the like of which the world had never seen before. Rather, they wished 
the League to copy what they saw as the already existing, somewhat clunky but 
overall efficient, machinery of the British Empire. There might still be ground for a 
fruitful political analysis of which, if any, parts of the old British imperial machinery 
of cooperation really worked and whether any useful lessons for modern international 
cooperation might be found. In the second place, the thesis has shown how they 
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sought to identify ways of reconciling the ideal of internationalism with the continued 
existence of fully independent states to allow for a framework for international 
cooperation in a post-imperial world—a dilemma that has been central to much 
subsequent reflection about international politics in the 20th and 21st centuries.  
Thirdly, and finally, the thesis has shown how they represented a Hegelian inspired 
approach to internationalism, in which imperialism provided a constructive 
foundation for a new form of true internationalism grounded in an understanding of 
historical change.  This challenged both utopian internationalism that failed to engage 
with the tension between the principles of national sovereignty and internationalism, 
and radical socialist internationalism rooted in the idea that the disappearance of 
international conflicts depended on domestic revolutions within the major countries of 
the world. 
Essential to all these main conclusions is the assumption that the imperialist-
internationalists actually existed as a group, and they did, though they never defined 
themselves as such. The defining features of the group was their shared belief that: 1) 
the British Empire had become or was becoming a new and historically unique type of 
institution better named the British Commonwealth, whose members of their own free 
will collaborated for the common good; 2) there was a need for the League of 
Nations; 3) the League of Nations ought to copy the practices of the British 
Empire/Commonwealth, which was the only appropriate model for a world scale 
international organisation designed to secure international peace; 4) The League of 
Nations would not make the British Commonwealth superfluous. The core 
representatives of this group discussed in this thesis—Zimmern, Murray, Hall, and 
Smuts—were all committed to these ideas and shared the notion that the English, or 
British, character was uniquely open-minded and unbiased, and that British identity 
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was exceptional by dint of having transcended the baser principles of nationalism to 
become (or at least be in the process of becoming) thoroughly international. 
Smuts promoted this idea both in his speech from May 1917, analysed in Chapters 4 
and 5, where he argued that the exceptional features of the British Empire had 
allowed it to develop into an unprecedented form of international community, as well 
as his open letter on the resignation of General Beyer, discussed in Chapter 4, when 
he referred to South Africa having been given full freedom to realise its own national 
ideals under the auspices of the British Empire only a few years after it was 
conquered. In both cases, Smuts indirectly referred to the Roman Empire, and its 
spread of peace and the rule of law, while indicating that the British had surpassed it. 
Hall considered the British system to be particularly favourable to the development 
and spread of new ideas (see Chapter 4) and thought that the British had a “greater 
capacity … for international co-operation” (Chapter 5). Zimmern, though wary of an 
English bias and a wish to impose Englishness and Shakespeare upon the world, all 
the same characterised the British national outlook as essentially international 
(Chapter 4), and believed that the English character was exceptional both for its sense 
of justice and government (Chapter 5). It was in this respect an ingrained aspect of 
their internationalism that all three men expected the process to be British in 
character, and inevitable that they used the British Empire as a model both 
ideologically and practically for their proposals for the League.  
As shown in the introduction, modern scholars directly or indirectly associate most of 
the imperialist-internationalists with the utopians attacked by Carr in his seminal work 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. It is indeed this association that appears to have 
limited the amount and quality of the scholarship on people like Murray and 
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Zimmern. Yet Carr’s description of the League of Nations’ project as utopian was 
misleading even according to his own definition of utopianism (which assumed that 
utopianism focused only on ideas without serious consideration of an analysis of 
historical and material conditions). The imperialist-internationalists used what they 
saw as a transformed Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations, as a model for 
the British proposal for the League of Nations Covenant (as analysed in Chapter 5). 
Smuts, Zimmern, and Robert Cecil were deeply involved both in preparing the British 
proposal and, with the exception of Zimmern, negotiating the British point of view at 
the Peace Conference. Murray and Hall both publicly expressed ideas and suggestions 
about the formation of the League. All of them believed that the historical experience 
of the British Empire—and particularly the way it had changed over time—could 
serve as a practical model for the machinery of League and as a model for values and 
character. Even if they were deeply unrealistic about how the experiences of the 
British Empire might help to shape an international organisation intended to represent 
the whole world, they were not utopians by Carr’s own definition of the term. Not 
only did Carr himself use the Commonwealth as a relevant model of international 
cooperation; it has also been shown throughout the thesis that the imperialist-
internationalists believed that it was precisely the real historical experience of the 
British Empire-Commonwealth that made it a model for the League of Nations. 
Rather than utopians then, they were idealists who sought to put their ideals into 
practice by adopting and adapting a model already in place in the expectation of a 
viable result. 
Looking back at the ideas of the imperialist-internationalist one hundred years later, it 
is easy to conclude that they were in many respects quite naïve. Hall, in a 
retrospective letter to an old colleague, Richard Casey, written in April 1963, 
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acknowledged that the ideas they had held for the Commonwealth in the nineteen-
twenties were unrealistic,569 and that the hope of convincing the world to model 
international cooperation on a British perception of the experience of the British 
Empire was overly optimistic. However, even though they were naïve, it is worth 
recognising how the imperialist-internationalists sought to combine a traditional line 
of political philosophy with their interpretation of recent international experience, in 
order to help create a global international forum to secure peace in the world in the 
future. From the outbreak of World War I, they had seen modern warfare as an 
existential threat to democracy and western civilisation, and responded by trying to 
identify the conditions that would prevent any further decent into barbarism. While 
the League of Nations clearly failed to prevent World War II, the United Nations was 
created in its place, which in spite of its own challenges survives to this day. So does 
the Commonwealth, and though there are probably few who can clearly define what 
the Commonwealth actually does, few countries are keen to leave it, while several 
others have joined or re-joined. It seems that it is for many countries an affiliation of 
some value. The imperialist-internationalists were thus not simple utopians, but rather 
idealist-realists, who failed to fully appreciate the complexity and speed of 
development. 
A fundamental issue in international relations from the late nineteenth century 
onwards has been to find a suitable framework for handling internationalism and 
international cooperation in a world of nation states, an issue that became increasingly 
relevant from the early twentieth century and the end of World War I as the empires 
began to fall. As demonstrated throughout Chapter 2, empires were the default model 
                                                             
569 Hall Papers, National Library of Australia, Canberra, 5047, Box 23: ’”Genesis of the Balfour 
Declaration:” Reprint lists, correspondence etc.’: Letter from Hall to Casey, 23 April 1963.  
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of international “cooperation” until the late nineteenth century, since no other 
framework really existed for making individual nations collaborate beyond vague 
treaties and occasional ideological or religious affinity. Even the claims to power of 
the Roman Church in the middle ages were framed within the discourse of “empire”. 
The demise of empires created a vacuum and a never-ending debate about how to 
create a new framework of cooperation and even a degree of global governance. In 
that context, the problems that the imperialist-internationalists grappled with remain 
relevant today: How can a large group of independent states cooperate in a manner to 
secure peace and improve life for the people who live within them while at the same 
time remaining fully independent? And how can they simultaneously provide for 
collaboration on a large range of scientific and cultural issues, promote economic 
collaboration between the constituent parts, and permit free movement of labour, 
while still respecting the differences in culture and interests between the various 
individual states? 
The solutions the imperialist-internationalists offered reflected their own experience 
as members of the British Empire who lived through the Great War, just as answers 
from later periods have similarly been the product of a specific set of historical 
circumstances. Nevertheless, at the core of all these ideas lies two areas of 
commonality. The first is the belief that some fundamental ideas are constructive for 
international collaboration regardless of historical context, such as the idea that a 
habit of international cooperation in everyday areas makes cooperation more likely on 
matters of peace and war. That idea was supported by Hall, Zimmern, and Cecil, and 
is a core value of the UN and the European Union. The second big area of 
commonality is the idea that peace is best secured by taking a realistic look at the 
actual conditions of the world, finding the areas where international cooperation will 
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give the most obvious benefits to the parties involved. This idea is clearly anchored in 
the historical context of any given period, as no period will offer the exact same 
conditions and areas for cooperation. In this context, then, the imperialist-
internationalists provide an important contribution to the debate on internationalism in 
a post-imperial world. 
The imperialist-internationalists were, ideologically speaking, first and foremost 
internationalists, but they subscribed to an understanding of internationalism as 
something born out of imperialism. Their view of history was basically Hegelian, as 
of course was that of the Marxists, but whereas the later considered history a 
predetermined succession of discontinuous epochs, the imperialist-internationalists, 
with their common early introduction to historicism as interpreted by T.H. Green at 
Oxford (Chapter 3), believed in a history that organically unfolded to reveal its 
character. Such a view is more associated with the Whig interpretation of history that 
looked askance at such ruptures as the American Revolution of the 18th century. It 
was seen in chapters 4-6 that the imperialist-internationalists saw the dual processes 
of the development of Empire into Commonwealth and the recognition of the Empire 
as a model for the creation of the League of Nations as natural progressions that 
flowed from the changing nature of the British Empire itself. While the outbreak of 
World War I was seen by Smuts and Murray as an existential danger to European 
civilization as well as the British Empire (chapter 4), both they and Zimmern 
concluded that it could still provide the conditions for an organic and non-
revolutionary development of civilization into a more peaceful world subject to the 
rule of law. They continued to develop their ideas and activities throughout the War 
and afterwards, both in their efforts to change the Empire into a more democratic 
Commonwealth, and after the Armistice for the creation of the League of Nations 
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(Chapter 5). This meant, that from their perspective, the principles of New Diplomacy 
had already but put into action and tested in intra-imperial relations before the war, 
with the Imperial Conferences as key examples of it. But with their belief in organic 
growth, accepting New Diplomacy did not imply that they had to reject all aspects of 
Old Diplomacy, rather is suggested that the best aspects of Old Diplomacy should be 
kept and used along with the new framework for international relations. 
As a group, the imperialist-internationalists belonged to the long tradition of seeing 
empires as a form of international organisation (as described in Chapter 2). As 
demonstrated in Zimmern’s Greek Commonwealth, and much of Murray’s work, the 
Oxford classicists were inspired by a Hellenism that reflected the Liberal 
interpretation of Greek history presented by Grote with the support of the Mill 
(chapter 3). Like Adam Smith, they considered the relationship between the Greek 
mother cities and colonies a relevant model for the British Empire, and agreed with 
Grote that the Athenian Empire, while not perfect, had brought prosperity, protection, 
and the ideals of democracy to the minor members of the Delian League. However, 
for all of them, the Roman Empire with its emphasis on imperial peace and an 
imperial citizenship that could be extended to all parts of the Empire was a model that 
had set the standard for the British Empire, with its own Pax Britannica and 
supranational understanding of British nationality. Just as Polybius claimed that the 
foundation for the might of Rome was partly its willingness to copy the best practices 
of the Greeks, so Hall in particular argued that the British Commonwealth was an 
ideal framework for the spread of new ideas (Chapter 4). With their Hegelian 
historicism, the imperialist-internationalists saw the British Empire as a natural 
successor to both Athens and Rome, implicitly adopting the medieval concept of 
translatio imperii by passing the legitimacy of empire on to Britain. 
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It was crucially not the idea of a Christian empire that was passed on, but rather the 
secular empire defended by Marsilius in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries (Chapter 2), something visible in The Idea of the League of Nations, co-
authored by Zimmern and Murray, which rejected the exclusive nature of the 
Christian and Islamic Empires (Chapter 5).  It was indeed a theme visible throughout 
Zimmern’s work, with his consistent focus on the need for equal political rights 
regardless of geography, religion or race (chapters 4-6). Both Zimmern and Hall show 
some affinity to the ideal of Marsilius’ bureaucratic empire, in which the prince 
should rely on experts (Chapter 2), with their view that a wide body of expert 
collaboration was needed to secure the best development of both 
Empire/Commonwealth and League of Nations (chapters 4 and 5).  
However, in spite of all the points on which the imperialist-internationalists could 
agree with the tradition of empire, like many modern political thinkers they shared an 
unease with the concept of Empire per se. The aspects of international cooperation 
such as “the ease and security of travel and traffic” mentioned by Penn, or “a common 
bound of laws and government” described by Rousseau (chapter 2), were very 
palatable to them.  But Murray, Hall, and Zimmern all strongly objected to the 
subjection of foreign races. The imperialist-internationalists agreed with Thucydides 
and Herodotus that the value of the might of the hegemon was to “do kindness to 
others” (Pericles’ Funeral Oration, in chapter 2) and to act as protector keeping the 
world in perpetual peace as argued by Virgil and Livy (Chapter 2). It was, in other 
words, the internationalist rather than the imperialist part of the tradition to which the 
imperialist-internationalists adhered most strongly. They believed that, at least as 
regards the relations between Britain and the Dominions, the British Empire of their 
own day had become a new form of international organisation requiring a new name.  
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It was for this reason that the imperialist-internationalists rejected the name of 
“Empire” for what Hall and Zimmern called the third stage of the British Empire, 
instead promoting the term “the British Commonwealth of Nations” as the new de 
facto name for Britain and the Dominions, and in the long run as the new name of the 
entire organisation (Chapter 4). It is worth recognising that even though the new name 
took decades to become prevalent, they were ultimately successful in their push for 
the change. Smuts directly, and Hall indirectly, were also part of the debates that took 
place at the Imperial Conferences from 1921-1926, which culminated in the official 
adoption of the name “British Commonwealth of Nations”, and the principles of full 
autonomy, equality and cooperation in the Balfour Declaration of 1926 (Chapter 6). 
While the imperialist-internationalists all admitted that there were no strong legal 
bonds tying together the Commonwealth, and Zimmern specifically acknowledged 
that it was in principle drifting apart (Chapter 6), they all argued that the benefits of 
cooperation were such that no member would voluntarily chose to leave (Chapters 4 
and 6). Rousseau had made exactly the same point 150 years earlier when discussing 
the Holy Roman Empire (Chapter 2). 
Considering that the imperialist-internationalists believed in an internationalism that 
was British in character, it was a given that they would consider the British 
Commonwealth an essential part of the League of Nations, since without it the League 
would have neither the legitimacy nor the moral wisdom to set the path ahead. It was 
seen in Chapter 6 that a series of Imperial Conferences in the 1920s sought to clarify 
the position of the Dominions relative to Britain and their place in international 
society. The uncertainty that this revealed about the future led Zimmern, Murray and 
Hall to argue that the Commonwealth depended on the League of Nations for its 
continued existence, not least because it needed “peace everywhere and all the time”. 
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However, with their belief in British exceptionalism, it appeared consistent to them to 
argue that conversely the League was equally dependent on the Commonwealth to 
show the road to further development as a spearhead of civilised internationalism. 
Thus, while the League was the Deus ex Machina that provided a framework in which 
the Commonwealth could continue to flourish, the Commonwealth was expected to be 
the eternal developing model for the League of Nations. 
This imagined future of perpetual co-dependence of Commonwealth and League 
reflects the attempt of the imperialist-internationalists to reconcile the fact that they 
had reached two distinct endpoints which might seem to conflict with each other. 
From their Hegelian/Greenist perspective of history, there were two potential organic 
developments in the chain of history that led from the various imperfect forms of 
empire, involving some half-revealed ideas of universality and internationalism, and 
on to the emergence of a British Empire that was now itself transforming into 
something new. One was from Empire into Commonwealth and the other was from 
Empire into League of Nations. Chapter six showed how Zimmern and Murray both, 
at least at a subconscious level, seem to have realised that the development of the 
League could actually remove the need for the Commonwealth as an intellectual 
successor to the Empire—but neither of them was fully willing to concede that the 
Commonwealth was growing obsolete. That the League was necessary was from their 
perspective unquestionable, but that the Commonwealth should be sacrificed was 
fundamentally unimaginable, although they were perfectly capable of formulating all 
the reasons why it was already dissolving. The only way to solve this core problem of 
the two separate endpoints in a satisfactory manner was by showing that both 
remained essential to the existence of the other. They were bound to struggle to find 
an elegant and satisfactory way of achieving this. 
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It is this progression from imperialism to internationalism that demonstrates the core 
idea of the imperialist-internationalists: that imperialism with all its flaws was a 
legitimate precursor to a true internationalism. While the Marxists proclaimed the 
virtues of a Socialist Internationalism rooted in revolutionary change, the imperialist-
internationalists promoted a liberal internationalism based on progress and continuity, 
where the excesses and cruelty of the empires (which in spite of their often rose-tinted 
glasses they knew existed) could be shed off as a remnant of a less enlightened past. 
The experience of Empire provided lessons in understanding how international 
cooperation and a sense of being part of a greater international community could be 
reconciled with remaining a proud member of one’s own nation. The development 
from Empire to League of Nations was a natural process in which the empires of the 
past were left behind while their positive aspects endured. 
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APPENDICES:  
A: Table of Names of Empire in Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations (1920) 
 
 














These quotations [one by Gen. Smuts, another by Lord Milner] –the first taken from a 
speech of the man who was chiefly responsible for the scotching of the Imperial 
Federation movement in England during the War, and the second from a speech of a 
lifelong advocate of Imperial Federation –sum up aptly the new ideas as to the nature 
and purpose of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and indicate the kind of  
constitutional reconstruction which the special post-war Imperial Conference, 
provided for in the Constitutional Resolution of 1917, will be called upon to make. 
This Conference will meet probably in 1921. If we may judge from the opinions 
expressed freely in 1917 and in the Dominion Treaty Debates in 1919-20 it is likely to 
be wider than a mere Conference of Cabinets, being attended not only by ministers 
but also by the leaders of the opposition parties. 
As indicated in the 1917 Resolution the work of the Special Conference will be 
threefold. (a) It will consider the view expressed in that Resolution that the principles 
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upon which the future government of the Empire should be based are: (1) the equal 
and autonomous nationhood of each self-governing State of the Group, and (2) co-
operation by means of continuous consultation followed by “such necessary concerted 
action, founded on consultation, as the several governments may determine.” (b) 
Having accepted these principles it will take the necessary measures to free the 
Dominions from the last remaining marks of the old dependency –thus realizing the 
ideal of complete equality of nationhood. (c) It will then plan and construct the 
machinery of government required by the British Group for effective co-operation in 
common concerns. 
[…] 
In the last three years the problems raised by the 1917 Resolution have been discussed 
in all parts of the Empire. They have been the subject of numerous speeches by 
eminent statesmen, especially Sir Robert Borden and General Smuts. What is even 
more important, they have been the subject of intimate and private discussions 
between British and Dominion statesmen during the many months of the last two 
years in which these statesmen have been thrown together in London and in Paris. It is 
fairly evident that out of the discussions of the Peace Conference period, a more 
definite conception, not merely of the basic principles, but also of the general 
organization of the British Group in the future, has begun to emerge. This conception 
is that of the British Empire as a Group of States which constitutionally are absolutely 
free and equal, and which co-operate by means of continuous consultation followed 
by concerted group-action taken in the name of the common Crown. Out of this 
conception sprang the carefully thought-out procedure which was adopted with regard 
to the appointment of Dominion plenipotentiaries and the signing and ratification of 
the Peace treaty by the Dominions. 
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